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PRAGMATIC ROOTS FOR CHRISTIAN EDUCATION

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PREFACE

At a time when religious education is fraught with the divisive implications of the "authoritarian approach" in education versus the "free" methodology, it seems imperative that a careful and fresh study of the roots of method be attempted. It is this that I have attempted. The pages that follow represent a study which is concerned with the philosophy of Christian education. It does not intend to overlook the techniques for accomplishment of a methodology, but it attempts to clarify a basic philosophy with the firm conviction that any method is determined by the philosophy which underlies it and gives it direction.

A certain bias must be admitted at the outset. As one who for ten years has been actively engaged in the task of Christian education in the local church, there are naturally certain convictions concerning effective approaches to the Christian educational process. I confess these convictions; I do not apologize for their presence. Sad would be the commentary, indeed, if after ten years there were no more convictions present than when I began. However, I have consistently attempted to recognize the pitfall of dogmatism and in all of this study to retain the qualities of evaluation and creative new direction. My convictions favor the experimental methodology, or the free approach, but at a

PREFACE

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time when the authoritarian methods of transmitting the Christian faith are in vogue, the convictions of any one lie vulnerable to this respectable attack.

In fact, it is the earnestness of the attack that has provoked this study. Not only have church school curricula been formulated recently which expressly state as their purpose "teaching the Christian faith", but similar pressure is being felt in the area of secular education. Committees of parents in numerous communities throughout our land are recommending that schools and teachers give primary attention to the transmission of the three R's and desert the emphasis upon education-for-life. Not long ago, some members of the United States Senate stated publicly that it was regrettable that such a place as Burlington, Vermont ever existed since it had produced the influential perverter of American public education, John Dewey.

The concern here is with Christian education rather than secular. My purpose is to look, as critically as possible, at the philosophy of pragmatism to see if its purpose, structure, and nature can be of any help in the process of religious education. For purposes of this study we shall deal only with the work of Charles Sanders Peirce, the founder of American pragmatism. This is not to ignore the work of William James and John Dewey because of indifference or lack of respect for their unrivaled contributions in the areas of

philosophy and education. Two reasons have prompted the limiting of this study to Peirce. First, both James and Dewey acknowledge Peirce as the founder of the pragmatic method; therefore, it seems of utmost importance to look at the original ideas underlying the pragmatic system of philosophy. Secondly, there are studies already in print, which I highly respect, that deal with the implications of John Dewey's thought for Christian education[1] and with the religious philosophy of William James.[2] Further, it is believed that a critical study of the principles which Peirce propounded will both shed light and bring judgment upon the educational methods used in contemporary religion and may even point to new directions worthy of our consideration.

Acknowledgment of help that I have received in preparing this manuscript will be woefully inadequate. The conversations which I have had with fellow-students as well as the courses from professors in the Pacific School of Religion at Berkeley, California have contributed much to my thinking. I cannot help but mention Dr. Wayne R. Rood and Dr. Hugh Vernon White who have read the manuscript throughout its preparation and have made valuable suggestions.

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[1] Manford George Gutzke, John Dewey's Thought and Its Implications for Christian Education. Columbia University, New York: King's Crown Press, 1956.

[2] Julius Seelye Bixler, Religion in the Philosophy of William James. Boston: Marshall Jones Company, 1926.

Appreciation is due, also, to Dr. J. Stillson Judah, librarian of Pacific School of Religion, whose cheerful and willing cooperation provided the valuable source-materials for the study. The understanding of the members and staff of University Christian Church at Berkeley, California, with whom I labored while the manuscript was in process, also made possible its completion.

To my wife is due an inexpressible credit. Her interest in this problem, her patient support in my lengthy program of study and research, her intelligent discernment of the matter under discussion, her constant encouragement together with her confidence of the significance of the work have made this treatise a reality. In addition to this, she has typed the entire manuscript, a contribution that cannot be overestimated.

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PART I

INTRODUCTION

Pragmatism, as a philosophical system, has come to be identified as so much a phenomenon of America that the term "American Pragmatism" is commonly used. Although Charles Sanders Peirce acknowledges the stimulation provided by his immersion in the German philosophical school, particularly Kant and Hegel, and to a lesser degree the English philosophical school led by John Stuart Mill, his work is predominantly a product of America. That pragmatism is purely American is generally accepted, but it is only recently that the prolific writing of Dr. Peirce has been uncovered. For the extraction and careful compilation of his extensive writings we are indebted to the accurate work of Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss.[1] Also, the brilliant work of Justus Buchler of Columbia University has been of inestimable value in both illuminating the principles of pragmatism and preserving selected important writings. Buchler has produced two works. The first,

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[1] The *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce* are in six volumes edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. The work was published by Harvard University Press, 1931-1935 and bears these titles: I, *Principles of Philosophy*; II, *Elements of Logic*; III, *Exact Logic*; IV, *The Simplest Mathematics*; V, *Pragmatism and Pragmaticism*; and VI, *Scientific Metaphysics*. Citations throughout this treatise will be by volume number and page number. If a paper by Peirce is cited simply as appearing in an independent source of publication, this means it has not been reprinted in the *Collected Papers*.

published in 1939, is interpretative in nature and is called Charles Peirce's Empiricism. The second, first published a year later, is a collection of selected writings from Peirce and is entitled The Philosophy of Peirce.

In the pages that follow the basic structure of Peirceian pragmatism is described. In Part II attempt is made to apply these basic principles to contemporaty religious education. The attempt is not by the usual method of bifurcated application of one thing to another but rather by stating in similar language the principles of religious educational philosophy as viewed from the pragmatic standpoint.

The best known statement of pragmatism is given here despite the fact that it will be the recurring theme in Part I of this treatise. It is the most quoted maxim of pragmatism and is given here to shed light on the general theme of this study:[1]

> Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of those effects is the whole of our conception of the object.[2]

In the second 1905 article for the Monist, Dr. Peirce restates this maxim and hastens to say:

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[1] Throughout the writings of Peirce much use is made of foreign words and expressions as well as italicized words to indicate emphasis. Therefore, all underlined words in this treatise belong directly to the primary source materials and none are to be attributed to the writer of this treatise.

[2] Vol. V, p. 258.

> I will restate this in other words, since ofttimes one can thus eliminate some unexpected source of perplexity to the reader. This time it shall be in the indicative mood, as follows: The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all general modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol.[1]

By this time the author was careful to use the term pragmaticism as distinguished from pragmatism. The reason for this change in terms is given by Peirce in these words:

> According to that logical doctrine which the present writer first formulated in 1873 and named Pragmatism, the true meaning of any product of the intellect lies in whatever unitary determination it would impart to practical conduct under any and every conceivably circumstance, supposing such conduct to be guided by reflexion carried to an ultimate limit. It appears to have been virtually the philosophy of Socrates. But although it is 'an old way of thinking', in the sense that it was practised by Spinoza, Berkeley, and Kant, I am not aware of its having been definitely formulated, whether as a maxim of logical analysis or otherwise, by anybody before my publication of it in 1878. Naturally, nobody ever heard of pragmatism. People don't care for methods! They want results. Give them all the diamonds you make, and you may have the method of making them for your own. So it was not until 1898 - Professor James took hold of the old thing, dignified it by calling it by its name in print (which I had never done even when I was in charge of the philosophical part of the *Century Dictionary*), furbished it up, and turned it into a philosophical doctrine - that it had any vogue at all. It did not, however, shine with its present effulgence until Professor Papini made the discovery that it cannot be defined - a circumstance which, I believe, distinguishes it from all other doctrines, of whatsoever natures they may be, that were ever promulgated. Thereupon I thought it high time to give my method a less distinguished designation; and I rechristened it *pragmaticism*.[2]

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[1] Vol. V, p. 293.

[2] Vol. VI, p. 335.

Two years prior to the restatement of the pragmatic maxim in 1905, Peirce defended the first statement of it thus:

> Note that in these three lines one finds, "conceivably", "conceive", "conception", "conception", "conception". Now I find there are many people who detect the authorship of my unsigned creeds; and I doubt not that one of the marks of my style by which they do so is my inordinate reluctance to repeat a word. This employment five times over of derivates of *concipere* must then have had a purpose. In point of fact it had two. One was to show that I was speaking of meaning in no other sense than of *intellectual purport*. The other was to avoid all danger of being understood as attempting to explain a concept by percepts, images, schemata, or by anything but concepts.[1]

Likewise, the religious education movement is an American phenomenon. Rooted in the first decade of the present century it began to flower in the 1920's and has reached that stage of full-bloom in our day in which the outer leaves are securely anchored to the stem having withstood the sun of fundamentalism and the winds of neo-orthodoxy.

Just as Peircian pragmatism credits German and English philosophy with its motivation, so the modern religious education movement gives credit to educators on the continent of Europe who provided the foundations for progressive education in America. The names of Pestalozzi, Herbart, and Froebel tower above all the others in this connection. However, the momentum and development of the religious education

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[1] Vol. V, p. 259.

movement as we know it occurred in America and can accurately be called an American phenomenon.

There is a final reason for this treatise. Charles Sanders Peirce was a confessed Christian. That pragmatism, as a philosophical system, has achieved world renown is widely accepted. However, the Christian foundation upon which it is built is not so commonly known nor so widely accepted. A close look at Peirce's pragmatic philosophy discloses his own Christian convictions and religious faith. In one place he boldly avows that pragmatism is "only an application of the sole principle of logic which was recommended by Jesus: 'Ye may know them by their fruits', and is very intimately allied with the ideas of the gospel."[1]

In more philosophical language Peirce also declares the relevance of pragmaticism to metaphysical matters as well as to Christianity. In this connection he says:

> Pragmaticism, then, is a theory of logical analysis, or true definition; and its merits are greatest in its application to the highest metaphysical conceptions. At the same time, these merits can only be appreciated as the result of long training.[2]

A clarification of the two terms, pragmatism and pragmaticism, must be made here. Throughout all the writings of Dr. Peirce, even his later works, he uses these two words synonymously. For a chronological account of the origin and use of the two

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[1] Vol. V, p. 258.

[2] Vol. VI, p. 335.

words we quote here from Dr. Peirce in order that any resulting confusion to the reader may be as minimal as possible:

> In 1871, in a Metaphysical Club in Cambridge, Massachusetts, I used to preach this principle as a sort of logical gospel, representing the unformulated method followed by Berkeley, and in conversation about it I called it 'Pragmatism'. In December (November) 1877 and January 1878 I set forth the doctrine in the Popular Science Monthly; and the two parts of my essay were printed in French in the Revue Philosophique, volumes vi and vii. Of course, the doctrine attracted no particular attention, for, as I had remarked in my opening sentence, very few people care for logic. But in 1897 Professor James remodelled the matter, and transmogrified it into a doctrine of philosophy, some parts of which I highly approved while other and more prominent parts I regarded, and still regard, as opposed to sound logic. About the time Professor Papini discovered, to the delight of the Pragmatist school, that this doctrine was incapable of definition, which would certainly seem to distinguish it from every other doctrine in whatever branch of science, I was coming to the conclusion that my poor little maxim should be called by another name; and accordingly, in April, 1905 I renamed it Pragmaticism. I had never before dignified it by any name in print, except that, at Professor Baldwin's request, I wrote a definition of it for his Dictionary of Psychology and Philosophy. I did not insert the word in the Century Dictionary, though I had charge of the philosophical definitions of that work; for I have a perhaps exaggerated dislike of reclame.[1]

There is valid justification, then, for using the two terms, pragmatism and pragmaticism, synonymously in this study of Peirce. It is especially valid when regarding his writings produced before 1905. However, for purposes of clarity every effort will be made to identify the work of Peirce by using the term, pragmaticism, refined by Peirce. When the term

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[1] Vol. VI, pp. 328, 329.

pragmatism appears herein, the reader is asked to remember that it is Peircian pragmatism and to strip his mind of pragmatic conceptions arising from any knowledge of the philosophies of William James and John Dewey.

A study of this kind is enhanced by some understanding of the life of the man who provides our primary source-material. There can be no doubt that Charles Sanders Peirce was eccentric. William James wrote that Peirce was always a "queer creature" who became increasingly eccentric as he grew older. James also called Peirce "the most original thinker of his generation".[1]

According to data provided by Kunitz and Haycraft in A Biographical Dictionary, Peirce suffered for years from cancer but continued his unwarying labors. This source describes Peirce as:

> . . . a dark little bearded man, like a gnome, with burning dark eyes, half crazy from pain and the morphia taken to deaden it, living in the midst of an inextricable tangle of manuscripts, neglected, destitute, forgotten; but 'the most original thinker of his generation'.[2]

Although eccentricity is often regarded as a concomitant characteristic of genius, Peirce is not dependent upon his eccentricity to qualify as genius. He was an able chemist at the age of eight, and a brilliant mathematician at ten.

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[1] Stanley J. Kunitz and Howard Haycraft, American Authors 1600-1900. A Biographical Dictionary of American Literature. (New York: The H. W. Wilson Company, 1938.) p. 609.

[2] Ibid.

No doubt the environment of his home worked the realization of these abilities which he natively possessed. He was born September 10, 1839 in Cambridge, Massachusetts, the son of Benjamin Peirce, the foremost mathematician of his time in America, and Sarah Hunt Mills Peirce, the daughter of a senator. Peirce, himself, said he "grew up in a laboratory", and later wrote this of the influences surrounding his early life:

> I was born and reared in the neighborhood of Concord - I mean in Cambridge - at the time when Emerson, Hedge, and their friends were disseminating the ideas that they had caught from Schelling, and Schelling from Plotinus, from Boehm, or from God knows what minds stricken with the monstrous mysticism of the East. But the atmosphere of Cambridge held many an antiseptic against Concord transcendentalism; and I am not conscious of having contracted any of that virus. Nevertheless, it is probable that some cultured bacilli, some benignant form of the disease was implanted in my soul, unawares, and that now, after long incubation, it comes to the surface, modified by mathematical conceptions and by training in physical investigations.[1]

That Peirce early rebelled at conventional education is evidenced by the fact that when he received his B. A. degree from Harvard in 1859 he was among the lowest in his class. However, both his M. A., received in 1862, and his Sc. B. in 1863, degrees were awarded for brilliant work.

Peirce was early attracted to philosophy and lectured on the subject at Harvard in 1864 and 1865 and again in 1869 and 1870. But he saw no means of livelihood in the field of

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[1] Vol. VI, pp. 86, 87.

philosophy and in 1861 joined the United States Coast Survey. For thirty years from this date philosophy was merely his avocation. From 1869 to 1875 he was an assistant at the Harvard Observatory, working in photometry. In 1875 he was the first American delegate to the International Geodetic Conference. At various times he was in charge of weights and measurements for the Coast Survey and special assistant in gravity research. He was the first to use the wave-length of a light-ray as a standard unit of measurement.

The important place which Peirce occupies in American thought lies in pioneer philosophical studies and writing. That he is regarded as the real father of American pragmatism is evidenced by the following statement from A Biographical Dictionary:

> His real life-work, however, was in logic. He taught seldom; except for the Harvard lectures already noted, and the Lowell Institute lectures in 1903 and 1904, his only formal teaching was at Johns Hopkins from 1879 to 1884 (in 1883 he edited the Hopkins Studies in Logic) and a course at Bryn Mawr during the same period. But from 1867 to 1885 he contributed hundreds of important technical papers to the professional journals. He was the real father of pragmatism, the empiricist philosophy; though the later pragmatism of his friend, William James so widely differed from his original theory promulgated in 1878 that he changed the name of his own system to "pragmaticism".[1]

Although Peirce's formal connection with the Coast Survey did not end until 1891, he retired in 1887 to Milford, Pennsylvania and ceased receiving any income from the govern-

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[1] Kunitz and Haycraft, op. cit., pp. 608, 609.

ment. He was one of the editors of the Century Dictionary, 1889-91, and of Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, 1901-05. A man of extreme versatility of learning, he wrote articles and reviews, chiefly for the Nation and the Monist, on subjects as disparate as Egyptology, Criminology, philology, and psychology. But he was totally without money sense, utterly unable to manage his practical affairs, and his last years were spent in extreme poverty. He had had domestic difficulties as well; in 1862 he had married Harriet Melusina Fay, a social reformer, his senior in age, whom he divorced in 1883. When he died on April 19, 1914, he was survived by a Frenchwoman, Juliette Froissy, who he claimed as a wife, although no evidence of this marriage can be found. It was from her that Harvard University bought his mass of manuscripts and notes after his death.

Kunitz and Haycraft have this to say of Peirce's writings and his place in philosophy.

> Peirce's writings are not for the general reader. He had a certain fierce snobbishness which made him deliberately obscure to fend off all but the chosen intellectual few. He was a great seminal force, a great fructifier with what Morris Cohen calls "the beautiful but capricious originality of genius". In his lifetime he published only one book, and that on physics. After his death Harvard bought his mass of manuscripts and notes from his widow, and finally reduced them to order by 1931. In 1923 his published papers had been collected into a volume. All philosophical theory must take him into account; he was the greatest logician this country has yet produced; but he is a "philosopher's philosopher", to be taken "straight" only by those trained in the technical verbiage of his subject.[1]

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[1] Kunitz and Haycraft, op. cit., p. 609.

Division A

THE STRUCTURE OF PRAGMATICISM

CHAPTER I

THE PRAGMATIC METHOD[1]

Paramount in the philosophy of pragmaticism is the thesis that it is a methodology rather than a completed system. In the opening paragraph of the essay, The Kernel of Pragmatism, Dr. Peirce says that all pragmatists will assent to his statement that "It (pragmatism) is merely a method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts."[2] This idea must be understood at the outset and remembered throughout the entire study of pragmaticism. It cannot be accurately called a completed system of philosophy. It is more accurately called a system of philosophical inquiry. It does not propose to determine final truth and then defend it. The only defense of pragmatism as a method of inquiry lies in remaining true to its own method.

In the ascertaining of these meanings we who ponder pragmaticism in this day regard the system as primarily a philosophical one. On the pages that follow our attention is bent in that direction. In all fairness, however, it must

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[1] This treatise contains two parallel parts. Part I contains a description of pragmatism, as set forth by Peirce; Part II consists of a philosophy of Christian education based upon this kind of pragmatism. The study may be read in two ways: first, in the format herein used, or second, reading Chapter 1 of Part I and following it immediately with Chapter 13 of Part II; Chapter 2 followed by Chapter 14, and so on.

[2] Vol. V, p. 317.

be remembered that Dr. Peirce's system of philosophy came as a result of his study of mathematics and geography. Peirce enunciated this fact clearly:

> Thus, in brief, my philosophy may be described as the attempt of a physicist to make such conjecture as to the constitution of the universe as the methods of science may permit, with the aid of all that has been done by previous philosophers. I shall support my propositions by such arguments as I can. Demonstrative proof is not to be thought of. The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine. The best that can be done is to supply a hypothesis, not devoid of all likelihood, in the general line of growth of scientific ideas, and capable of being verified or refuted by future observers.[1]

Simply, then, we can say that pragmatism is a method of finding out. There will be results or conclusions of the process, but these will not be dogmatic statements of truth that can never be altered. Rather these conclusions become new hypotheses to be tried and tested by the same method.

This attitude of the pragmatic method cannot be overemphasized. Truth is constantly being discovered through this system of inquiry. The precise meaning of truth as attained through the pragmatic method will be discussed in a succeeding chapter. This represents a sharp contrast to the final conclusive truth that is achieved and transmitted by other philosophical systems, i.e., idealism, naturalism, and personalism. Peirce so poignantly states it in this oft-quoted statement:

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[1] Vol. 1, p. x.

> My book is meant for people who want to find out; and people who want philosophy ladled out to them can go elsewhere. There are philosophical soup shops at every corner, thank God![1]

At the same point in his writings Dr. Peirce says that only once in his lifetime did he receive praise for his work. And the one who contributed it assuredly intended it for blame rather than praise. With scintillating style and good humor he tells the story in this manner:

> It was that a critic said of me that I did not seem to be absolutely sure of my own conclusions. Never, if I can help it, shall that critic's eye ever rest on what I am now writing; for I owe a great pleasure to him; and, such was his evident animus, that should he find that out, I fear the fires of hell would be fed with new fuel in his breast.[2]

Let us examine, then, the steps of the pragmaticistic method.

The first is the admission that you do not already know the conclusion which you seek, or, at least, do not possess a satisfactory conclusion. This seems simple enough on the surface but as a foundation of the method it cannot be overemphasized.

Through the cumulation of life's experiences certain conclusions are reached and accepted as true. This is inevitable! The method of pragmaticism requires that one strip himself of preconceived conclusions if he is to apply inquiry

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[1] Vol. I, p. xi.

[2] Vol. I, p. xi.

that is pragmatic in nature. He must take the potential qualities as they are existent in any given subject, then observe the being of actual facts as they exist, and thus determine the being which will shape future events.

BEING

The next three steps of the pragmaticistic process are comparable to the three modes of being as conceived by Peirce. These three modes of being will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3, but it is necessary to introduce them here. The pragmatic system maintains that all three are present in any one event.

The first mode of being is that of "positive qualitative possibility".[1] Possibility is real although it must always be regarded as positive potential. It is real because it exists regardless of anything else. This mode of being can never be completely known for we can come to know only the possibility that becomes actualized. At the same time there can be no question as to its reality for if it were not real there would be nothing to become actualized. To illustrate the first mode of being Peirce uses the quality of the color, red, and says:

> The mode of being a redness, before anything in the universe was yet red, was nevertheless a positive qualitative possibility.[2]

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[1] Vol. I, p. 7.

[2] Ibid.

The second mode of being consists in the being which exists when one subject comes into contact with another. A subject is anything which possesses qualitative potential. It may be a person, an object, an hypothesis, or an event. When a subject comes into relationship with another subject a new event comes into existence which changes, or shapes, the possibility inherent in the first mode. Likewise, the being is new because the subject acting is affected by the interaction. This is "the being of actual fact".[1]

The third mode of being arises out of the interaction. It is a new mode of being in that, because it becomes the property of the possible subject and the actual fact, it thus determines future actual facts. This is a general being and will never be completely determinate because every event is novel with a new subject, new because it is changed by past experience and new actual facts of being.[2]

This triadinal pattern recurs often throughout pragmaticism, but nowhere is it more significant than in the understanding of being. Furthermore, the three modes of being comprise the first three categories of principle of the pragmatic method.

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] It is significant to note in this connection that three modes of being represent a new development in thephhilosophical thought of the 1880's. Descartes, Locke, Hume, Leibnitz all sought the essence of being, but they recognized one mode of being - the being of an individual object or fact.

Remember, it was stated at the beginning of this discussion that the three modes of being were synonymous with the second, third, and fourth steps of the pragmatic method. Once we have admitted that we do not know what the results will be we are free to observe the subject, confront the real facts of circumstance, and then interpret the third quality - that of a new determination of the future. It must be stated further that interpretation is not limited to the third category since one's conception of those effects is included in the whole of one's conception of the object. This concept of wholeness is consistent with the three categories comprising the first structural principle of pragmaticism - that of being.

SUBSTANCE

We turn then to the second principle of the pragmatic method - that of substance. Being gives unity to conception; substance gives content to conception. In Peirce's own words, "Substance and being are the beginning and end of all conception."[1] In an early writing, On A New List Of Categories, the number of categories is increased from three to five. Of these Peirce says:

> The five conceptions thus obtained, for reasons which will be sufficiently obvious, may be termed categories. That is,
>
> Being
>
> Quality (reference to a ground)
>
> Relation (reference to a correlate)
>
> Representation (reference to an interpretant)
>
> Substance[2]

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[1] Vol. I, p. 288.

[2] Vol. I, p. 294.

The question then immediately becomes: what is substance? The best answer seems to be that substance is embodying quality. Thus, the five categories include the two elements of pragmatism which we have here called principles.

There are many kinds of embodying qualities or substances. Peirce uses this example:

> Take, for example, the proposition, This stove is black! Here the conception of this stove is the more immediate, that of black the more mediate, which latter, to be predicated of the former, must be discriminated from it and considered in itself, not as applied to an object, but simply as embodying a quality, blackness.[1]

In the following chapter we shall look at the intellectualistic emphasis of pragmatism. Suffice it here to say that in the pragmatic system the purpose of the inquiry is to find meanings for intellectual concepts. This task is always the same, then: to pass from being to substance or from the first principle of the method on to the second. The pragmatic method moves from existence to speculation. This is accomplished by the three conceptions of the first principle.

An hypothesis, or a conception, always has a subject which expresses the substance andaa predicate which expresses the quality of that subject. The function of the hypothesis is to unite the being and the substance.

The first conception in passing from being to substance is the idea of embodying quality as, "This stove is

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[1] Vol. I, p. 291.

black." The identity with the first mode of being, inherent possibility, is obvious.

Secondly, we can know or identify a quality only by means of comparison or contrast with another quality. That is to say, we can know quality only through its relation to the total area of quality. This provides the second conception in passing from being to substance - the conception of relation. Relation necessarily involves comparison. Every comparison requires an interpreter who does the comparing, who holds together the diversity of impressions and who understands the comparisons. This understanding, of necessity also, comes in terms of the interpreter's own purpose and in terms of its bearing upon his conduct. Thus the practical effects of a conception of any subject are a part of the total conception, as stated in the maxim of pragmatism.

Now, by ignoring the interpreter, or the person who does the comparing, there remains the interpretation of fact which the discovery has produced which has meaning. Thus meaning is conceived in pragmatic terms - in terms of purpose and consequences. The inseparable connection between rational cognition and rational purpose can never be disestablished. It is this connection that caused Peirce to apply the name "pragmatism", rather than "practicalism", to his system.[1]

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[1] Vol. V, p. 274.

He explains it in this way:

> Endeavoring, as a man of that type naturally would, to formulate what he so approved, he framed the theory that a conception, that is, the rational purport of a word or other expression, lies exclusively in its conceivable bearing upon the conduct of life; so that, since obviously nothing that might not result from experiment can have any direct bearing upon conduct, if one can define accurately all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply, one will have therein a complete definition of the concept, and there is absolutely nothing more in it. For this doctrine he invented the name pragmatism. Some of his friends wished him to call it practicism or practicalism . . . But for one who had learned philosophy out of Kant, as the writer, along with nineteen out of every twenty experimentalists who have turned to philosophy, had done, and who still thought in Kantian terms most readily, praktisch and pragmatisch were as far apart as the two poles, the former belonging in a region of thought where no mind of the experimentalist type can ever make sure of solid ground under his feet, the latter expressing relation to some definite human pprpose. Now quite the most striking feature of the new theory was its recognition of an inseparable connection between rational cognition and rational purpose; and that consideration it was which determined the preference for the name pragmatism.[1]

This discussion seems adequate to establish pragmatism as a method of ascertaining the meanings of hypotheses. Let us turn now to the experimental aspect of the pragmatic method. In this regard, two things must be made clear. (1) Meanings are both specific and general, and (2) meanings are tested by future experimentation.

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[1] Vol. V, p. 274.

THE PROCESS OF EXPERIMENT

Meanings are both specific and general. It must be said at the outset that an experiment is an operation of thought. The materials of the experiment, and the process followed are but factors. The real experiment lies in the thought-operation of the experimenter as he checks the results with the beginning hypothesis. The significance of the experiment is contained in the thought-operation.

Meaning, which results from any experiment, is specific because it either affirms or denies a single hypothesis. But it is also general because no single experiment is completely isolated from every other. Pragmatism says "that every connected series of experiments constitutes a single collective experiment."[1] Therefore, an experiment has a general meaning as it assumes meaning in relation to all other experiments. Dr. Peirce's description of an experiment is relevant at this point:

> Passing over several ingredients on which we need not dwell, the purpose, the plan, and the resolve, we come to the act of choice by which the experimenter singles out certain identifiable objects to be operated upon. The next is the external (or quasi-external) ACT by which he modifies those objects. Next, comes the subsequent reaction of the world upon the experimenter in a perception; and finally, his recognition of the teaching of the experiment. While the two chief parts of the event itself are the action and the reaction, yet the unity of essence of the experiment lies in the purpose and plan, the ingredients passed over in the enumeration.[2]

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[1] Vol. V, p. 283. [2] *Ibid.*

It is discernible at once that the interpretation of an isolated experiment produces, or alters, the purpose of the next experiment. It is equally clear that the meaning of an isolated experiment can be tested only in the future. The pragmatic method reiterates again and again that the rational meaning of every proposition lies in the future. Herein lies the crux of the pragmatic method.

Once the meaning of a proposition is extracted, it becomes nothing else than a proposition to be verified or denied in the future. It has already been asserted that meaning is dependent upon the ground, correlate, and interpretant. It is true that there could be many meanings of any one proposition since the positive possibility, the relationship, and the interpretation would vary in each actualization. True, the question then becomes which meaning is the true meaning. To the pragmatist the answer is:

> . . . that form in which the proposition becomes applicable to human conduct, not in these or those special circumstances, nor when one entertains this or that special design, but that form which is most directly applicable to self-control under every situation, and to every purpose.[1]

It then becomes clear why meanings are significant in the future since future conduct is the only kind that is subject to self-control.

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[1] Vol. V, p. 284.

Note that the general nature of true meaning is restated here as applicable to every situation and every purpose.

EXPERIMENT AS EXPERIENCE

So far we have been concerned with the categories of pragmatic thought and the steps of the pragmatic system. We turn now to the unit of the pragmatic system. In his earlier writings Dr. Peirce talks about "events in actuality".[1] In his unfinished work on Logic he uses the term experience to indicate a single event in actuality. The simplest unit then of the pragmatic system is deciphered as an experience.

Experience distinguishes reality from appearance. Reality, or what really is, is found in subjects; appearance includes the element of interpretation regarding subjects, so is that which appears to everyone. Experience is the key to all logic. Of experience Peirce says:

> I essay an analysis of what appears in the world. It is not metaphysics that we are dealing with: only logic. Therefore, we do not ask what really is, but only what appears to everyone of us in every minute of our lives. I analyze experience, which is the cognitive resultant of our past lives, and find it in three elements.[2]

The three elements of experience are the same categories described as the modes of being. This triadinal pattern runs

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[1] Vol. I, p. 7.

[2] Vol. II, p. 44.

throughout the pragmatic system. In this connection they are given different names than Firstness (quality), Secondness (relation), and Thirdness (representation). Rather the elements are called: Originality, Obsistence, and Transuasion.[1]

If experience is the unit of pragmatism and experience implies some activity, then why does not meaning consist simply and only in doing? Because doing is not the meaning. Doing simply provides the situation from which meaning is abstracted; and the purpose of the pragmatic method is to determine the meanings of intellectual concepts.

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[1] Vol. II, p. 50.

CHAPTER II

AN INTELLECTUALISTIC SYSTEM

The combination of common sense and scientific inquiry which permeates every facet of Peirce's work gives ample evidence that it is weighted on the intellectual side. It must be said at the outset that this is in opposition to the kind of pragmatism made popular by William James at the turn of the present century. James' pragmatism and pluralistic philosophy, by necessity of its own nature, had to be anti-intellectual in the last analysis because the "will to believe" had to survive the many influences of the pluralistic universe. Peirce states his concern for intellectualism unequivocally when he says:

> I understand pragmatism to be a method of ascertaining the meanings, not of all ideas, but only of what I call 'intellectual concepts', that is to say, of those upon the structure of which, arguments concerning objective fact may hinge. . . . Intellectual concept, . . . essentially carry some implication concerning the general behavior either of some conscious being or of some inanimate object, and so convey more, not merely than any feeling, but more, too, than any existential fact, namely, 'the would-acts', 'would-dos' of habitual behavior; and no agglomeration of actual happenings can ever completely fill up the meaning of a 'would-be'. But (pragmatism asserts), that the total meaning of the predication of an intellectual concept is contained in an affirmation that, under all conceivable circumstances of a given kind (or under this or that more or less indefinite part of the cases of their fulfillment, should the predication be modal) the subject of the predication would behave in a certain general way - that is, it would be true under given experiential circumstances (or under a more or less

> definitely stated proportion of them, *taken as they would occur*, that is in the same order of succession, in experience).[1]

This relation between experience and intellectual concepts must be accepted and understood early in our study of pragmaticism. It is essential to an adequate understanding of the categories underlying the system of thought.

The emphasis is upon meanings; but the meanings ascertained are dependent upon the circumstances as well as existential facts and habits. Thus the "would-be" of every experience is unique and different. Furthermore it is undetermined, except in a general way, until it actually exists.

Experience is regarded as the unit out of which meanings derive. In Peirce's own words, experience is here defined as "circumstances . . . in order of succession". In another writing[2] Peirce describes experience as "the world of fact". In this connection he propounds the idea that every man lives in two worlds, - a world of act and a world of fancy. The world of fact is man's external world. It is the world of fact or man's external world which forcibly modifies our internal world.[3]

From what is the meaning of experience derived? The bare answer for pragmaticism is cognition. This is not to say that cognition is the only factor of experience; but the

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[1] Vol. V, pp. 318, 319.

[2] Vol. I, pp. 160, 161.

[3] *Ibid.*

element which gives meaning to experience is cognitive. This is to say that through the operation of thought only is meaning derived. In this way the basic foundation of pragmaticism is intellectualistic.

COGNITION

Peirce uses the term "cognition" throughout his philosophical writings. It is sometimes used as a predicate to indicate the act of cognizing. At other times it is used as a subject to indicate an instance of knowledge. In both usages it refers to and is used to connote mental operation. Consistently throughout his writings cognition and thought are used synonymously. At times the term knowledge is utilized in a synonymous usage also; but since cognition is most frequently used, we shall use it here to indicate the mental quality of pragmaticistic thought.

Experience, from which meaning is derived, has already been defined as possessing three elements: the possibility, the fact of interaction, and the media of connection. The resultant is the interpretant which will be discussed in the next chapter.

It is clear at this point that experiences are individual. It is granted that circumstances might occur in the identical order of succession; but they cannot be identical circumstances. They are made individual by the individual

possibility inherent in the first mode of being. Therefore, meaning is individual. Likewise, cognition is an individual matter since it is the actual operation of an individual mind.

Peirce consistently describes, rather than defines, cognition. Cognition is used to indicate both an "instant" of cognizing by the mind and the "continuous" act of cognizing which is correlated with learning. Cognitions are composed of feelings, will, and continuity. Throughout his writings cognition is fundamentally essential to an understanding of his discussions of both "consciousness" and "signs". Furthermore, two basic distinctions between kinds of cognition are essential. Peirce distinguishes between a cognition and a "material quality" of a cognition. Also, the two kinds of cognitions must be distinguished: those which are determined by previous cognitions and those which are determined by their object rather than by previous cognitions.

Every mental operation of the mind can be called a "cognition", although a cognition is not a separate and distinct faculty of the mind. Peirce makes this clear when he says:

> Every phenomenon of our mental life is more or less like cognition. Every emotion, every burst of passion, every exercise of will, is like cognition. But modifications of consciousness which are alike have some element in common. Cognition, therefore, has nothing distinctive and cannot be regarded as a fundamental faculty. If, however, we ask whether there be not an element in cognition which is neither feeling, sense, nor activity, we

> do find something, the faculty of learning, acquisition, memory and inference, synthesis.[1]

CONSCIOUSNESS

Let us look first at the relation of cognition to consciousness. There are three categories of consciousness. Peirce says:

> In the first place every kind of consciousness enters into cognition. Feelings, in the sense in which alone they can be admitted as a great branch of mental phenomena, form the warp and woof of cognition, and even in the objectionable sense of pleasure and pain, they are constituents of cognition. The will, in the form of attention, constantly enters, and the sense of reality or objectivity, which is what we have found ought to take the place of the will, in the division of consciousness, is even more essential yet, if possible. But that element of cognition which is neither feeling nor the polar sense, is the consciousness of a process, and this in the form of the sense of learning, of acquiring, of mental growth is eminently characteristic of cognition.[2]

The three categories of consciousness then are distinguished as these: feeling, which occurs in an instant of time and is a passive consciousness without any recognition or analysis; interruption or resistance, which is an awareness of something which is other or over against; and synthesis, which binds thought together. It is equally accurate to say that synthetic consciousness binds life together in the same way that it does learning and thought. Dr. Peirce says:

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[1] Vol. I, p. 199.

[2] Vol. I, pp. 201, 202.

> We have indubitably three radically different elements of consciousness, these and no more. And they are evidently connected with the ideas of one-two-three. Immediate feeling is the consciousness of the first; the polar sense is the consciousness of the second; and synthetical consciousness is the consciousness of a third or medium.[1]

We can say then that every kind of consciousness becomes a cognition since these three kinds of consciousness are all there are. A cognition is an "informing" thought. We now turn to cognition as a sign or symbol.

COGNITION AS A SIGN

In the light of the preceding section, we have seen that a cognition is a thought operation of one of the three types of consciousness. Once the thought is in the past it is then a representation of the factors in the experience of cognizing. Each cognition is a sign. A sign is something which stands for something else in a specific and definitive way. Pragmaticism is careful to distinguish between a _sign_ and a _representamen_. Of this difference Peirce says:

> I use these two words, _sign_ and _representamen_, differently. By a _sign_ I mean anything which conveys any definite notion of an object in any way, as such conveyors of thought are familiarly known to us. Now I start with this familiar idea and make the best analysis I can of what is essential to a sign, and I define a _representamen_ as being whatever that analysis applies to.[2]

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[1] Vol. I, p. 202.

[2] Vol. I, p. 285.

We shall look in detail at the nature of signs in Chapter Four. From Peirce's own definition here we are sure that sign is a mental interpretant of an object since it must convey a definite notion of an object.

A cognition, then, is a sign because it carries meaning as it stands for an object. This is in contrast to a representamen which need not determine the notion of an object by conveying a mental interpretant. Cognition or thought is the mode of representation which carries meaning. In his writings on Logic Peirce says "thought is the chief, if not the only mode of representation".[1]

It is sufficiently clear from this discussion that pragmaticism is an intellectualistic system of inquiry. Each cognition is an intellectual sign. Even the conception of the consequences are intellectual concepts. Lest some reader say this is essentially idealistic, it seems appropriate here to say that the emphasis here on the intellectual is quite different from idealism. In idealism the idea represents reality; in pragmaticism, intellectual conception motivates conduct and controls acts of volition.

Another important distinction yet remains. This involves cognitions which are produced by prior associations, education, or training, and cognitions which are produced

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[1] Vol. II, p. 157.

solely by an object, or an end, and its practical effects. We turn now to this distinction.

COGNITIONS DETERMINED BY PREVIOUS COGNITIONS

The cumulative nature of cognition is the important cornerstone in the experimental nature of pragmaticism. It has already been said that a cognition involves the mental interpretant of something represented. This interpretation issued out of consciousness or there would have been no interpretation made.

Each time an interpretation is made it becomes the property of the interpreter or the subject. This possession alters the subject so that his mode of Firstness, or qualitative possibility, is changed. Since the quality of Firstness is different at each point of relationship, it now is apparent that the interpretation made in any one cognition is partially determined by previous cognitions.

This may be at a conscious level or may become so automatic that it is at the level of habit. Previous cognitions may become so much the possession of a subject that conduct is automatic and does not involve conscious reasoning of the whole conception. At the conscious level the subject recalls previous cognitions and because of them acts in a certain manner deliberately as a result of his reasoning process.

Peirce summarizes this cumulative affect of cognition thus:

> From the proposition that every thought is a sign, it follows that every thought must address itself to some other, must determine some other, since that is the essence of a sign. This, after all, is but another form of the familiar axiom, that in intuition, i.e., in the immediate present, there is no thought, or, that all which is reflected upon has past. Hinc loquor inde est. That, since any thought, there must have been a thought, has its analogue in the fact that, since any past time, there must have been an infinite series of times. To say, therefore, that thought cannot happen in an instant, but requires a time, is but another way of saying that every thought must be interpreted in another, or that all thought is in signs.[1]

The logical conclusion here is that all cognitions are determined by previous cognitions. This seems indisputable. However, pragmaticism makes room for intuition, or cognitions that are determined by the object rather than by previous cognition. Let us examine these.

COGNITIONS NOT DETERMINED BY PREVIOUS COGNITIONS

Peirce gives the name intuition to a cognition which is not determined by previous cognition of the same object. Cognitions which are produced by interaction with the same object time after time soon reach the level of habit. Of course, much conduct is at the level of habit. But a cognition which has no background of habit and which arises out of relation with an object must be determined by new reasoning, and this

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[1] Vol. V, p. 151.

reasoning always includes, of course, the concept of the consequences within the whole of the conception. Peirce states it in this manner:

> The term *intuition* will be taken as signifying a cognition not determined by a previous cognition of the same object, and therefore so determined by something out of the consciousness. Let me request the reader to note this. *Intuition* here will be nearly the same as 'premiss not itself a conclusion'; the only difference being that premisses and conclusions are judgments, whereas an intuition may, as far as its definition states, be any kind of cognition whatever. But just as a conclusion (good or bad) is determined in the mind of the reasoner by its premiss, so cognitions not judgments may be determined by previous cognitions; and a cognition not so determined, and therefore determined directly by the transcendental object, is to be termed an intuition.[1]

In the process of life it is difficult to conceive a cognition that is not determined by previous cognitions for the experiences of life are cumulative. But pragmaticism insists that in the first instant of a cognition, before reasoning produces interpretation, there is a moment of intuition when conduct is determined by the object rather than by interpretation. Intuition represents the point of beginning for cognition.

In some of his writings Peirce contradicts the validity of intuition. Even in this same essay these two statements are difficult to correlate:

> (1) To say, then, that if there be a state of cognition by which all subsequent cognitions of a certain

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[1] Vol. V, pp. 135, 136.

> object are not determined, there must subsequently be some cognition of that object not determined by previous cognitions of the same object.[1]
>
> (2) The point here insisted upon is not this or that logical solution of the difficulty, but merely that cognition arises by a *process* of beginning, as any other change comes to pass.[2]

In spite of this apparent contradiction pragmaticism affirms the validity of intuition on the basis that there is necessarily a beginning instant of cognition just as there is a beginning instant of motion. It is the beginning premise which is not yet formulated into a conclusion.

This discussion of cognition brings us to the relation of cognition and conduct.

RELATION OF MEANING AND CONDUCT

In this chapter we have thus far attempted to show that the meaning derived from any experience lies in the intellectual conception or cognition. We must now turn our attention to the relation of intellectual cognition to conduct.

Conduct is aimless without purpose. In fact it can unequivocally be said that without purpose there is no reason for action at all. There can be no meaning without action having taken place, although meaning may be included in a conception which is at rest. That is to say, action is not

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[1] Vol. V, pp. 154, 155. [2] Vol. V, p. 155.

constantly demanded for meaning to be present in an intellectual conception. The purpose then as it is conceived essentially contains the effects of the intellectual conception. Another phrasing of the pragmatic maxim by Peirce is given to show this connection between meaning and conduct. He says:

> Such reasonings and all reasonings turn upon the idea that if one exerts certain kinds of volition, one will undergo in return certain compulsory perceptions. Now this sort of consideration, namely, that certain lines of conduct will entail certain kinds of inevitable experiences is what is called a 'practical consideration'. Hence is justified the maxim, belief in which constitutes pragmatism; namely,
>
> In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one should consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by necessity from the truth of that conception; and the sum of these consequences will constitute the entire meaning of the conception.[1]

Pragmatism, as delineated by Peirce, consistently affirms that the practical consequences are a part of the intellectual concept. John Dewey followed this idea precisely in his development of educational philosophy. Dewey states it these ways:

> Thought, reason, intelligence, whatever word we wish to use, is existentially an adjective (or better an adverb) not a noun. It is disposition of activity, a quality of that conduct which foresees consequences of existing events, and which uses what is foreseen as a plan and method of administering affairs.[2]

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[1] Vol. V, p. 6.

[2] John Dewey, Experience and Nature (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1929), pp. 158, 159.

> The action and its consequence must be joined in perception. This relationship is what gives meanings; to grasp it is the objective of all intelligence.[1]

In summary, let it be said that pragmaticism, as a system of inquiry, produces intellectual concepts, and intellectual concepts only. Cognitions are meaningful only as they are mentally interpreted. Every intellectual conception includes the practical consequences within its wholeness.

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[1] John Dewey, Art As Experience (New York: Minton, Balch & Co., 1934), p. 44.

CHAPTER III

EMPHASIS ON INTERPRETATION OF MEANING

Interpretation of meaning is the hub for pragmaticism as a system of philosophical inquiry. Indeed, it was at this point that Mr. Peirce began his writings in 1877 with the appearance of the two articles "How To Make Our Ideas Clear" and "The Fixation of Belief" which first appeared in the Popular Science Monthly.[1] One of the purposes of pragmatism is the clarification of ideas. Though he uses the familiar much traveled thoroughfare of the road to reason he begins at the opposite pole from that which is the beginning point for many philosophers. Instead of analyzing the logical process he begins with the purpose of reason. The object of reason is "to find out, from the consideration of what we already know, something else which we do not know".[2] Thus reasoning is good only to the extent that it is validated by future events as true. Therefore, the final validity for reasoning is facts, as they present themselves, and not reason itself. And as the facts of experience, or circumstances in succession, are interpreted does the meaning which shapes men's lives issue.

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[1] Vol. V, pp. 223-271. [2] Vol. V, p. 226.

In order to comprehend the emphasis given to interpretation of meaning in pragmaticism, it is necessary to disassociate ideas of the mind from reality. Phenomenology will be treated in the last section of this treatise but it is essential to introduce here Peirce's use of phaneroscopy.

Phaneroscopy is the description of the phaneron, a term used often in Peircian pragmatism. It stands for the direct appearances which present themselves to man's mind barren of any interpretation or psychological connotation. To get as clear a definition as possible, let us examine his own description of the phaneron:

> By the phaneron I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not. If you ask present when, and to whose mind, I reply that I leave these questions unanswered, never having entertained a doubt that those features of the phaneron that I have found in my mind are present at all times and to all minds. So far as I have developed this science of phaneroscopy, it is occupied with the formal elements of the phaneron.[1]

These direct appearances present to the mind are basic to the categories of being out of which meaning is interpreted.

From the categories as briefly outlined in the opening chapter we must understand in detail the three modes of being set forth by pragmaticism. Peirce uses the term being synonymously with actuality. Being, or actuality, then consists in specific events of a happening "then and there".

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[1] Vol. I, p. 141.

The specifications then and there involve all its relations to other existents.[1] This mode of being which involves relationships is the second mode of being or hereinafter referred to as Secondness.

FIRSTNESS

The first mode of being, or Firstness, is the being of any subject out of relationship with anything else. Subject may be a person, an object, or an hypothesis. It may even be universal qualitativeness. The possibility of Reals will be discussed in Chapter Ten. In Peirce's words, "Firstness is the mode of being which consists in its subject's being positively such as it is regardless of aught else."[2] This original, innate being is positive being because it has the capacity for interaction - both of acting and of being acted upon. In pragmatism the term sui generis is commonly employed to describe this mode of being. Doubtless, it is at this place that the illustration of the quality of redness, often utilized by Dr. Peirce, gives significant meaning. His thesis is that before anything in the universe was red in color or was called red by men, there was a mode of being in redness, - a quality of redness which existed as a positive qualitative possibility. The facts of redness then merely

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[1] Vol. I, p. 7.

[2] Ibid.

validate the first mode of being redness. Other examples of this original state of being can be found in a salt taste, an ache, a grief or a joy, and a musical note. These are examples of the quality of Firstness.

It is significant to note in this connection that the basic premise upon which progressive education has been built lies in the exposition of firstness as a mode of being. Peirce states it in this way:

> We naturally attribute Firstness to outward objects, that is we suppose they have capacities in themselves which may or may not be actualized, which may or may not ever be actualized, although we can know nothing of such possibilities (except) so far as they are actualized.[1]

SECONDNESS

Secondness describes the category of being which brings two subjects into relation. In the relationship they are brought into oneness. Just as each subject has being in the first mode, each one also has being in the union with each other. Each remains separate and distinct subject possessing individual Firstness; but in their union the potential possibility of each is altered so that a new character is imparted to each subject. The union, then, represents

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[1] Ibid. (Note: The educational philosophy of John Dewey holds in high place the actualization of facts heretofore unknown or undiscovered. This gives to his educational philosophy its creativity and open end. The quality of firstness here propounded by Peirce provides the capacity for heretofore unpredictable actualization.)

a relation which is a distinct category of being from positive possibility. In this mode of being both subjects are actor and patient. Pragmaticistic thought makes it clear that it is "mutual action between two things regardless of any sort of third or medium, and in particular regardless of any law of action."[1]

Always present in the category of Secondness is interaction or struggle. Of this, Peirce says:

> This is present even in such a rudimentary fragment of experience as a simple feeling. For such a feeling always has a degree of vividness, high or low; and this vividness is a sense of commotion, an action and reaction, between our soul and the stimulus. If, in the endeavor to find some idea which does not involve the element of struggle, we imagine a universe that consists of a single quality that never changes, still there must be some degree of steadiness in this imagination, or else we could not think about and ask whether there was an object having any positive suchness.[2]

This kind of questioning and resistance both indicate the nature of struggle or forceful action.

Vivid examples of the category of Secondness are to be found in "causation" and "statical force". The distinction between cause and effect is plain. A little consideration prompts us to agree with Peirce that statical forces are as clearly distinct and always occur in opposition.[3]

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[1] Vol. I, p. 161.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Constraint is an illustration of two statical forces; one says, "do"; the other says, "do not".

It is in the quality of secondness that change as a result of experience is most evident. Peirce says, "We are continually bumping up against hard fact."[1] In the life-process we continually bring our perceptions, our ideas to the world in which we live and frequently find the results quite different from those which we expected. At this point our perceptions and hypotheses are forcibly modified by the encounter. The relation of action and reaction is a prominent category of being from which meaning is interpreted.

In this regard the differentiation between perception and experience must be made clear. Philosophies which emphasize behaviorism insist that all experience consists of sense-perception. Pragmatism insists that man intellectually perceives an external object and in so doing there is a specific perception, or general perception. Experience is a more inclusive term which includes some response to an external object or some evaluation of an intellectual cognition if the external object is a cognition. An experience is composed of three elements: potential possibility, fact of interaction, and the resulting interpretation realized through cognition. Therefore an experience is more accurately described as an event. Of this distinction Dr. Peirce says:

> We perceive objects brought before us; but that which we especially experience - the kind of thing to which the

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[1] Vol. I, p. 162.

> word 'experience' is more particularly applied - is an event. We cannot accurately be said to perceive events; for this requires what Kant called the 'synthesis of apprehension', not however, by any means, making the needful discriminations.
>
> . . . It is (the) special field of experience to acquaint us with events, with changes of perception.[1]

The category of Secondness, which is found in the relation of two subjects, furnishes an experience when cognitively evaluated. The media of relationship is the category of thirdness.

THIRDNESS

The pragmatism of Dr. Peirce describes the category of Thirdness clearly and succinctly when he says, "By the third, I mean the medium or connecting bond between the absolute first and last."[2] It is this connecting which gives meaning to all experience. From it all interpretation of meaning proceeds. In addition to providing meaning to experience, thirdness produces firstness which has already been described as the original state of any subject, whether it be person, object, hypothesis, or Real quality. As every connecting bond is completed, a new interpretation, or it may be the formation of a habit, a new subject is formed. In other words a subject of any kind is constantly in formation as it experiences. Firstness is pure firstness only in the isolated

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[1] Vol. I, p. 169.

[2] Vol. I, p. 170.

moment of immediate present. Secondness, or the process of relating, is in action. Thirdness is the interpretation of meaning arising out of experience which is an integral part of an event. It is correct to say that it is the only meaningful part.

Because the category of Thirdness provides the interpretation of meaning of experience it is the category that affects the conduct of a person. And if we recall the original maxim of pragmatism we will see the primordial connection between conception and conduct:

> Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.[1]

This relation becomes even more vivid in the restatement of 1905:

> The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all general modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol.[2]

Pragmaticism states again and again that the system is intellectual and cognitive; also, that the intellectual conception of any and every subject, be it either hypothesis, person, object, or universal quality, is affected, or more accurately determined, by the effects, or the conduct, which

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[1] Vol. V, p. 258.

[2] Vol. V, p. 293.

result from the conception.[1] Peirce states this in more detailed form when he says:

> Pragmaticism makes the ultimate intellectual purport of what you please to consist in conceived conditional resolutions, or their substance; and therefore, the conditional propositions, with their hypothetical antecedents, in which such resolutions consist, being of the ultimate nature of meaning, must be capable of being true, that is, of expressing whatever there be which is such as the proposition expresses, independently of being thought to be so in any judgment, or being represented to be so in any symbol of any man or men.[2]

Experience includes all three categories, Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. Although relation is produced in Secondness, nothing is actually learned until Thirdness is present for it is Thirdness which provides the interpretation of meaning. As was stated in the opening phrases of this chapter, this is the hub of the pragmatic method. Obviously, the nature of the method is cyclical since each new interpretation of meaning produces a new and different subject. In this way the process ever continues.

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[1] Failure to recognize and understand the intellectual nature of the pragmatic method has led to radical misunderstanding in philosophical circles. Indeed, pragmatism has been termed "the philosophy of action" in an article by Donald F. Morey entitled "The Present Crisis in Religious Education", contained in Vol. LII, Number 6 of *Religious Education* for November and December, 1957. Mr. Morey says: Everything *is* what it *does*, and so in the presentation we have just reviewed we find *that* learning *is* what learning *does*, and we have to suggest it, but we wonder if persons ever *learn* by *thinking*? If so, this is never hinted. Perhaps someone can *enlighten* the writer on this rather old-fashioned notion." Would that this chapter might provide a bit of this enlightenment!

[2] Vol. V, pp. 306, 307.

Dr. Peirce's statement of the place of Thirdness is succinct and appropriate in this regard:

> The beginning is first, the end second, the middle third. The end is second, the means third. The thread of life is a third; the fate that snips it, its second. A fork in a road is a third, it supposes three ways; a straight road, considered merely as a connection between two places is second, but so far as it implies passing through intermediate places it is third. Position is first, velocity or the relation of two successive positions second, acceleration or the relation of three successive positions third. But velocity in so far as it is continuous also involves a third. Continuity represents Thirdness almost to perfection. . . . Action is second, but conduct is third. Law as an active force is second, but order and legislation are third. Sympathy, flesh, and blood, that by which I feel my neighbor's feelings, is third.[1]

MEANING AS AN INTERPRETANT

Since the pragmatic method asserts unequivocally that nothing is actually learned until meaning is interpreted, some elaboration of the interpretation of meaning is essential. A brief word on the ideas of Thirdness and its general nature is necessary. In the following chapter we will look with more detail at the structure of signs and representatants.

The philosophical implications of meaning as an interpretant are the same for both words and ideas. However, it is more comprehensible to think in terms of ideas. Both words and ideas are symbols. To Peirce the words symbol and sign are used synonymously. Both are a representation of

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[1] Vol. I, pp. 170-171.

something that actually exists. A representation can be of an object, a meaning, or an interpretant. A representation of an object simply stands for the object; a representation of a meaning is the vehicle which conveys that meaning; the representation of that which the vehicle produces is the interpretant.

Significant as the interpretant is in the pragmatic method of inquiry, it must be remembered always that the interpretant is nothing but a representation. Therefore, it is alterable. The cyclical nature of this kind of philosophy has already been mentioned. Of it Peirce says:

> Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another representation to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series.[1]

In this kind of thought the pertinent question then becomes: is there any end to this kind of series, or is it just one series of interpretants after another?

The answer from pragmaticism appears on the surface to be double-talk. Peirce says, "In general, we may say that meanings are inexhaustible."[2] At another point he says, "But an endless series of representations, each representing the one behind it, may be coneived to have an absolute object at its limit."[3]

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[1] Vol. I, p. 171.
[2] Vol. I, p. 174.
[3] Vol. I, p. 171.

Careful consideration of these two statements reveals that they are not contradictory since the ultimate object is a conception. The evidence then, is upon the inexhaustibility of meanings without refuting the existence of an absolute. This is quite consistent with the pragmatic philosophy when one remembers the purpose of pragmaticism - to ascertain meanings of "hard words and abstract concepts".

That the conduct of a person is affected by interpretants may be, by now, a superfluous statement. However, to understand the pragmatic system of inquiry, it must ever be remembered that just as conduct is determined by interpretant so is the new interpretant determined by the whole of the concept including conduct. The two are dependent upon each other. Dr. Peirce states it this way:

> In truth the only difference is that when a person means to do anything he is in some state in consequence of which the brute reactions between things will be moulded (in) to conformity to which the man's mind is itself moulded, while the meaning of a word really lies in the way in which it might, in a proper position in a proposition believed, tend to mould the conduct of a person into conformity to that to which it is itself moulded. Not only will meaning always, more or less, in the long run, mould reactions to itself, but it is only in doing so that its own being consists.[1]

The emphasis upon the interpretation of meaning, which is so central to the pragmatic method, now is clearly identified "with the practical effects" and only as the effects are conceived is there meaning in the interpretant.

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[1] Vol. I, p. 174.

In conclusion it must be said that the inexhaustibility of new interpretants is not only possible but is inherent in the very nature of experience. Furthermore, there may be an ultimate object at the end of experience. This conception becomes a part of the meaning and like any other hypothesis must be validated or invalidated by the same pragmatic method. The inexhaustible potentiality of each experience provides the educational worth of the pragmatic method. Peirce comes to this point in these words:

> But without beating longer around the bush, let us come to close quarters. Experience is our only teacher. Far be it from me to enunciate any doctrine of a tabula rasa. . . . there manifestly is not one drop of principle in the whole vast reservoir of established scientific theory that has sprung from any other source than the power of the human mind to originate ideas that are true. But this power, for all it has accomplished, is so feeble that as ideas flow from their springs in the soul, the truths are almost drowned in a flood of false notions; and that which experience does is gradually, and by a sort of fractionation, to precipitate and filter off the false ideas, eliminating them and letting the truth pour on in its mighty current.[1]

With interpretation of meaning as the goal of philosophical inquiry as well as the determining force of human purpose and conduct, pragmatism emphasises the element of surprise as a forceful element in the method by which experience produces learning. Peirce goes on to say in this regard:

> In all the works on pedagogy that ever I read - and they have been many, big, and heavy - I don't remember

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[1] Vol. V, p. 37.

that any one has advocated a system of teaching by practical jokes, mostly cruel. That, however, describes the method of our great teacher, Experience. She says, 'Open your mouth and shut your eyes and I'll give you something to make you wise'; and thereupon she keeps her promise, and seems to take her pay in the fun of tormenting us.[1]

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[1] Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

THE SYMBOLIC NATURE OF COGNITIVE THOUGHT

In Chapter Two the intellectual aspect of pragmaticism was discussed. Meaning is conceived in intellectual terms because cognition is a mental process. In other words, all meaning is intellectual. It was also clear that each cognition is a sign because it represents an interpretation derived from experience. Peirce is unequivocal in this premise as demonstrated by this statement: "Thought, however, is in itself of the nature of a sign."[1]

We turn now to the nature of the symbolism of thought and will deal with it in two sections. First, we will look at the kinds of signs which are present in thought, and secondly, we will examine the relationship of signs to Logic since Logic is thought in process.

A sign has previously been defined as a symbol which stands for something else. In his elaborate work on Signs Peirce defines a sign thus:

> A Sign is anything which is related to a Second thing, its *Object*, in respect to a Quality, in such a way as to bring a Third thing, its *Interpretant*, into relation to the same *Object*, and that in such a way as to bring a Fourth into relation to that Object in the same form, *ad infinitum*. If the series is broken off, the Sign, in so far, falls short of the perfect significant character.[2]

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[1] Vol. V, p. 416.

[2] Vol. II, p. 51.

The triadinal nature recurs often throughout pragmaticistic thought. It was first seen in the three modes of being. It was apparent also in the elements of experience.

Here we see the triadinal nature of a sign. It stands in relation to a second thing and is a true sign only when it becomes sufficiently actualized to become a subject or to produce another sign. Therefore, it is imperative that it include mental interpretation. In this regard the distinction between a sign and a representamen, made in Chapter Two, must be recalled. All signs are representamens since a sign is a representamen with a mental interpretant. All representamens are not signs, however, since it is possible for a representation to stand for something else and be incapable of producing another representation.

With the definition of a sign completed, the question now becomes: What types of signs are there? For pragmaticism signs are divided into three basic types. Each type may produce a sign of another type but all signs may be classified as Icons, Indices, or Symbols.

THE ICON

An icon is the kind of sign which stands for something else simply by the nature of its quality. An icon is a sign which represents a similar object. An icon asserts nothing about an object but represents its object simply by similarity.

Of the icon, Peirce says,

> An Icon is a Representamen whose Representative Quality is a Firstness of it as a First. That is, a quality that it has qua thing renders it fit to be a representamen.[1]

We see here the same conception contained in the category of Firstness. The icon is a representation inherent in its own nature and fulfills its purpose of representation by its own character. An icon possesses just as much character even if the object for which it stands does not exist because it conveys its object so completely and accurately. The representative quality of the icon lies in its similarity of meaning to the object for which it stands. It is true that unless an object actually exists, the Icon does not act as a sign. Therefore the Icon must stand for something, but this does not affect its character as a sign.

Pictures are an example of icons. Photographs are purely iconic because they exactly reproduce the objects which they represent. Diagrams are icons. The following icon is a representation of this section. The iconic nature of this diagram lies in the brace which indicates that the three classes of signs are all signs with their respective sub-divisiins. It does not resemble its subject as a photograph does but it resembles the relation of the parts in the subject.

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[1] Vol. II, p. 157.

Signs

- Icon
  - Hypoicon
    - Image
    - Diagram
    - Metaphor
- Index
  - Genuine
  - Degenerate
- Symbol
  - Genuine
  - Degenerate
    - Singular
    - Abstract

Paintings are examples of hypoicons. A painting is a material image of that which it represents but is not as precise as a photograph. The three sub-classes of hypoicons are classified by the qualities of representative character which they possess. They are described by Peirce in this way:

> Hypoicons may be roughly divided according to the mode of Firstness of which they partake. Those which partake of simple qualities, or First Firstness, are images; those which represent the relations, mainly dyadic, or so regarded, of the parts of one thing by analogous relations in their own parts, are diagrams; those which represent the representative character of a representamen by representing a parallelism in something else, are metaphors.[1]

Upon first reflection it would seem that an idea would represent a pure icon. This definition, however, rules out idea as having iconic quality since an idea does not have visible appearance.

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[1] Ibid.

THE INDEX

A sign which indicates relation is called an index. Peirce says of the index:

> An Index is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of being really affected by that Object. . . . In so far as the Index is affected by the Object, it necessarily has some Quality in common with the Object, and it in respect to these that it refers to the Object. It does, therefore, involve a sort of Icon, although an Icon of a peculiar kind; and it is not the mere resemblance of its object, even in these respects which makes it a sign, but it is the actual modification of it by the Object.[1]

Thus the index is a representamen which possesses its individual character and which would have neither character nor meaning if its object did not exist in the form that it does. For it is the relation of representant and object which gives meaning to the index.

Two kinds of indices must be distinguished in order for this to become clear.

Some indices serve as a substitute for the object which it represents. These, according to Peirce, are genuine indices. Other indices represent their object in such a way that a reference to the object inheres in the character of the index. These are called degenerate indices.[2]

Examples of genuine indices are a barometer and a weathercock. Peirce explains it in this way:

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[1] Vol. II, p. 143.

[2] Vol. II, p. 160.

> A low barometer with a moist air is an index of rain; that is we suppose that the forces of nature establish a probable connection between the low barometer with moist air and coming rain. A weathercock is an index of the direction of the wind; because in the first place it really takes the self-same direction as the wind, so that there is a real connection between them, and in the second place we are so constituted that when we see a weathercock pointing in a certain direction it draws our attention to that direction, and when we see the weathercock veering with the wind, we are forced by the law of the mind to think that direction is connected with the wind.[1]

In these examples we see the pure, or genuine, relation between representamen and object.

The area of referential, or degenerate indices is more vast. An exclamation of warning given by one person to another is an index since it indicates a relation - the relation between the shout and an alertness to something unusual. The common practice of utilizing letters such as A, B, and C to mark or represent parts of a diagram are degenerate indices since they carry reference to their object. A possessive pronoun is another example of a referential index. Indefinite pronouns are still another example of degenerate indices since they set the limits within which the representamen is to be understood.

Like the icon, an index does not assert meaning. The meaning is already present, either by existence or by reference.

We look now at Symbols, the third type of sign.

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[1] Vol. II, p. 161.

THE SYMBOL

A sign which has meaning regardless of any similarity to or any factual connection with its object is a Symbol. A symbol is a sign which causes itself to be interpreted, in fact it can have no meaning without an interpretation. We are now using symbols for all words and sentences are symbols. Of words, Peirce says:

> We speak of writing or pronouncing the word 'man'; but it is only a replica, or embodiment of the word, that is pronounced or written. The word itself has no existence although it has a real being, consisting in the fact that existents will conform to it.[1]

It is evident that a symbol has meaning because of the usage which is made of it. This usage is acquired. The important matter is that the meaning of a symbol is accepted by habit and is not questioned without some special effort of attaching a new meaning.

There are two kinds of Symbols. One kind connotes a general meaning of its object; the other indicates the quality or character of its object. The first type is called genuine; the latter type is called degenerate. Furthermore, there are two kinds of degenerate symbols, singular and abstract. Peirce distinguishes these types of symbols in this way:

> Thus, while the complete object of a symbol, that is to say, its meaning, is of the nature of a law, it must

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[1] Vol. II, pp. 165, 166.

> *denote* an individual, and must *signify* a character. A *genuine* symbol is a symbol that has a general meaning. There are two kinds of *degenerate* symbols, the *Singular Symbol* whose object is an existent individual, and which signifies only such characters as that individual may realize; and the *Abstract Symbol*, whose only Object is a character.[1]

Considering the foregoing discussions of the icon and the index, it now appears that a symbol includes both an icon and an index. This is correct. Again we turn to the precise language of Peirce for an explanation:

> A *Symbol* is a sign naturally fit to declare that the set of objects which is denoted by whatever set of indices may be in certain ways attached to it is represented by an icon associated with it. To show what this complicated definition means, let us take as an example of a symbol the word 'loveth'. Associated with this word is an idea, which is the mental icon of one person loving another. Now we are to understand that 'loveth' occurs in a sentence; for what it may mean by itself, if it means anything, is not the question. Let the sentence, then, be 'Ezekiel loveth Huldah'. Ezekiel and Huldah must, then, be or contain indices; for without indices it is impossible to designate what one is talking about. Any mere description would leave it uncertain whether they were not mere characters in a ballad; but whether they be so or not, indices can designate them. Now the effect of the word 'loveth' is that pair of objects denoted by the pair of indices Ezekiel and Huldah is represented by the icon, or the image we have in our minds of a love and his beloved.[2]

Consistent with the preceding chapter, which described the intellectual quality of pragmaticism, we now see that the symbol is the kind of sign which involves mental operation. The icon and the index are essential components for meaning to occur. But it is symbols which provide the area of meaning

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[1] Vol. II, p. 166.

[2] Vol. II, p. 167.

which can be made clear by the pragmatic method and, as will be seen later, which causes people to believe rather than to doubt.

THE RELATION OF SYMBOLISM TO LOGIC

It is hoped that the reader is not weary with the foregoing elaboration of signs because for pragmaticism this delineation is essential to understand the process of logic. This is made clear by Dr. Peirce's definition of Logic: "Logic is the science of the general necessary laws of Signs and especially of Symbols."[1]

With this definition of logic established, pragmaticism defines three departments of the science, or three kinds of logic. The first kind is Critical Logic which is the theory of the conditions of truth. Speculative Grammar is the second kind which has to do with the general conditions of symbols. The third kind is Speculative Rhetoric and is basically the process of logical method.[2]

Critical Logic, also termed "obsistent logic",[3] corresponds to the pragmaticistic category of Secondness. For it is critical logic which considers the conditions of the reference of symbols to their objects. This is to say that through critical logic symbols are seen in relation to their objects thus providing the basis for what is true, and

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[1] Vol. II, p. 52.   [2] *Ibid.*   [3] *Ibid.*

likewise what is false, in the relation. Or we may say, critical logic provides the basis for determining whether or not the symbol conveys accurate meaning of the object as it actually exists.

Speculative Grammar is also called "originalian logic"[1] by Peirce. The clue to the meaning of its process lies in the term original. A similarity will be seen here to the category of Firstness, or being as it originally exists regardless of anything else. Therefore it is accurate to say that speculative grammar is simply the kind of logic which denotes the character or general character of symbols.

Speculative Rhetoric, or "transuasional logic"[2] is the mediating process of logic. By this kind of logic interpretation is produced for it utilizes the general conditions of truth, resulting from critical logic, and the general character of symbols, produced through speculative grammar, and achieves a reference of the two in workable relationships - thus achieving an interpretation of symbols and their relation to truth. Two things must be remembered in transuasional logic: first, that the symbols utilized and the general conditions of their truth determine the kind of interpretation which results; secondly, every interpretation is novel which becomes a new icon, which, in turn becomes the first element of a new symbol.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

This process of logic and symbolism of cognitive thought is summarized by Peirce in these words:

> In consequence of every sign determining an Interpretant, which is itself a sign, we have sign overlying sign. The consequence of this, in its turn, is that a sign may, in its immediate exterior, be of one of the three classes, but may at once determine a sign of another class. But this in its turn determines a sign whose character has to be considered.[1]

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[1] *Ibid.*

CHAPTER V

THE REALITY OF RELATIONISM

From the foregoing chapters it is now clear that relationship is the element which not only makes pragmaticism real but also provides meaning for the structure. In the modes of being, discussed in Chapter One, we found that new being can come only as a result of relationship. Also, it was evident in the steps of the pragmatic method that interpretation is made only after comparison occurs in the process of relation. In Chapter Two it was apparent that the meaning of experience is found only in intellectual interpretation which comes only in the syntheses, or unifying category of consciousness. Further in the discussion of the categories underlying pragmaticism we found the structure of the system in relation. Likewise, in the symbolism of thought, elaborated in the preceding chapter, it is the symbol which carries interpretation as a result of relation. We turn our attention now to the reality of the relational factor in an attempt to see if it is simply a posited factor or if it is as inherent as it now appears.

Already we are making use of both "relation" and "relationship" and using them synonymously. Peirce does this also until in his later writing, *Notes on Metaphysics*, he

makes a distinction between "relation" and "relationship", although he says the difference is trifling. He writes:

> I have, since 1870, written much about the logic of relations. In those writings, I have usually restricted the terms 'relations' and 'relationships' to existential relations and relationships. By a relationship I understand the conception of a fact about a set of things abstracted from the representation of the things themselves or, in other words, a predicate which requires more than one subject to complete a proposition, or conception of a fact. A 'relation' only differs from a 'relationship' in that one of the subjects is regarded as being taken account of first, and is usually called the subject nominative, while the others are called the direct and indirect objects. In other words a relation is a predicate requiring one subject nominative and one or more objects in a definite sequence.[1]

This is to say that the bond between two subjects is a relationship; the bond between a subject and parts or qualities of that subject is a relation. To illustrate, the connection between a person and a table is a relationship while the connection between a person and the arm of that same person is a relation.

Granted that this distinction is minute and a technicality in Peirce's thought regarding relations, the important element to remember in pragmatic thought is that the relation is existent. It has to be neither created nor induced. It is already present! Because of this principle this chapter bears the title, "The Reality of Relationism".

As has been seen in the principles described thus far, the entire structure of pragmaticism is built upon

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[1] Vol. VI, p. 216.

the existence of relationship. This reality of relationism in the structure of pragmatic thought was recapitulated in the opening paragraph of this chapter. The dependence of being, steps of the pragmatic method, categories of Peircian pragmatism, and meaning upon relationship seems sufficiently clear. We now turn our attention to the place of relationship in human conduct and attempt to show the real position of relationship in sensation, consciousness, and volition. Before turning to Sensation as the first division, however, it is necessary to remind ourselves that this is a philosophical treatment of the reality of relationism and is not intended to be construed as Ultimate Reality as either the metaphysician or mathematician would be inclined to do. These words from Dr. Peirce serve as the most adequate preface for what follows insofar as they set the limits for thinking of existent relationships in experience:

> Mathematics is the most abstract of all the sciences. For it makes no external observations, nor asserts anything as a real fact. When the mathematician deals with facts, they become for him mere 'hypotheses'; for with their truth he refuses to concern himself. The whole science of mathematics is a science of hypotheses; so that nothing could be more completely abstracted from concrete reality. Philosophy is not quite so abstract. For though it makes no special observations, as every other positive science does, yet it does deal with phenomena of experience; and these are, generally speaking, sufficiently revealed in the ordinary observations of every-day life. I would even grant that philosophy in the strictest sense confines itself to such observations as must be open to every intelligence which can learn from experience.[1]

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[1] Vol. III, pp. 270, 271.

These three, sensation, consciousness, and volition, are considered categories of the "universal phenomena of experience".[1]

RELATIONISM IN SENSATIONAL EXPERIENCE

To say that impressions received through the senses are dependent upon relationships may be startling at first. However, a brief analysis shows that those things which we say we feel, or taste, or hear are not intuitive impressions. Rather they are felt, and tasted, and heard in comparison with other impressions. The list of illustrations could be multiplied many times but these three will suffice here.

We may say that by feeling we can identify woolen cloth. A closer look reveals that in the process of identification we are obliged to rub our fingers over the cloth. In so doing we are comparing our sensations of this experience with those of another experience. Only by this procedure can we tell if the cloth is woolen or silken. Two relationships are evidenced here. We are relating the qualities of wool and of silk as they are contained in the positive qualitative potential of the cloth. And we are also relating our past experience of sensations in which we have learned to associate certain qualities with the name "wool" and certain other qualities with the name "silk".[2]

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] This illustration is utilised by Dr. Peirce in Vol. V, p. 140.

For a second illustration we turn to the sense of hearing. We hear the pitch of a tone or the screech of a whistle. We at once say that the tone is that of a piano, or a trumpet, or a bird. Some may go farther and say that the tone is that of a in the musical scale. In the case of the screeching noise, we say that it is the sound of a whistle. Obviously the ears do not tell us that it is a piano tone or a trumpet tone, or sound of a bird or even the sound of a whistle. They simply hear the noise and through our intellectual cognition and acquired abilities to compare one sound with another we relate one sound with another so as to identify it. In the case of identifying a certain tone of the musical scale we are making an added relation of one tone to another depending upon the quality and frequency of impressions received by the ears.[1]

The last illustration here concerns the sense of taste. We may say that a certain food tastes salty. Again two comparisons of relationships inhere in this statement. In such a statement is the comparison of a salt-taste with a taste that is non-salty. Also we are comparing the quality of a certain food which has salt in it with the quality of the same food without salt, or at least, without so much salt.

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[1] Ibid. This illustration is adapted from one used by Dr. Peirce.

These illustrations serve to clarify two principles of sensation. First, that the relationship in sensational experience is determined by the quality of the texture, sound, or taste of the representamen. Secondly, that the relationship contained in the experience is also determined by previous cognitions of prior experiences. Always and everywhere relationship inheres! In this connection Peirce says:

> Thus, the sensation, so far as it represents something, is determined, according to a logical law, by previous cognitions; that is to say, these cognitions determine that there shall be a sensation. But so far as the sensation is a mere feeling of a particular sort, it is determined only by an inexplicable, occult power; and so far, it is not a representation, but only the material quality of a representation.[1]

Certainly, the reality of relationism in sensational experience cannot be refuted.

RELATIONISM IN CONSCIOUSNESS

This phrase from Peirce, "Thought is a thread of melody running through the succession of our sensations",[2] is not only picturesque but also carries a significant premise of the structure of pragmaticism.

The interpretative quality of cognitive thought was discussed in detail in the preceding chapter. To demonstrate the element of relationism which is inherent in all conscious-

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[1] Vol. V, p. 175. [2] Vol. V, p. 254.

ness this illustration from Peirce is adequate:

> In a piece of music there are the separate notes, and there is the air. A single tone may be prolonged for an hour or a day, and it exists as perfectly in each second of that time as in the whole taken together; so that, as long as it is sounding, it might be present to a sense from which everything in the past was as completely absent as the future itself. But it is different with the air, the performance of which occupies a certain time, during the portions of which only portions of it are played. It consists in an orderliness in the succession of sounds which strike the ear at different times; and to perceive it there must be some continuity of consciousness which makes the events of a lapse of time present to us. We certainly only perceive the air by hearing the separate notes; yet we cannot be said to directly hear it, for we hear only what is present at the instant, and an orderliness of succession cannot exist in an instant. These two sorts of objects, what we are *immediately* conscious of and what we are *mediately* conscious of, are found in all consciousness. Some elements (the sensations) are completely present at every instant so long as they last, while others (like thought) are actions having beginning, middle, and end, and consist in a congruence in the succession of sensations which flow through the mind.[1]

This illustration serves to describe succinctly the relationism which is present in all consciousness. Only individual notes can be cognized in one instant but their relation which is present in conscious thought produces the melody. Surely the reality of this relationism cannot be disputed.

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[1] *Ibid.*

RELATIONISM IN VOLITION

When we come to the reality of relationism in volition the element of relationism becomes more apparent and leads us forcibly to consider the hypothesis that relation is the result of action as well as the initiator of it. Thus, the cyclical nature of relationism is as real as the cyclical nature of experience. This interpretation leads Peirce to the conclusion that "existence is purely dyadic.[1] This is to say that existence is relational. In elucidation of this hypothesis Peirce says:

> A dyad consists of two subjects brought into oneness. These subjects have their modes of being in themselves, and they also have their modes of being, as first and second, etc., in connection with each other. They are two, if not really, at least in aspect. There is also some sort of union of them. The dyad is not the subjects; it has the subjects as one element of it. It has, besides, a suchness of monoidal character; and it has suchness, or suchnesses, peculiar to it as a dyad. The dyad brings the subjects together, and in doing so imparts a character to each of them. Those characters are, in some sense, two. . . .
>
> As an example of a dyad take this: God said, Let there be light, and there was light. We must not think of this as a verse of Genesis, for Genesis would be a third thing. Neither must we think of it as proposed for our acceptance, or as held for true; for we are third parties. We must simply think of God creating light by fiat. Not that the fiat and the coming into being of the light were two facts; but that it is one indivisible fact. God and light are the subjects. The act of creation is to be regarded, not as any third object, but merely as the suchness of connection of God and light. The dyad is the fact. It determines the existence of the light, and the creatorship of God. . . .

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[1] Vol. I, p. 164.

> I chose this instance because it is represented as instantaneous. Had there been any process intervening between the causal act and the effect, this would have been a medial, or third, element. Thirdness, in the sense of the category, is the same as mediation. For that reason, pure dyadism is an act of arbitrary will or blind force; for if there is any reason, or law, governing it, that mediates between the two subjects and brings about their connection. The dyad is an individual fact, as it existentially is; and it has no generality in it. The being of a monadic quality is a mere potentiality, without existence. Existence is purely dyadic.[1]

It must be recalled in this regard that Being, as described in Chapter One, consists of three modes. The reality of relationism in no way alters these three modes of quality, relation, and representation. Rather it again emphasizes the second mode and elaborates this mode as pure "existence". The first mode, that of quality, is called simply "being".

Before proceeding further, however, a brief definition of volition must be made. For pragmaticism, as for other systems of philosophical thought, volition means will. Volition, or will, is the "middle" area of consciousness. It comes after cognition and before action. It contrasts sharply with actions that have been completed in the past, for volition is not of the past. Neither is it of the future for it is not yet accomplished although it looks to the future. Therefore, it is the middle area of consciousness between completed past and effected future. In this

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[1] Vol. I, pp. 163, 164.

fact lies the relational nature of volition. It is always between. As such, therefore, it is always between something and something else. The something and something else may be any elements of experience - ideas, laws, phenomena, feelings, material objects, or personal subjects.

Relationism is existential in two ways. It may simply exist as "blind force" or it may result from an act of arbitrary will. Relationism as a result of action will be discussed in the succeeding section. Here, we shall confine our consideration to existence inherent in blind force. Peirce describes this kind of relational existence in this way:

> It is to be noted that existence is an affair of blind force. 'The very hyssop that grows on the wall exists in that chink because the whole universe could not prevent it.' No law determines any atom to exist. Existence is presence in some experiential universe - whether the universe of material things now existing, or that of laws, or that of phenomena, or that of feelings - and this presence implies that each existing thing is in dynamical reaction with every other in that universe. Existence, therefore, is dyadic; though Being is monadic.[1]

Peirce's illustration of the growth of thistles in spite of the whole universe is vivid. However, for our purposes, we shall confine our discussion to the will of personal subjects rather than to weeds.

Where will is involved relationship is always found. If one wills to change his pattern of life, there is the

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[1] Vol. I, p. 165.

relationship of two patterns - the pattern he is now following and the pattern he wills to follow. Another illustration of a more tangible nature is equally clear. If one wills to move a chair from one place to another, there is present the relationship of the prior position of the chair to the new position.

In a more philosophical vein Dr. Peirce describes the reality of relationism in volition this way:

> Volition is through and through dual. There is the duality of agent and patient, of effort and resistance, of active effort and inhibition, of acting on self and on external objects.[1]

Volition is further classified as "active" and "passive" by Peirce.[2] Active volition is represented by the will to change things; passive volition is represented by the will to keep things as they are. The latter is also termed "inertia" by pragmaticism. This distinction provides the basis for different grades of experience from which learning derives. Peirce recognizes the jolt of critical experiences which jolt the passive volition sharply. This he terms "shock" and explains its place in volitional relationism thus:

> Moreover, there is active volition and passive volition, or inertia, the volition of reform and the volition of conservatism. That shock which we experience when anything particularly unexpected forces itself upon our recognition (which has a cognitive utility as being a call for explanation of the presentment), is simply the sense of the volitional inertia of expect-

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[1] Vol. I, p. 167. [2] Ibid.

> ation, which strikes a blow like a water-hammer when it is checked; and the force of this blow, if one could measure it, would be the measure of the energy of the conservative volition that gets checked. Low grades of this shock doubtless accompany all unexpected perceptions; and every perception is more or less unexpected.[1]

Certainly the reality of relationism in volition stands upon solid foundation. We turn now to relation as the result of action.

RELATION AS THE RESULT OF ACTION

In the early writing already mentioned, How To Make Our Ideas Clear, Peirce says that thought is an action consisting in a relation.[2] He continues to explain that a person performs an action but not a relation for a relation can only be the result of an action.[3]

In the light of the foregoing discussion, then, it seems accurate to conclude that a person is in relationship and performs actions that affect existent relations. This completes the cyclical nature of relationship.

As we conclude this division on the structure of pragmatism it is significant to return to the relation of meaning and conduct. For upon this relation does pragmatism achieve its high place in the realm of philosophical systems.

The purpose of pragmatism can be briefly stated as a method for ascertaining meanings of hard words and abstract concepts. Three modes of being, quality, relation, and

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[1] Ibid. [2] Vol. V, p. 256. [3] Ibid.

representation exist. These modes of being provide the basis for inquiry as it is pursued by pragmatism since an experience, which is the unit of learning, has meaning only as the relation of these three elements is interpreted. Interpretation is made by cognitive or intellectual process and expressed in signs, of which the chief is symbols.

We come now to the important question, what is the purpose of thought?

Pragmatism, as outlined by Peirce, has a clear answer. Thought is an action produced by relation of feeling and will which produces a single interpretation or a synthesis of thought at any one instant. The purpose of thought is not simply to reproduce itself but rather to bring meaning to the relations which exist. Therefore, the purpose of thought is to produce actions which will in turn produce new relations. Peirce expresses it in these words:

> From all these sophisms we shall be perfectly safe so long as we reflect that the whole function of thought is to produce habits of action; and that whatever there is connected with a thought, but irrelevant to its purpose, is an accretion to it, but no part of it. If there be a unity among our sensations which has no reference to how we shall act on a given occasion, as when we listen to a piece of music, why we do not call that thinking. To develop its meaning, we have, therefore, simply to determine what habits it produces, for what a thing means is simply what habits it involves. Now, the identity of a habit depends on how it might lead us to act, not merely under such circumstances as are likely to arise, but under such as might possibly occur, no matter how improbable they may be. What the habit is depends on *when* and *how* it causes us to act. As for the *when*, every stimulus to action is derived from perception; as for the *how*, every purpose of action is to produce some

> sensible result. Thus, we come down to what is tangible and conceivably practical, as the root of every real distinction of thought, no matter how subtile it may be; and there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice.[1]

Actions, then, precipitate sensible perceptions and sensible perceptions produce sensible actions. In this fact lie the relations produced by actions. Not only are perceptions and actions related; they are cyclical. Now we have meaning in the pragmatic rule for attaining understanding and clarity in conceptions:

> Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.[2]

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[1] Vol. V, pp. 256-257. [2] Vol. V, p. 258.

Division B

THE NATURE OF PRAGMATICISM

CHAPTER VI

SYNECHISM AND TYCHISM

The preceding division has presented pragmaticism as a system of philosophical inquiry. Attention was given to the meaning of Being and Substance, the categories upon which pragmaticism is built, the centrality of relationism, the emphasis upon meaning which is the result of intellectual interpretation, and the symbolic nature of all communication of meaning. We turn now to the nature of the pragmatic method.

As we begin to consider the nature of the pragmatic method, the first thing that must be said about it is a reiteration of a principle contained in the opening chapter. We refer to the progressive nature of the method. Remember that pragmatism is not a final systematic statement of truth to be either tenaciously defended or strictly transmitted. Rather it is a process of inquiry aimed at determining meanings by testing intellectual conceptions. Each conception of the immediate present becomes an hypothesis to be tested in the future by the total meaning of it as a conception, including its consequences. In this way new meanings are achieved as the testing process continues. Meanings are cumulative, then, since a meaning arrived at in the past

becomes a part of each new hypothesis to be tested. The first description of the nature of pragmaticism, then, includes the words "progressive" and "cumulative".

Doubtless, the word "cumulative" has the same meaning for most readers but one word of interpretation must be given about the use of "progressive". The word "progressive" in this connection does not mean to imply a movement toward a higher level of attainment as set forth by the preconceived criteria of any system of judgment, be it either religious or speculative. Instead, use of the word "progressive" means simply that movement does occur as new interpretations are made. By utilizing these words we have attempted to present the first principles of the nature of pragmaticism. We shall now examine it in detail by a closer look at the principle of synechism.

THE NATURE OF SYNECHISM

Synechism can be briefly defined as the law of continuity. In the foregoing paragraphs we referred to the continuing nature of pragmaticism as a principle of its nature. A principle which can be universally applied becomes a law. In the following paragraphs it will become clear that this principle can be so universally applied to pragmaticism that it can properly be called a law.

A first attempt by Peirce to define synechism is stated thus:

> Logical analysis applied to mental phenomena shows that there is but one law of mind, namely that ideas tend to spread continuously and to affect certain others which stand to them in a peculiar relation of affectibility. In this spreading they lose intensity, and especially the power of affecting others, but gain generality and become welded with other ideas.[1]

This definition limits the law of continuity to the area of the mind or to the realm of ideas. In a little while we shall discover that Peirce applied the law of synechism to the natural universe as well, as he refined this definition.

In Chapter Two the substantive nature of cognition was seen. Once a cognition becomes isolated in the consciousness, it becomes a subject-in-itself which is capable of affecting other ideas. The problem here confronted is: can an idea which occurred in the past still be a present idea in the mind? Since an idea is made an individual subject in pragmatic thought, the question as to whether or not it remains an individual subject for all time is an essential and significant one.

The law of continuity, or synechism, restates the principle of process of idea in the recognition that one idea, as a subject, affects the ideas which follow it. Once it becomes a subject, it inherently stands in relation to other subjects and hence meaning is derived from both the quality

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[1] Vol. VI, p. 87.

of the subject and the relationships in which it stands. Synechism goes on to say that in the process ideas lose their intensity and immediate presentness as individual subjects. As they become fused with other ideas they assume a general nature which is fused in succeeding subjects.

How can ideas that are past be present? Furthermore, how can these past ideas be present in immediate consciousness? Peirce answers in these words:

> Some minds will here jump to the conclusion that a past idea cannot in any sense be present. But that is hasty and illogical. How extravagant, too, to pronounce our whole knowledge of the past to be mere delusion! Yet it would seem that the past is as completely beyond the bounds of possible experience as a Kantian thing-in-itself.
>
> How can a past idea be present? Not vicariously. Then, only by direct perception. In other words, to be present, it must be ipso facto present. That is, it cannot be wholly past; it can only be going, infinitesimally past, less past than any assignable past date. We are thus brought to the conclusion that the present is connected with the past by a series of real infinitesimal steps.[1]

We come now to the second question posed in the preceding paragraph: are past ideas present in immediate consciousness?

In answer to this the law of synechism replies that ideas do lose intensity. There comes a time then when ideas, as individual subjects, are not ipso facto present. Since they are welded into the continuity of ideas, however, they

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[1] Vol. VI, pp. 88, 89.

must be in some fashion a part of the present. The answer from pragmaticism includes the hypothesis that consciousness is continuous also. In Peirce's own words comes this reply:

> But yet consciousness must essentially cover an interval of time; for if it did not, we could gain no knowledge of time, and not merely no veracious cognition of it, but no conception whatever. We are, therefore, forced to say that we are immediately conscious through an infinitesimal interval of time.
>
> This is all that is requisite. For in this infinitesimal interval, not only is consciousness continuous in a subjective sense, that is, considered as a subject or substance having the attribute of duration, but also, because it is immediate consciousness, its object is *ipso facto* continuous. In fact, this infinitesimally spread-out consciousness is a direct feeling of its contents as spread-out. . . . In an infinitesimal interval we directly perceive the temporal sequence of its beginning, middle, and end - not, of course, in the way of recognition, for recognition is only of the past, but in the way of immediate feeling. Now upon this interval follows another, whose beginning is the middle of the former, and whose middle is the end of the former. Here, we have an immediate perception of the temporal sequence of its beginning, middle, and end, or say of the second, third, and fourth instants. From these two immediate perceptions, we gain a mediate, or inferential, perception of the relation of all four instants. This mediate perception is objectively, or as to the object represented, spread over the four instants; but subjectively, or as itself the subject of duration, it is completely embraced in second moment. . . . Now, let there be an indefinite succession of these inferential acts of comparative perception, and it is plain that the last moment will contain objectively the whole series. Let there be, not merely an indefinite succession, but a continuous flow of inference through a finite time, and the result will be a mediate objective consciousness of the whole time in the last moment. In this last moment, the whole series will be recognized, or known as known before, except only the last moment, which of course will be absolutely unrecognizable to itself. Indeed, even this last moment will be recognized like the rest, or, at least, be just beginning to be so.[1]

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[1] Vol. VI, pp. 89, 90.

It is now apparent that not only do ideas ascribe to the law of synechism, but also consciousness and time. Let us turn to the natural world and we will soon see that the principle of continuity becomes so universal in pragmaticistic thought that it can be readily called a law.

Peirce often uses the creation of the universe as an illustration. In this regard he was an avowed evolutionist, indeed a religious evolutionist. We have seen in the foregoing discussion that generality is an element of continuity, produced by relations and in process of time. Of the creation of the universe with inherent relationships Peirce reveals the combination of admitted faith in God coupled with a scientific evolutionism when he says:

> Yet we must not assume that the qualities arose separate and came into relation afterward. It was just the reverse. The general indefinite potentiality became limited and heterogeneous. Those who express the idea to themselves by saying that the Divine Creator determined so and so may be incautiously clothing the idea in a garb that is open to criticism, but it is, after all, substantially the only philosophical answer to the problem. Namely, they represent the ideas as springing into a preliminary stage of being by their own inherent firstness. But so springing up, they do not spring up isolated; for if they did, nothing could unite them. They spring up in reaction upon one another, and thus into a kind of existence.[1]

Pragmaticism, then, attributes to a Divine Creator a creation in which inheres a relational state of qualities. This dynamic state Peirce here calls "existence". It is essential in this regard to note his definition of existence:

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[1] Vol. VI, p. 136.

> We shall naturally suppose, of course, that existence is a stage of evolution. *This existence* is presumably but a *special* existence. *We need not* suppose that every form needs for its evolution to emerge into this world, but only that it needs to enter into *some* theatre of reactions, of which this is one.[1]

Creation can justifiably be credited to a Divine source. Creation gives not only firstness to the creation, but also places relations as its inherent nature. Pragmaticism attributes the remainder of the meaning to its own method of ascertaining meaning out of subjects in relationship.

The synechistic principle is evident in Peirce's explanation of the evolution of "forms". Although he does not say explicitly, it seems that the forms he is thinking of are of the natural world:

> The evolution of forms begins or, at any rate, has for an early stage of it, a vague potentiality; and that either is or is followed by a continuum of forms having a multitude of dimensions too great for the individual dimensions to be distinct. It must be by a contradiction of the vagueness of that potentiality of everything in general, but of nothing in particular, that the world of forms comes about.[2]

It is readily apparent that either the theory of evolutionism produced the principle of synechism or, if synechism came first in the thought of Peirce, it found forcible support in the evolutionary theory. The chronology of Peirce's writings would indicate that the former is true. Just as evolutionary thought proceeds from the vague to the

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[1] Vol. VI, p. 135.   [2] *Ibid.*

definite, synechism proceeds from the specific to the general, or more accurately, to the relational generality. Furthermore, the separated points are indestructibly welded together in the on-going process in the law of synechism.

Of the definition and elaboration of synechism contained in this discussion so far, Peirce later wrote:[1]

> I feel that I ought to make amends for my blundering treatment of Continuity in a paper entitled "The Law of Mind", in Vol. II of The Monist, by here redefining it after close and long study of the question. Whatever is continuous has material parts.[2]

He then goes on to say:

> I begin by defining these thus: The material parts of a thing or other object, W, that is composed of such parts, are whatever things are, firstly, each and every one of them, other than W; secondly, are all of some one internal nature (for example, are all places, or all times, or all spatial realities, or are all spiritual realities, or are all ideas, or are all characters, or are all relations, or are all external representations, etc.); thirdly, form together a collection of objects in which no one occurs twice over and, fourthly, are such that the Being of each of them together with the modes of connexion between all sub-collections of them, constitute the being of W.[3]

This redefinition of synechism here made by Peirce in no way negates his earlier explanation of the place and function of it. However, it is significant because, as was seen in the foregoing dissussion concerning ideas, the law of continuity tends to be so potent that all ideas become general and not vividly present in the immediate instant of

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[1] About 1910. [2] Vol. VI, p. 118. [3] Vol. VI, p. 119.

time. No doubt it is this concern that prompted Dr. Peirce to emphasize later the individualized "parts" of generality. Without refuting, in any sense, the operability of one idea affecting another, emphasis is now placed on the individual reality of a specific quality or object. This is accomplished in two ways: First, by noting the common internal nature of the individual parts and second, by emphasizing the individuality of objects which are related by connectional qualities or relations. Peirce uses the phrase "absolutely independent members" to accomplish this emphasis and explains it thus:

> What I mean by that expression is that every member is distinguished from every other by possessing some one or another elementary and definite non-relative character which that other does not possess; and that this is the usual acceptation of the expression is evidenced by the fact that the majority of logicians are in the habit of conceiving of a universe of absolutely distinct individual objects, by which they only mean that every individual is in every respect, of a certain universe of respects, determined in one or other of two ways and that every individual is differently determined from every other in some of those respects; and they do not generally conceive that every individual object has a determination in any one elementary and definite respect, while all the other individuals are determined in the opposite way.[1]

This emphasis upon individuality is no doubt essential for clarification. On the other hand it seems clear that the entire law of synechism, as it was first discussed, is dependent upon the existence of individual subjects - be they ideas, objects, persons, or signs. Only as they exist individually

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[1] Vol. VI, p. 122.

can they stand in the relationship of affectibility to other subjects.

THE NATURE OF TYCHISM

Like synechism, the principle of tychism is held by pragmaticism to be sufficiently universal to be termed a law. The word means literally "chance" and in one brief sentence Peirce defines tychism as "the doctrine that absolute chance is a factor of the universe".[1] At first glance this may appear contradictory in light of the place given to the law of continuity by pragmatic thought.

Most of the illustrations utilized by Peirce to explain the reality of tychism are related to the evolutionary process. But it is clear that the principle is equally operative in the realm of ideas and the area of habits which regulate conduct. In general terms Peirce says when he speaks of chance "I only employ a mathematical term to express with accuracy the characteristics of freedom or sponaneity".[2]

Freedom or spontaneity is inherent in the category of Firstness, or quality. If we recall this is the given element in the relational triad of pragmatic categories, then, we see the consistency of tychism throughout the system. It will be remembered that the first category was described as

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[1] Vol. VI, p. 137. [2] Vol. VI, p. 138.

positive potential possibility. There is a sense in which this possibility is not determined by either relations or relationships; therefore the law of chance enters into its being.

The law of chance is illustrated by Peirce's explanation of the origin of the universe. He says:

> The initial condition, before the universe existed was not a state of pure abstract being. On the contrary it was a state of just nothing at all, not even a state of emptiness, for even emptiness is something.
>
> If we are to proceed in a logical and scientific manner, we must, in order to account for the whole universe, suppose an initial condition in which the whole universe was non-existent, and therefore a state of absolute nothing. . . .
>
> But start, then, with nothing, pure zero. But this is not the nothing of negation. For not means other than, and other is merely a synonym of the ordinal numeral second. As such it implies a first; while the present pure zero is prior to every first. The nothing of negation is the nothing of death, which comes second to, or after, everything. But this pure zero is the nothing of not having been born. There is no individual thing, no compulsion, outward nor inward, no law. It is the germinal nothing, in which the whole universe is involved or fore-shadowed. As such, it is absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility - boundless possibility. There is no compulsion and no law. It is boundless freedom.
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> So of potential being there was in that initial state no lack.[1]

Not only was tychism inherent in the creation of the universe but its principle of chance has shown itself in the process of evolution. Peirce writes this in substantiation of this principle:

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[1] Vol. VI, pp. 147, 148.

> By thus admitting pure spontaneity or life as a character of the universe, acting always and everywhere though restrained within narrow bounds by law, producing infinitesimal departures from law continually, and great ones with infinite infrequency, I account for all the variety and diversity of the universe, in the only sense in which the really *sui generis* and new can be said to be accounted for. The ordinary view has to admit the inexhaustible multitudinous variety of the world, has to admit that its mechanical law cannot account for this in the least, that variety can spring only from spontaneity, and yet denies without any evidence or reason the existence of this spontaneity, or else shoves it back to the beginning of time and supposes it dead ever since.[1]

One of the most conclusive examples of the law of chance is shown by Peirce in the throwing of a pair of dice. He says that every throw of the dice is a chance. The position in which the dice come to rest is determined by precise mechanical laws and are always the same. The numbered side of the dice, however, which comes up is irregular and the result of chance. The laws by which the dice come to rest operate in the same way regardless of which side is up. Peirce elaborates on this illustration in this way:

> The chance lies in the diversity of throws; and this diversity cannot be due to laws which are immutable.
>
> 'The diversity is due to the diverse circumstances under which the laws act. The dice lie differently in the box, and the motion given to the box is different. These are the unknown causes which produce the throws, and to which we give the name of chance; not the mechanical law which regulates the operation of these causes. . . .'[2]

Again, in this illustration, we see the law of tychism operating in the category of the giveness, or Firstness.

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[1] Vol. VI, p. 41. [2] Vol. VI, pp. 39, 40.

In the realm of ideas the law of chance is equally real. To show its reality Peirce evolves a triad. This triad is composed of feelings, efforts, and habits. First, there are feelings which stand in relation to other feelings, or to any other subject. The second element is effort which relates the feeling to another subject in some way. The result is a tendency toward a habit, or a habit itself. Because this is a living triad, the element of chance is present. Peirce emphasizes this in these words:

> But what I mean is, that all that there is, is First, Feelings; Second, Efforts; Third, Habits - all of which are more familiar to us on their psychical side than on their physical side; and that dead matter would be merely the final result of the complete induration of habit reducing the free play of feeling and the brute irrationality of effort to complete death. Now I would suppose that that result of evolution is not quite complete even in our beakers and crucibles.[1]

In both realms, of nature and ideas, there is one additional element contained in the tychistic principle that must be mentioned, although it is logically contained in the principle. Variety is inherent in the universe. The law of chance is operative although no scientific rules for its performance can be prescribed. Therefore, variety is always changing. This is inherent in the fact that chance cannot be regulated. Peirce speaks directly to this when he compares pragmaticism to the philosophy of necessitarianism:

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[1] Vol. VI, p. 138.

> But what is first for us is not first in nature. The premisses of Nature's own process are all the independent uncaused elements of facts that go to make up the variety of nature which the necessitarian supposes to have been all in existence from the foundation of the world, but which the Tychist supposes are continually receiving new accretions.[1]

Tychism has been treated in this chapter following Synechism. This was purposely done for, in spite of its important position, Tychism is considered by Peirce to take a secondary place to Synechism. He says:

> Permit me further to say that I object to having my metaphysical system as a whole called Tychism. For although tychism does enter into it, it only enters as subsidiary to that which is really, as I regard it, the characteristic of my doctrine, namely, that I chiefly insist upon continuity, or Thirdness, and, in order to secure to thirdness its really commanding function, I find it indispensable fully (to) recognize that it is a third, and that Firstness, or chance, and Secondness, or Brute reaction, are other elements, without the independence of which Thirdness would not have anything upon which to operate. Accordingly, I like to call my theory Synechism, because it rests on the study of continuity. I would not object to Tritism. And if anybody can prove that it is trite, that would delight me (in) the chiefest degree.[2]

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[1] Vol. V, p. 76. [2] Vol. VI, p. 138.

CHAPTER VII

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ABDUCTIVE THOUGHT

In the opening chapters emphasis was given to the fact that hypotheses could be tested by the pragmatic method of inquiry. It is now realized that if pragmatism is to be true to its own method the meaning of hypotheses must be examined and a look taken at the kind of logical processes which must be applied for the testing of an hypothesis as well as providing the method by which hypotheses are produced.

Remembering that all hypotheses are symbols because words are symbols, Dr. Peirce places all hypotheses under three categories. All propositions can be classified as *Terms*, *Propositions*, or *Arguments*. His definition of these is:

> A *Term* is a sign which leaves its Object, and a *fortiori* its Interpretant, to be what it may. A *Proposition* is a sign which distinctly indicates the Object which it denotes, called its *Subject*, but leaves its Interpretant to be what it may. An *Argument* is a sign which distinctly represents the Interpretant, called its *Conclusion*, which it is intended to determine. That which remains of a Proposition after removal of its Subject is a Term (a rhema) called its Predicate. That which remains of an Argument when its Conclusion is removed is a Proposition called its Premiss, or (since it is ordinarily copalative) more usually its Premisses.[1]

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[1] Vol. II, pp. 52, 53.

In this definition we see the cyclical nature of an hypothesis. Remove the conclusion from any hypothesis and all that remains is the premise which is either a new term, a new proposition, or a new hypothesis.

Because pragmaticism is a system of inquiry aimed at establishing or disestablishing an hypothesis it focuses attention upon the Argument. Peirce claims that all argument is of three kinds: deduction, induction, or abduction.[1] The first two kinds are common in philosophical circles. Abduction is peculiar to pragmatism, particularly to Peircian pragmaticism.

Before looking at the three kinds of reasoning in detail, with special attention to abduction, it is important to consider the purpose of reasoning. To determine the purpose of reasoning embodied in pragmaticism, we shall posit three possible answers and look to Dr. Peirce for the replies.

Is reasoning employed for contemplative satisfaction? Dr. Peirce answers:

> The Germans, whose tendency is to look at everything subjectively and to exaggerate the element of Firstness, maintain that the object is simply to satisfy one's logical feeling and that the goodness of reasoning consists in that esthetic satisfaction alone. This might do if we were gods and not subject to the force of experience.[2]

Does reasoning provide personal gain? To this Peirce replies:

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[1] Vol. II, p. 53. [2] Vol. V, pp. 98, 99.

> Or if the force of experience were mere blind compulsion, and we were utter foreigners in the world, then again we might as well think to please ourselves; because we then never could make our thoughts conform to that mere Secondness.[1]

Does reasoning produce knowledge? The philosophy of Peircian pragmatism responds:

> But the saving truth is that there is a Thirdness in experience, an element of Reasonableness to which we can train our own reason to conform more and more. If this were not the case, there could be no such thing as logical goodness or badness; and therefore we need not wait until it is proved that there is a reason operative in experience to which our own can approximate. We should at once hope that it is so, since in that hope lies the only possibility of any knowledge.[2]

Pragmaticism, then, attributes all knowledge to the reasoning process. It is important to keep this premise always in mind. Experience as the unit of learning was established early in this treatise. Experience was then defined as experiment. The meaning of experience is derived by intellectual processes. Therefore, in pragmaticism, learning, or knowledge, comes from the reasoning process by which meaning is derived.

This is the significant thesis of this treatise. Note the difference from the popular maxim of progressive education as derived from the philosophy of John Dewey. The maxim from Dewey's philosophy is that "we learn by doing". Pragmatism, as conceived and expounded by Peirce, also says that the unit of learning is the experience of doing, or

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[1] Vol. V, p. 99.   [2] Ibid.

more accurately, one experience of one doing. However, Peirce is careful to say that we learn only by the meaning which is derived from the doing. This writer cannot help but feel that Dewey perceived this distinction and adhered to the philosophy as enunciated by Peirce. But, in his writings, Dewey's emphasis becomes so predominantly occupied with the providing of experiences in education that the emphasis on the meaning produced from experience becomes seriously subordinated, if not altogether omitted.

With this emphasis upon reasoning as the originating source of learning, or knowledge, let us now examine more closely the three kinds of reasoning.

DEDUCTION

Deductive reasoning, also termed necessary reasoning by pragmaticism, is usually defined as that kind of reasoning which begins with a general supposition, or a theory, and determines to what extent this supposition is substantiated by particular phenomena. The beginning theory is an hypothesis of generality. Peirce describes deduction in this way:

> We consider this hypothetical state of things and are led to conclude that, however it may be with the universe in other respects, wherever and whenever the hypothesis may be realized something else not explicitly supposed in that hypothesis will be true invariably. Our inference is valid if an only if there really is such a relation between the state of things supposed in the premisses and the state of things stated in the conclusion.[1]

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[1] *Ibid.*

The emphasis here is upon relation; the relation of particular propositions to the general theory with which we begin. The movement is from general to particular in order to predict that which is true in particular cases must be similarly true in all cases.

Deductive reasoning has two parts according to Peirce. The first part is the explanation of the hypothesis in order to make the hypothesis as clear as possible. This does not involve experimentation for it is logical explanation. It cannot be proved or disproved by experience for as long as the logic is correct the conclusion reached by the logic must be true.

The second part of deduction is demonstration of the logic. Demonstration requires something of diagrammatic nature to represent, or demonstrate, the logic of the explanation. Peirce calls this part "Deductive Argumentation".[1] He describes it in these words:

> It invariably requires something of the nature of a diagram; that is, an 'Icon', or Sign that represents its Object in resembling it. It usually, too, needs 'Indices', or Signs that represent their Objects by being actually connected with them. But it is mainly composed of 'Symbols' or Signs that represent their Objects essentially because they will be so interpreted. Demonstration should be Corollarial when it can.[2]

We see here both the relation of particular propositions to the general argument and the expression of this relation

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[1] Vol. VI, p. 321. [2] Vol. VI, pp. 321, 322.

through a Sign, usually a Symbol. Actually these two relations comprise only one relation - the relation of conclusion to the beginning hypothesis. The relation of particular proposition to general proposition is one specific form of the logic employed to illustrate that which must be so, and the relation of symbol to the proposition is the expression of the relation of the particular to the general.

Deductive reasoning places emphasis on the relation of the conclusion to beginning hypothesis. The truth of the conclusion, as it might or might not be verified by experience, is not of import. Peirce says:

> Whether this really be so or not is a question of reality, and has nothing at all to do with how we may be inclined to think. If a given person is unable to see the connection, the argument is none the less valid, provided that relation of real facts really subsists. If the entire human race were unable to see the connection, the argument would be none the less sound, although it would not be humanly clear.[1]

The place of the relation of conclusion to hypothesis in deduction becomes clear in the more technical definition of deduction which Peirce constructs in his writings on Logic. It is stated thus:

> An Obsistent Argument, or Deduction, is an argument representing facts in the Premiss, such that when we come to represent them in a Diagram we find ourselves compelled to represent the fact stated in the Conclusion; so that the Conclusion is drawn to recognize that, quite independently of whether it be recognized or not, the facts stated in the premisses are such as could not be if the

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[1] Vol. V, pp. 99, 100.

> fact stated in the conclusion were not there; that is to say, the Conclusion is drawn in acknowledgment that the facts stated in the Premiss constitute an Index of the fact which it is thus compelled to acknowledge.[1]

Deductive reasoning, then, can be described as compulsive and diagrammatic.

INDUCTION

Like deductive reasoning, induction also begins with an hypothesis. From this hypothesis general predictions of its phenomena are made. Induction then consists in experimentation. This experimentation provides the observations in order to determine to what extent particular phenomena agree with the general theory. The movement then is from particular phenomena to the general; from observations of particular phenomena to support of the general hypothesis. The emphasis is upon experimentation in order to discover what is actually true of the hypothesis.

Inductive reasoning evaluates the hypothesis by observing particular phenomena. Here again is the relation of the general to the specific. In contrast to deduction, induction demonstrates the relation of conclusion to hypothesis that can be proved to be real. To achieve this the same conditions surrounding the experimentation must be maintained. Peirce says:

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[1] Vol. II, p. 53.

> When I say that by inductive reasoning I mean a course of experimental investigation, I do not understand experiment in the narrow sense of an operation by which one varies the conditions of a phenomenon almost as one pleases. . . . Like any interrogatory, it is based on a supposition. If that supposition be correct, a certain sensible result is to be expected under certain circumstances which can be created or at any rate are to be met with.[1]

Induction, therefore does not deal with probability. Peirce is clear about this when he says of induction, "It essentially refers to a course of experience, or at least of real events; because mere possibilities are not capable of being counted."[2]

Hence, the relation between general and specific in induction is regular throughout the process of experimentation. Induction is not concerned with logical probability because probability is not real. It is concerned with demonstrating the regularity of relation of the particular with the general. Peirce describes the factor of regularity in this way:

> The principle of the demonstration is that whatever has no end can have no mode of being other than that of a law, and therefore whatever general character it may have must be describable, but the only way of describing an endless series is by stating explicitly or implicitly the law of the succession of one term upon another. But every such term has a finite ordinal place from the beginning and therefore, if it presents any regularity for all finite successions from the beginning, it presents the same regularity throughout.[3]

Still one more question needs to be asked about the inductive method of reasoning. That question is this: are the experiments utilized in the reasoning process capable of

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[1] Vol. V, p. 103. [2] Vol. V, p. 104. [3] Vol. V, p. 105.

exhaustion? In induction the validity of the general principle is dependent upon a series of experiments involving particular situations so the general character of the conclusions support or disqualify the general beginning hypothesis. It would seem to follow then that there could come a time when no further experimentation would remain in the area of a single theory. Pragmaticism says that experiment is inexhaustible! Listen to Peirce's own words:

> But I must not be understood as meaning that experience can be exhausted, or that any approach to exhaustion can be made. What I mean is that if there be a series of objects, say crosses and circles, this series having a beginning but no end, then whatever may be the arrangement or want of arrangement of these crosses and circles in the entire endless series must be discoverable to an indefinite degree of approximation by examining a sufficient finite number of successive ones beginning at the beginning of the series. This is a theorem capable of strict demonstration.[1]

By the inductive process, then, proof or disproof of the general theory is established through an endless series of experiments. Each experiment, however, has a beginning and an end in the infinite series which gives validity or invalidity to the beginning hypothesis.

ABDUCTION

Since abduction is the kind of reasoning most significant in pragmaticism, let us begin by noting Peirce's definition in his words:

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[1] Vol. V, p. 105.

> Abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis. It is the only logical operation which introduces any new idea; for induction does nothing but determine a value, and deduction merely evolves the necessary consequences of a pure hypothesis.[1]

It is evident from the above discussions of deduction and induction that both of these types of reasoning begin with a general theory or hypothesis. Neither deduction nor induction produces new hypotheses. To produce the pure hypothesis becomes the task of the third kind of reasoning, abduction. In this way abduction becomes the most important kind of reasoning for pragmaticism since its method is to test the validity of hypotheses. There must be then a method by which hypotheses are originated.

Abductive thought offers the suggestions which may be tested by either deduction or induction. Peirce states the justification for abductive thought this way:

> Its only justification is that from its suggestion deduction can draw a prediction which can be tested by induction, and that, if we are ever to learn anything or to understand phenomena at all, it must be by abduction that this is to be brought about.[2]

Here again can be seen the primary place of hypotheses in the pragmaticistic method of inquiry. It also becomes evident immediately that abductive reasoning is more significant than either of the other kinds since hypotheses are produced by abduction. It is important to notice also that

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[1] Vol. V, p. 106. [2] *Ibid.*

learning is equated with the understanding of phenomena. Hence, it is that learning is the result of abductive reasoning.

The problem then becomes: what factors, or combination of factors, give rise to abduction which produces hypotheses? In pragmatic manner Peirce raises a series of hypotheses, or questions, to ascertain the answer. Are hypotheses produced by chance, evolution, instinct, cognition, psychological response? Or, is it the inherent force of man's nature to formulate hypotheses? Let us consider these questions one by one in order to ascertain the reply from pragmaticism.

Are hypotheses the result of chance? Peirce answers:

> Consider the multitude of theories that might have been suggested. A physicist comes across some new phenomenon in his laboratory. How does he know but the conjunctions of the planets have something to do with it or that it is not perhaps because the dowager empress of China has at that same time a year ago chanced to pronounce some word of mystical power or some invisible jinnee may be present. Think of what trillions of trillions of hypotheses might be made of which only one is true; and yet after two or three or at the very most a dozen guesses, the physicist hits pretty nearly on the correct hypothesis. By chance he would not have been likely to do so in the whole time that has elapsed since the earth has solidified.[1]

Are hypotheses produced by psychological reaction? To this Peirce answers briefly:

> You may produce this or that excellent psychological account of the matter. But let me tell you that all the

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[1] Vol. V, p. 106.

> psychology in the world will leave the logical problem just where it was.[1]

Does the evolutionary process of man's thought produce hypotheses to be tested by deductive or inductive reasoning? To this Peirce replies:

> You may tell me that astrological and magical hypotheses were resorted to at first and that it is only by degrees that we have learned certain general laws of nature in consequence of which the physicist seeks for the explanation of his phenomena within the four walls of his laboratory. But when you look at the matter more narrowly, the matter is not to be accounted for in any considerable nature in that way.[2]

Or are hypotheses instinctive in human nature? The answer from pragmaticism is a qualified affirmative one:

> It appears to me that the clearest statement we can make of the logical situation - the freest from all questionable admixture - is to say that man has a certain Insight, not strong enough to be oftener right than wrong, but strong enough not to be overwhelmingly more often wrong than right, into the Thirdnesses, the general elements, of Nature. An Insight, I call it because it is to be referred to the same general class of operations to which Perceptive Judgments belong. This Faculty is at the same time of the general nature of Instinct, resembling the instincts of the animals in its so far surpassing the general powers of our reason and for its directing us as if we were in possession of facts that are entirely beyond the reach of our senses. It resembles instinct too in its small liability to error; for though it goes wrong oftener than right, yet the relative frequency with which it is right is on the whole the most wonderful thing in our constitution.[3]

Thus, pragmaticism clearly attributes to a native insight the ability to formulate hypotheses. At the same time it relates insight to perceptual judgments which brings us

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[1] Vol. V, p. 107. [2] Vol. V. pp. 106-107.

[3] Vol. V, p. 107.

to the area of intellectual cognition. In light of Dr. Peirce's exposition on abduction as an intellectual formulation of hypotheses, it is somewhat curious that he should provide as much basis for instinct as he does. However, we are all familiar with the method of formulating an hypothesis by saying "it seems reasonable" without any experimentation. Since this is his basis of proof for insight[1] we will pass on to abductive reasoning by perceptual judgment.

That pragmatism is based on abductive reasoning is made clear when Peirce says:

> If you carefully consider the question of pragmatism you will see that it is nothing else than the question of the logic of abduction. That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must render needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as hypotheses, that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful suggestions; and, furthermore, this is all that the maxim of pragmatism really pretends to do, at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is not understood as a proposition in psychology. For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have no logical effect or import differing from that of a second conception except so far as, taken in connection with other conceptions and intentions, it might conceivably modify our practical conduct differently from that second conception.[2]

The logic of abduction, then, provides pragmatism with both its beginning and its end. Any hopeful suggestion is admitted to stand as an hypothesis in pragmatic thought. This admits the entire field of reasonable suggestions to the testing-ground of experimentation. The end of abduction lies

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[1] Vol. V, p. 167. [2] Vol. V, p. 121.

in the relation of practical effects. An hypothesis is not valid if the conception of it does not in some way modify, or change, practical conduct. The final test of an hypothesis is consistent with the pragmatic method itself. One conception stands in relationship to another conception and if the meaning of it after experimentation does not effect practical consequences, the former conception is discarded, or not admitted to the interpretation as a positive potential possibility.

Peirce summarizes the status of an hypothesis thus:

> Admitting, then, that the question of Pragmatism is the question of Abduction, let us consider it under that form. What is good abduction? What should an explanatory hypothesis be to be worthy to rank as an hypothesis? Of course, it must explain the facts. But what other conditions ought it to fulfill to be good? The question of the goodness of anything is whether that thing fulfills its end. What, then, is the end of an explanatory hypothesis? Its end is, through subjection to the test of experiment, to lead to the avoidance of all surprise and to the establishment of a habit of positive expectation that shall not be disappointed. Any hypothesis, therefore, may be admissible, in the absence of any special reasons to the contrary, provided it be capable of experimental verification, and only insofar as it is capable of such verification. This is approximately the doctrine of pragmatism.[1]

In conclusion, we see the emphasis on abductive reasoning in pragmaticism since this is the only kind of reasoning which produces pure hypotheses. And, it will be recalled, the general purpose of pragmaticism, as a method of philosophical inquiry, is to ascertain the meanings of hard words and

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[1] Vol. V, pp. 122, 123.

abstract concepts. Since the whole system is based upon the proof or disproof of hypotheses by experimentation, with which beginning is made be as "pure" an hypothesis as possible. Therefore, abduction is the most significant kind of reasoning for pragmaticism. Peirce states the significance of abduction this way:

> Deduction proves that something *must* be; Induction shows that something *actually* is operative; Abduction merely suggests that something may be.[1]

Surely if an hypothesis is to be proved or disproved by experiment, it must be a "may be" in its beginning state.

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[1] Vol. V, p. 106.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SUPPOSITION OF UNDERLYING REALITY

Throughout pragmaticism there exists one basic presupposition. It is a belief in an underlying Reality which Dr. Peirce consistently refers to as God. The influence of the pragmatic system of inquiry is revealed in the evidences of his supposition. In his early writings Peirce refers to his belief in God in an unquestioning way, as this:

> Therefore, if you ask me what part Qualities can play in the economy of the universe, I shall reply that the universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its Icons of Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these qualities play in an argument that, they of course, play in the universe - that Universe being precisely an argument.[1]

Here is a bold affirmation of Dr. Peirce's belief expressed in terms of total purpose of the universe. Contained in the statement is not only the accrediting of creation to God but also the immanence of God in the continuing purpose of the world. An equally bold affirmation of God as underlying reality is expressed in strict pragmatic terms when he says:

> The starting-point of the universe, God the Creator, is the Absolute First; the terminus of the universe, God completely revealed, is the Absolute Second; every state

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[1] Vol. V, p. 75.

> of the universe at a measurable point of time is the third.[1]

As the pragmatic philosophy evolved in the mind of Peirce there is evidence of questioning of the existence of God. It is difficult to know if this is a sincere reasonable doubting of the reality of God or simply a gesture required by an empirical reasoning, but it produces an hypothesis quite different from the assertion of the reality of God, namely, "if there be a God". It is this hypothesis which begins the Neglected Argument of pragmaticism. The important place which this argument holds in achieving knowledge of God will be seen later in this chapter. However, it is significant to note here the hypothesis posited by Peirce which the Neglected Argument is employed to answer. This hypothesis, as stated by Peirce, illustrates the questioning of God's existence:

> If God really be, and be benign, then, in view of the generally conceded truth that religion, were it but proved, would be a good outweighing all others, we should naturally expect that there would be some Argument for His Reality that should be obvious to all minds, high and low alike, that should earnestly strive to find the truth of the matter; and further, that this Argument should present its conclusion, not as a proposition of metaphysical theology, but in a form directly applicable to the conduct of life, and full of nutrition for man's highest growth.[2]

Since the hypothesis, "if there be a God", is as justifiable for pragmaticism as the hypothesis, "there is a God", the conclusions which Peirce elucidates in his later

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[1] Vol. I, p. 187. [2] Vol. VI, pp. 312, 313.

writings are extremely important. His notes on Metaphysics reveal a staunch faith in God and a devotion to the teachings of Jesus Christ as contained in Christianity. We shall begin with general nature of religion, then discuss how knowledge of God is gained, and close this chapter with the demands of the Christian faith to actions.

A RELIGION OF SCIENCE

Attention has been called to the fact that Peirce was mathematician, geographer, and logician. At the same time he was an avowed Christian. It is significant then that Dr. Peirce "married" religion and science in his writing called The Marriage of Religion and Science[1] under the general heading A Religion of Science.

To understand this wedding of science and religion we must begin with Peirce's definitions of the two terms. In reply to the question, what is science?, he states:

> The dictionary will say that it is systematized knowledge. Dictionary definitions, however, are too apt to repose upon derivations; which is as much as to say that they neglect too much the later steps in the evolution of meanings. Mere knowledge, though it be systematized, may be a dead memory; while by science we all habitually mean a living and growing body of truth. We might even say that knowledge is not necessary to science. . . . That which constitutes science, then, is not so much correct conclusions, as it is a correct method. But the method of science is itself a scientific result. It did not spring out of the brain of a

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[1] Vol. VI, p. 302.

> beginner: it was a historic attainment and a scientific achievement. So that not even this method ought to be regarded as essential to the beginnings of science. That which is essential, however, is the scientific spirit, which is determined not to rest satisfied with existing opinions, but to press on to the real truth of nature.[1]

Peirce answers the question, what is religion?, in this way:

> In each individual it is a sort of sentiment, or obscure perception, a deep recognition of a something in the circumambient All, which, if he strives to express it, will clothe itself in forms more or less extravagant, more or less accidental, but ever acknowledging the first and last, the A and Ω, as well as a relation to that Absolute of the individual's self, as a relative being. But religion cannot reside in its totality in a single individual. Like every species of reality, it is essentially a social, a public affair. It is the idea of a whole Church, welding all its members together in one organic, systemic perception of the Glory of the Highest - an idea having a growth from generation to generation and claiming a supremacy in the determination of all conduct, private and public.[2]

Four significant characteristics of religion, as conceived by Peirce, are contained in the above definition. The first, religion is personal. As personal quality it is described as sentiment, feeling, or recognition of that which underlies all of reality. Secondly, religion is social as well as personal in that it expands as it is passed on from generation to generation. The third thing that can be said about religion is that it reigns supreme in the motivation of conduct. This gives religion the pragmatic quality of effectiveness. And fourthly, man is a relational subject. As man, he stands in relation to the "circumambient All".

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] Vol. VI, pp. 302, 303.

The marriage of religion and science, achieved by pragmaticism, accords the quality of firstness to religion and credits the scientific attitude with aiding religion. Peirce writes:

> Science, to specialists, may seem to have little or nothing to say that directly concerns religion; but it certainly encourages a philosophy which, if in no other respect, is at any rate opposed to the prevalent tendency of religion, in being animated by a progressive spirit. There arises, too, a tendency to pooh-pooh at things unseen.
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> . . . Religion, from the nature of things, refuses to go through her successive transformations with sufficient celerity to keep always in accord with the convictions of scientific philosophy. The day has come, however, when the man whom religious experience most devoutly moves can recognize the state of the case. While adhering to the essence of religion, and so far as possible to the Church, which is all but essential, say, penessential, to it, he will cast aside that religious timidity that is forever prompting the Church to recoil from the paths into which the Governor of history is leading the minds of men, a cowardice that has stood through the ages as the landmark and limit of her little faith, and will gladly go forward, sure that truth is not split into two warring doctrines, and that any change that knowledge can work in his faith can only affect its expression, but not the deep mystery expressed.
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> Such a state of mind may properly be called a religion of science. Not that it is a religion to which science or the scientific spirit has itself given birth; for religion, in the proper sense of the term, can arise from nothing but the religious sensibility. But it is a religion, so true to itself, that it becomes animated by the scientific spirit, confident that all the conquests of science will be triumphs of its own, and accepting all the results of science, as scientific men themselves accept them, as steps toward the truth, which may appear for a time to be in conflict with other truths, but which in such cases merely await adjustments which time is sure to effect. This attitude, be it observed, is one which religion will assume not at the dictate of science, still less by way of a compromise, but simply and solely out of a bolder confidence in herself and in her own destiny.[1]

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[1] Vol. VI, pp. 303, 304.

ATTAINING KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

A recurrent premise of pragmaticism, emphasized in preceding chapters, is that the unit of learning is the experience. So it is also of knowledge of God. Peirce says:

> We can know nothing except what we directly experience. So all that we can anyway know relates to experience. All the creations of our mind are but patchworks from experience. So that all our ideas are but ideas of real or transposed experiences. A word can mean nothing except the idea it calls up. So that we cannot even talk about anything but a knowable object.[1]

If God is to be known through experience, as Peirce succinctly states here, it is necessary to recall the definition of experience contained in Chapter One. Experience consists of these three elements: a subject, relationship, and representamen. The subject comes into relationship with other subjects and the representamen is the resultant meaning of the intellectual conception of the relationship. When Peirce speaks of experience with regard to achieving knowledge of God, he further elaborates:

> By experience must be understood the entire mental product. Some psychologists whom I hold in respect will stop me here to say that, while they admit that experience is more than mere sensation, they cannot extend it to the whole mental product, since that would include hallucinations, delusions, superstitious imaginations and fallacies of all kinds; and that they would limit experience to sense-perceptions. But I reply that my statement is the logical one. Hallucinations, delusions, superstitious imaginations, and fallacies of all kinds are experiences, but experiences misunderstood; while to say that all our

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[1] Vol. VI, p. 338.

> knowledge relates merely to sense perception is to say that we can know nothing - not even mistakenly - about higher matters, as honor, aspirations, and love.[1]

To support the hypothesis that knowledge of God is produced by experience Peirce asks from what other sources could it be derived. Could it come from reason alone? Or could honest scepticism produce knowledge of God? In answer to these questions he replies:

> Why, reasoning can supply the mind with nothing in the world except an estimate of the value of a statistical ratio, that is, how often certain kinds of things are found in certain combinations in the ordinary course of experience. And scepticism, in the sense of doubt of the validity of elementary ideas - which is really a proposal to turn an idea out of court and permit no inquiry into its applicability - is doubly condemned by the fundamental principle of scientific method - condemned first as obstructing inquiry, and condemned second because it is treating some other than a statistical ratio as a thing to be argued about.[2]

To both of these questions, then, pragmaticism answers an emphatic "No". To prove that knowledge of God and the reality of God as a knowable object come from direct experience Peirce says:

> As to God, open your eyes - and your heart, which is also a perceptive organ - and you see him. But you may ask, Don't you admit there are any delusions? Yes: I may think a thing is black, and on close examination it may turn out to be bottle-green. But I cannot think a thing is black if there is no such thing to be seen as black. Neither can I think that a certain action is self-sacrificing, if no such thing as self-sacrifice exists, although it may be very rare.[3]

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[1] Vol. VI, p. 339. [2] *Ibid.* [3] *Ibid.*

These two assertions of pragmaticism, then, are emphatically made: first, God is real because he is a necessity; and second, knowledge of God comes by direct experience of him. Intertwined as they are throughout pragmaticism, we shall now let the first assertion rest and examine in more detail how knowledge of God is attained through experience.

THREE UNIVERSES OF EXPERIENCE

Up to now, the existence of God as underlying reality has been primarily evidenced by finding his reality in His perpetual purpose of the Universe. We come now to the three "Universes of Experience"[1] as defined by pragmaticism and contained in this definition of God by Dr. Peirce:

> The word "God" so "capitalized" (as we Americans say), is *the* definable proper name, signifying *Ens necessarium*; in *my* belief Really creator of all three Universes of Experience.[2]

Because pragmaticism affirms that knowledge of God is attained by experience of God, it is necessary to understand these three universes of experience, which God not only has created, but also through which He may be known. The three universes of experience are ideas, facts, and connections. Peirce writes of them:

> Of the three Universes of Experience familiar to us all, the first comprises all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to which the mind of poet, pure mathematician,

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[1] Vol. VI, p. 311.   [2] *Ibid.*

> or another *might* give local habitation and a name within that mind. Their very airy-nothingness, the fact that their Being consists in mere capability of getting thought, not in anybody's actually thinking them, saves their Reality. The second Universe is that of the Brute Actuality of things and facts. I am confident that their Being consists in reactions against Brute forces, notwithstanding objections redoubtable until they are closely and fairly examined. The third Universe comprises everything whose being consists in active power to establish connections between different objects, especially between objects in different Universes. Such is everything which is essentially a Sign - not the mere body of the Sign, which has its Being in its power of serving as intermediary between its Object and a Mind.[1]

The first universe of experience, that of Ideas, which leads to knowledge of God is the result of what Dr. Peirce terms "Musement".[2] He says that Musement is significant because it will inevitably lead to meditation upon the idea of God.[3] Musement does not begin with reasoned contemplation of God or a serious quest for the idea of God. Rather, it is capricious. Peirce describes it in this way:

> In fact, it is Pure Play. Now, Play, we all know is a lively exercise of one's powers. Pure Play has no rules, except this very law of liberty. It bloweth where it listeth. It has no purpose, unless recreation. The particular occupation I mean - a *petite bouchée* with the Universes - may take either the form of aesthetic contemplation, or that of distant castle-building (whether in Spain or within one's own moral training), or that of considering some wonder in one of the Universes, or some connection between two of the three, with speculation concerning its cause. It is this last kind - I will call it 'Musement' on the whole - that I particularly recommend, because it will in time flower into the N. A. One who sits down with the purpose of becoming convinced of the truth of religion is plainly not inquiring in scientific singleness of heart, and must always suspect himself of reasoning unfairly. So he can never attain the

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[1] Vol. VI, p. 312. [2] Vol. VI, p. 313.

[3] Vol. VI, p. 332.

> entirety even of a physicist's belief in electrons, although this is avowedly but provisional. But let religious meditation be allowed to grow up spontaneously out of Pure Play without any breach of continuity, and the Muser will retain the perfect candour proper to Musement.[1]

Beginning with the capricious quality of free play Musement leads to observation and to thought. Thought leads to ideas and thus the first universe of experience is entered. Ideas will produce observations; observations will be tested by examinations; examinations will lead to interpretations. Thus an hypothesis is born. Peirce's advice to those who would engage in musement is picturesque:

> 'Enter your skiff of Musement, push off into the lake of thought, and leave the breath of heaven to swell your sail. With your eyes open, awake to what is about or within you, and open conversation with yourself; for such is all meditation.' It is, however, not a conversation in words alone, but is illustrated, like a lecture, with diagrams and with experiments.[2]

How does this produce knowledge of God? Peirce answers thus:

> The first (argument) is that entirely honest, sincere and unaffected, because unprepense, meditation upon the Idea of God, into which the Play of Musement will inevitably sooner or later lead, and which, by developing a deep sense of the adorability of that Idea, will produce a truly religious Belief in His Reality and His nearness. It is a reasonable argument, because it naturally results in the most intense and living determination (Bestimmung) of the soul toward shaping the Muser's whole conduct into conformity with the Hypothesis that God is Real and very near; and such a determination of the soul in regard to any proposition is the very essence of a living Belief in such proposition. This is that 'humble argument', open to every honest man, which I surmise to have made more worshippers of God than any other.[3]

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[1] Vol. VI, pp. 313, 314. [2] Vol. VI, p. 315.

[3] Vol. VI, p. 332, 333.

The second universe of experience which results in knowledge of God concerns things and facts. This is the argument which pragmaticism holds to be most neglected and therefore Peirce refers to it as the "N. A." According to pragmaticism there is a universal "latent tendency"[1] in man to believe in God. Peirce describes it thus:

> The second of the nest is the argument which seems to me to have been 'neglected' by writers upon natural theology, consisting in showing that the humble argument is the natural fruit of free meditation, since every heart will be ravished by the beauty and adorability of the Idea, when it is so pursued. Were the theologians able to perceive the force of this argument, they would make it such a presentation of universal human nature as to show that a latent tendency toward belief in God is a fundamental ingredient of the soul, and that, far from being a vicious or superstitious ingredient, it is simply the natural precipitate of meditation upon the origin of the Three Universes. Of course, it could not, any more than any other theological argumentation, have the value or the religious vitality of the 'humble argument'; for it would only be an apology - a vindicatory description - of the mental operations which the Humble Argument actually and actively lives out.[2]

The third universe of experience is the power to make connections between ideas and facts. Here, again, is emphasis of pragmaticism upon intellectual cognition. It is this ability to relate ideas which produces a reasoned, or as Peirce calls it, a scientific belief in God. Of this universe Peirce writes:

> The student, applying to his own trained habits of research the art of logical analysis - an art as elaborate and methodical as that of the chemical analyst, compares

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[1] Vol. VI, p. 333. [2] Vol. VI, p. 333.

> the process of thought of the Muser upon the Three Universes with certain parts of the work of scientific discovery, and finds that the 'Humble Argument' is nothing but an instance of the first stage of all such work, the stage of observing the facts, or variously rearranging them, and of pondering them until, by their reactions with the results of previous scientific experience, there is 'evolved' (as the chemists word it) an explanatory hypothesis. . . . So hard is it to doubt God's Reality, when the Idea has sprung from Musements, that there is great danger that the investigation will stop at this first stage, owing to the indifference of the Muser to any further proof of it.[1]

The import of the third universe of experience which produces knowledge of God lies in the consequences of the hypothesis which is evolved. This is the area which makes belief in God subject to pragmatic inquiry. Once the hypothesis is evolved, the conception of its practical effects becomes a part of the whole conception. In this way belief in God commands influence over the whole conduct of the believer.

Thus, through direct experience in three universes of experience knowledge of God comes. Pragmaticism avowedly concludes that belief in the underlying reality, which Peirce calls God, is real because the meaning derived from experimentation with the hypothesis of God's existence produces affirmative conclusions. Indeed, as will be seen in succeeding pages, one of the purposes of pragmaticism is to produce belief. Furthermore, the whole conception of the belief includes the practical effects, or its relation to conduct.

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[1] Vol. VI, pp. 333, 334.

Therefore, belief in an underlying reality must affect our conduct. Peirce emphasizes this when he says:

> Yet it is absurd to say that religion is a mere belief. You might as well call society a belief, or politics a belief, or civilization a belief. Religion is a life, and can be identified with a belief only provided that belief be a living belief - a thing to be lived rather than said or thought.[1]

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[1] Vol. VI, p. 306.

CHAPTER IX

FEELINGS, AS QUALITIES OF THOUGHT, ARE COMMUNICABLE

The premise that feelings, as qualities of thought, are communicable is central to the system of pragmaticism. Dr. Peirce states it this way:

> When an idea is conveyed from one mind to another, it is by forms of combination of the diverse elements of nature, say by some curious symmetry, or by some union of a tender color with a refined odor.[1]

Feeling was described in Chapter Two as that category of consciousness which occurs in an instant of time. Furthermore it is a passive consciousness without recognition or analysis. Every kind of consciousness enters into cognition. It was also shown in that discussion of the structure of pragmaticism that a cognition was a mental sign. Feelings, then, can be said to be the sign of that element of thought, which denote intensity, or quality. As we now come to the communicability of feelings, it is necessary to look at both the nature of a feeling and the nature of communication. Also, in light of the preceding chapter, it is significant to look at the communicability of those feelings which concern belief in an underlying Reality, or God.

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[1] Vol. VI, p. 111.

THE NATURE OF FEELING

It will be recalled from the elaboration of the intellectual quality of pragmaticism that a cognition is the mental interpretation of an experience. Once it is in the past it becomes a sign for the meaning derived from the experience and further, each kind of consciousness, feeling, interruption, or synthesis, is capable of becoming a cognition. Therefore, it can be concluded that a feeling, in pragmatism, is not to be confused with, or regarded to be the same as, emotion. Peirce makes this distinction clear when he says:

> Thus, we have in thought three elements: first, the representative function which makes it a *representation*; second, the pure denotative application, or *real connection*, which brings one thought into *relation* with another; and third, the material quality, or *how it feels*, which gives thought its quality.[1]

A feeling, then, is the material quality of a mental sign. A feeling is a part of cognition. Peirce substantiates the intellectual quality of feeling in this way:

> In short, whenever a man feels, he is thinking of *something*. Even those passions which have no definite object - as melancholy - only come to consciousness through tinging the *objects of thought*. That which makes us look upon the emotions more as affections of self than other cognitions, is that we have found them more dependent upon our accidental situation at the moment than other cognitions; but that is only to say that they are cognitions too narrow to be useful.[2]

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[1] Vol. V, p. 174. [2] Vol. V, p. 175.

The distinction between feelings and emotions will be discussed later. Let us now proceed with the cognitive quality of feelings.

A feeling is cognitive because it is at the same time a representation. Peirce says a feeling is "a predicate of something determined logically by the feelings which precede it."[1] If, as is indicated above, emotions are feelings which are not useful, pragmaticism maintains that there are many feelings which are useful. The feeling of sympathy is used to illustrate a useful feeling.[2] Peirce claims that feelings are especially useful in the areas of metaphysics and art.

The validity of cognitive feelings in the realm of art is described by Peirce when he says:

> I hear you say: 'All that is not fact; it is poetry.' Nonsense! Bad poetry is false, I grant; but nothing is truer than true poetry. And let me tell the scientific men that the artists are much finer and more accurate observers than they are, except of the special minutiae that the scientific man is looking for.[3]

In this example the poem is the object and the feeling which one has about it is a representation resulting from previous poetry and previous feelings.

As regards feeling in the area of metaphysics, Peirce remarks:

> I hear you say: 'This smacks too much of an anthropomorphic conception.' I reply that every scientific explanation of a natural phenomenon is a hypothesis that there is something in nature to which the human reason is

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] Vol. I, p. 158.

[3] *Ibid.*

> analogous; and that it really is so all the successes of science in its applications to human convenience are witnesses. They proclaim that truth over the length and breadth of the modern world. In the light of the successes of science to my mind there is a degree of baseness in denying our birthright as children of God and in shamefacedly slinking away from anthropomorphic conceptions of the universe.[1]

The previous feelings which serve as the predicate for this feeling that man is a child of God, seem to have science as their primary object in this case. It is also obvious within the framework of the Christian faith that previous feelings about God are determinative also in producing this feeling.

The second thing to be said about feeling as a material quality of thought is that feeling itself is a simple, unified, quality rather than a complex one. This is true in spite of numerous other feelings upon which a single feeling is predicated. Peirce elucidates this fact thus.

> The whole content of consciousness is made up of qualities of feeling, as truly as the whole of space is made up of points or the whole of time of instants.
>
> Contemplate anything by itself - anything whatever that can be so contemplated. Attend to the whole and drop the parts out of attention altogether. One can approximate nearly enough to the accomplishment of that to see that the result of its perfect accomplishment would be that one would have in his consciousness at the moment nothing but a quality of feeling. This quality of feeling would in itself, as so contemplated, have no parts. It would be unlike any other such quality of feeling. In itself, it would not even resemble any other; for resemblance has its being only in comparison. It would be a pure *priman*. Since this is true of whatever we contemplate, however complex may be the object, it follows that there is nothing else in the immediate consciousness. To be conscious is nothing else than to feel.[2]

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[1] Vol. I, pp. 158, 159.

[2] Vol. I, p. 159.

Thus, the single nature of feeling, in any one instant of time, or at one instance of consciousness is seen.

Thirdly, a feeling is a living entity. True as it is that feeling is produced by its object or objects and that in any one instant of time it is a unified quality it has living quality because the intensity of feeling is capable of variance. Peirce describes this living quality in these words:

> A feeling is a state of mind having its own living quality, independent of any other state of mind. Or, a feeling is an element of consciousness which might conceivably override every other state until it monopolized the mind, although such a rudimentary state cannot actually be realized, and would not properly be consciousness. Still it is conceivable, or supposable, that the quality of blue should usurp the whole mind, to the exclusion of the ideas of shape, extension, contrast, commencement and cessation, and all other ideas whatsoever. A feeling is necessarily perfectly simple, in itself, for if it had parts these would also be in the mind, whenever the whole was present, and thus the whole could not monopolize the mind.[1]

Feelings, then, are living in their capacity in addition to being simple and predicated upon other feelings. One additional characteristic about the nature of a feeling must be noted. This is the distinction between feelings and emotions.

A feeling not predicated upon other feelings is an emotion. An emotion has both an object and a subject. Peirce explains this in this manner:

> Now every emotion has a subject. If a man is angry, he is saying to himself that this or that is vile and

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[1] Vol. VI, pp. 17, 18.

> outrageous. If he is in joy, he is saying 'this is delicious'. If he is wondering, he is saying 'this is strange'. . . . The emotions, as a little observation will show, arise when our attention is strongly drawn to complex and inconceivably circumstances.[1]

Furthermore, an emotion is a substitute for an intellectual hypothesis. Of this fact Peirce says:

> Fear arises when we cannot predict our fate; joy, in the case of certain indescribably and peculiarly complex sensations. If there are some indications that something greatly for my interest, and which I have anticipated would happen, may not happen; and if, after weighing probabilities, and inventing safeguards, and straining for further information, I find myself unable to come to any fixed conclusion in reference to the future, in the place of that intellectual hypothetic inference which I seek, the feeling of *anxiety* arises. When something happens for which I cannot account, I *wonder*. When I endeavor to realize to myself what I never can do, a pleasure in the future, I *hope*. . . . Now if we consider that a very complex predicate demands explanation by means of an hypothesis, that that hypothesis must be a simpler predicate substituted for that complex one; and that when we have an emotion, an hypothesis, strictly speaking, is hardly possible - the analogy of the parts played by emotion and hypothesis is very striking. There is, it is true, this difference between an emotion and an intellectual hypothesis, that we have reason to say in the case of the latter, that to whatever the simple hypothetic predicate can be applied, of that the complex predicate is true; whereas, in the case of an emotion this is a proposition for which no reason can be given, but which is determined merely by our emotional constitution.[2]

This significant characteristic, that a true feeling is distinguished from an emotion by a hypothetic, or intellectual quality, must be added to the description of the nature of feeling. For pragmaticism, then, feeling is predicated upon other feelings, is simple, is a living entity, and is intellectual.

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[1] Vol. V, p. 175.

[2] Vol. V, pp. 175, 176.

THE NATURE OF COMMUNICATION

Reference was made in the preceding section to the conveyance of an idea from one mind to another. This reference is restated in this connection since it includes both the elements of diversity and of unity which gives communication its vital quality:

> When an idea is conveyed from one mind to another, it is by forms of combination of the diverse elements of nature, say by some curious symmetry, or by some union of a tender color with a refined odor.[1]

Basic to the diverse and unifying factors of communication in pragmatic thought is the prior premise that an idea can only be affected by another idea. Peirce states this succinctly when he says:

> . . . I am bound to maintain that an idea can only be affected by an idea in continuous connection with it. By anything but an idea, it cannot be affected at all.[2]

The first thing to be said about the nature of communication, then, is that it is intellectualistic.

Diversity is the factor which gives communication vitality or its living quality. Peirce says that the intellectual nature of communication causes him to conclude:

> This obliges me to say, as I do say, on other grounds, that what we call matter is not completely dead, but is merely mind hidebound with habits. It still retains the element of diversification; and in that diversification there is life.[3]

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[1] Vol. VI, p. 111. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

It was pointed out in the preceding section that a feeling is an element of thought. As such it is cognitive. Therefore we can conclude that for purposes of communication feelings are conveyed in the same way as ideas, since essentially true feelings, not emotions, are ideas. Feelings, then, are living not only because of their capacity to predicate other feelings but also because, insofar as they are unhabituated, they are diverse. Through their diversity are they able to be communicated from one mind to another or, in other words, from one person to another. Diversity provides the varying quality which enables ideas to be captured and take root in different minds.

The quality of generality, or unity, which is also present in ideas allows for communication. Peirce calls this general nature of ideas the "embodying spirit" when he writes:

> To such forms the law of mechanical energy has no application. If they are eternal, it is in the spirit they embody; and their origin cannot be accounted for by any mechanical necessity. They are embodied ideas; and so only can they convey ideas.[1]

As to the precise manner of communication of this general quality, Peirce admits that he cannot be certain but believes this general nature of ideas can be compared to the connecting quality of the physical nervous system. He says:

> As far as sight and hearing are in question, we know that they are only excited by vibrations of inconceivable complexity; and the chemical senses are probably not more

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

> simple. Even the least psychical of peripheral sensations, that of pressure, has in its excitation conditions which, though apparently simple, are seen to be complicated enough when we consider the molecules and their attractions. The principle with which I set out requires me to maintain that these feelings are communicated to the nerves by continuity, so that there must be something like them in the excitants themselves.[1]

Pragmaticism asserts, in these ways, that communication is by way of ideas, and is made possible by the diversity and generality of ideas.

THE COMMUNICABILITY OF RELIGIOUS FEELINGS

Throughout this entire discussion of Peircian pragmatism it has become increasingly clear that while the primary task of pragmaticism is the clarification of ideas, clarification is achieved only as interpretation is related and applied to conduct. Herein lies the testing ground for the practical consequences which affects the total conception. Recollection of Peirce's words, already cited on page sixty-two of this treatise, reminds us of this emphasis:

> From all these sophisms we shall be perfectly safe so long as we reflect that the whole function of thought is to produce habits of action; and that whatever there is connected with a thought, but irrelevant to its purpose, is an accretion to it, but no part of it.[2]

Two things become evident immediately when we enter the realm of religious feelings: first, that such feelings affect the conduct of the person; and secondly, that religious feelings will be changing, or evolving, constantly.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Vol. V, pp. 256, 257.

Peirce deals directly with these two conceptions in his theory of pragmatic thought when he says:

> But the word coordination implies . . . a teleological harmony in ideas, and in the case of personality this teleology is more than a mere purposive pursuit of a predeterminate end; it is a developmental teleology. This is personal character. A general idea, living and conscious now, it is already determinative of acts in the future to an extent to which it is not now conscious.[1]

This affirms both premises already mentioned, that personal character is the result of thought expressed in conduct, and that personal character is a developing element.

Without engaging in any serious attempt to distinguish between personal character and personality, Peirce uses the two terms synonymously. Personality is defined by him as "some kind of coordination or connection of ideas"[2] and is elaborated thus:

> Yet when we consider that, according to the principle which we are tracing out, a connection between ideas is itself a general idea and that a general idea is a living feeling, it is plain that we have at least taken an appreciable step toward the understanding of personality. This personality, like any general idea, is not a thing to be apprehended in an instant. It has to be lived in time; nor can any finite time embrace it in all its fullness. Yet in each infinitesimal interval it is present and living, though specially colored by the immediate feelings of that moment. Personality, so far as it is apprehended in a moment, is immediate self-consciousness.[3]

Here is seen the conception which pragmaticism presents of personality existing in time and including the connection between ideas. This gives personality a quality of wholeness or integration, the perception of which includes conduct. It

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[1] Vol. VI, p. 110. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

is further granted that personality may be colored by the immediate feelings of the moment, but the quality of integration makes practical consequence, or conduct, a part of its total conception.

The constant change of personality is also considered by pragmaticism. Of it Peirce says:

> This reference to the future is an essential element of personality. Were the ends of a person already explicit, there would be no room for development, for growth, for life; and consequently there would be no personality. The mere carrying out of predetermined purposes is mechanical.[1]

What is the source of this freedom? Pragmaticism declares the source is a personal God. Peirce continues:

> It is that a genuine evolutionary philosophy, that is, one that makes the principle of growth a primordial element of the universe, is so far from being antagonistic to the idea of a personal creator that it is really inseparable from that idea; while a necessitarian religion is in an altogether false position and is destined to become disintegrated. But a pseudo-evolutionism which enthrones mechanical law above the principle of growth is at once scientifically unsatisfactory, as giving no possible hint of how the universe has come about, and hostile to all hopes of personal relations to God.[2]

Thus, pragmaticism finds the basis for growth and development in the belief in a personal God. Through man's personal relations with this personal creator personality receives its ability for growth. Growth is made possible through the intellectual affectibility of conduct. In this

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] Vol. VI, pp. 110, 111.

way feelings, which are a category of thought, are influenced by belief in a personal God. Peirce confirms this conviction when he says:

> A difficulty which confronts the synechistic philosophy is this. In considering personality, that philosophy is forced to accept the doctrine of a personal God; but in considering communication, it cannot but admit that if there is a personal God, we must have a direct perception of that person and indeed be in personal communication with him. Now, if that be the case, the question arises how it is possible that the existence of this being should ever have been doubted by anybody. The only answer that I can at present make is that facts that stand before our face and eyes and stare us in the face are far from being, in all cases, the ones most easily discerned. That has been remarked from time immemorial.[1]

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[1] Vol. VI, p. 112.

CHAPTER X

THE ATTAINMENT OF TRUTH

Pragmaticism has consistently been referred to as a system of philosophical inquiry. In fact, care has been taken to present Peirce's system of thought in this way to distinguish it from a system of philosophy in which basic tenets can be isolated and then structured to form a completed philosophical system. If pragmaticism, then, is a system of philosophical inquiry, it must inquire after something. This is true. Pragmaticism, like all other systems of philosophical inquiry, seeks truth.

TRUTH AND REALITY

Peirce describes the movement of pragmatic thought toward truth in this way:

> My paper of November 1877, setting out from the proposition that the agitation of a question ceases when satisfaction is attained with the settlement of belief, and then only, goes on to consider how the conception of truth gradually develops from that principle under the action of experience; beginning with willful belief, or self-mendacity, the most degraded of all intellectual conditions; thence rising to the imposition of beliefs by the authority of organized society; then to the idea of a settlement of opinion as the result of a fermentation of ideas; and finally reaching the idea of truth as overwhelmingly forced upon the mind in experience as the effect of an independent reality.[1]

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[1] Vol. V, p. 394.

It is significant to notice in this description of the movement of pragmaticism that a distinction is made between truth and reality. Also that the term used in reference to truth is "idea of truth" rather than "truth" alone. This indicates that truth is subject to verification by experience and may be altered and that reality is the term applied to unalterable truth. Peirce distinguishes truth and reality with these definitions:

> Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief, which concordance the abstract statement may possess by virtue of the confession of its inaccuracy and one-sidedness, and this confession is an essential ingredient of truth. . . . Reality is that mode of being by virtue of which the real thing is as it is, irrespective of what any mind or any definite collection of minds may represent it to be.[1]

Pragmaticism, then, places reality beyond truth when it says that reality is what it is regardless of any conception of it. Truth lies in the degree of accuracy with which a representation represents its object. The above definition of truth is limited to scientific belief, but that it is equally applicable in other areas is affirmed by Peirce when he says:

> In the above we have considered positive scientific truth. But the same definitions equally hold in the normative sciences. If a moralist describes an ideal as the *summum bomum*, in the first place, the perfect truth of ~~his statement~~ requires that it should involve the confession that the perfect doctrine can neither be stated nor conceived. If, with that allowance, the future development of man's moral nature will only lead to a firmer satisfaction with the described ideal, the doctrine

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[1] Vol. V, pp. 394, 395.

> is true. A metaphysician may hold that the fact that the ideal thus forces itself upon the mind, so that minds in their development cannot fail to come to accept it, argues that the ideal is *real*: he may even hold that that fact (if it be one) constitutes a *reality*. But the two ideas, *truth* and *reality*, are distinguished here by the same characters given in the above definitions.[1]

With this distinction between truth and reality clearly in mind, it can be concluded that the goal of pragmaticism, as a system of philosophical inquiry, is the attainment of truth. Truth, as it is known, after careful and extensive investigation may describe or correspond with reality. This is its aim. But it also allows for the fact that every interpretation may not be wholly complete and accurate. Truth does not claim to represent reality completely. Rather, truth represents the most accurate hypothesis of reality that it can.

Truth, then, inheres in hypotheses. Peirce states this candidly when he says, "Truth belongs exclusively to propositions."[2] Before proceeding further, however, with the nature of propositions and the manner in which truth resides in them, it is important to distinguish the four kinds of truth: Complex, simple, transcendental, and formal, which pragmaticism recognizes.

Peirce describes these four kinds of truth. Complex truth is the truth of propositions and is described in this way:

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[1] Vol. V, p. 395. [2] Vol V, p. 390.

> This is divided into many varieties, among which may be mentioned *ethical truth*, or the conformity of an assertion to the speaker's or writer's belief, otherwise called *veracity*, and *logical truth*, that is the concordance of a proposition with reality, in such way as is above defined.[1]

The usefulness of simple truth is identified with philosophy and defined thus:

> The word *truth* has also had great importance in philosophy in widely different senses, in which it is distinguished as *simple truth*, which is that truth which inheres in other subjects than propositions.[2]

Transcendental truth is elaborated as follows:

> But *truth* is also used in senses in which it is not an affection of a sign, but of things as things. Such truth is called *transcendental truth*. The scholastic maxim was ens est *unum*, *verum*, *bonum*. Among the senses in which transcendental truth was spoken of was that in which it was said that all science has for its object the investigation of *truth*, that is to say of the real characters of things. It was, in other senses, regarded as a subject of metaphysics exclusively. It is sometimes defined so as to be indistinguishable from reality, or real existence. Another common definition is that truth is the conformity, or conformability, of things to reason. Another definition is that truth is the conformity of things to their essential principles.[3]

Lastly, formal truth is defined by Peirce:

> *Truth* is also used in logic in a sense in which it inheres only in subjects more complex than propositions. Such is *formal truth*, which belongs to an argumentation which conforms to logical laws.[4]

Although Peirce recognizes these four varying definitions and usages of truth, he is concerned, and hence pragmaticism is concerned, with complex truth. For complex truth

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[1] Vol. V, pp. 397, 398.
[2] Vol. V, p. 398.
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] *Ibid.*

consists in propositions which represent reality and that is the aim of pragmatic thought.

The next question is: what is the nature of a proposition which represents truth?

THE NATURE OF TRUTH

A proposition is a representation of something real - its object. Truth is defined very succinctly by Peirce when he says that, "Truth is the conformity of a representamen to its object, its object, ITS object, mind you."[1]

The symbolic nature of cognitive thought was discussed in Chapter Four. It is essential to remind ourselves again of this symbolic nature. In that previous discussion it was pointed out that any word is a sign. Likewise a groups of words or a sentence is a sign. It is symbolic, because it stands for, or represents, something. Therefore an hypothesis is symbolic. An hypothesis contains truth to the degree that it accurately represents the thing for which it stands, its object. This is the nature of truth as held by the philosophy of pragmaticism.

A further word must be said of the way in which conformity of hypothesis to its object is achieved. Pragmaticism says that a sign is "compelled by its object".[2] That an hypothesis is a sign in pragmaticism has been discussed in

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[1] Vol. V, p. 391.

[2] Ibid.

the foregoing paragraph. Peirce states it in this way:

> A proposition has a subject (or set of subjects) and a predicate. The subject is a sign; the predicate is a sign; and the proposition is a sign that the predicate is a sign of that of which the subject is a sign. If it be so, it is true. . . . Now thought is of the nature of a sign. In that case, then, if we can find out the right method of thinking and can follow it out - the right method of transforming signs - then truth can be nothing more nor less than the last result to which the following out of this method would ultimately carry us. In that case, that to which the representation should conform, is itself in the nature of a representation, or sign - something noumenal, intelligible, conceivable, and utterly unlike a thing-in-itself.[1]

It was stated in the preceding section that the truth of propositions consisted in the degree of accurateness to which they represented reality. In the preceding quotation from Peirce truth seems to consist in the degree to which hypotheses represent a cognition of reality. This is not so much a contradiction as it first appears. The conformity of hypothesis to object is a conception, or an intellectual conception. But the force of the real object, or reality, remains the "first" mode of being which compels or determines its representation. The hypothesis provides the medium through which representation is interpreted. Peirce goes on to say:

> What the sign virtually has to do in order to indicate its object - and make it its - all it has to do is just to seize its interpreter's eyes and forcibly turn them upon the object meant: it is what a knock at the door does, or an alarm or other bell, or a whistle, a cannon-shot, etc. It is pure physiological compulsion; nothing else.

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[1] Vol. V, pp. 390, 391.

> So, then, a sign, in order to fulfill its office, to actualize its potency, must be compelled by its object. This is evidently the reason of the dichotomy of the true and the false. For it takes two to make a quarrel, and a compulsion involves as large a dose of quarrel as is requisite to make it quite impossible that there should be compulsion without resistance.[1]

Pragmatic thought maintains, then, that while truth consists in the representation of reality, the conception of the proposition, as well as the proposition itself, is an intellectual process.

METHODS FOR ATTAINING TRUTH

According to pragmaticism truth is attained in one of these three ways: deduction, induction, or retroduction. Retroduction is a new term, first used here as a type of reasoning, but is essentially the same as abduction. Since an entire prior chapter has been devoted to these three types of reasoning with emphasis on abduction, the structure of each type will not be repeated in this connection. However, since these three kinds of reasoning constitute the pathways to the attainment of truth, it is significant to refer to them once again in a general way and to note the general structure common to all three types.

In deductive reasoning the beginning hypothesis is composed of several premises or observations and verification of the several in search of a conclusion is sought, or deduced.

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[1] Vol. V, p. 391.

In inductive reasoning the hypothesis consists of one premise which is verified or refuted by applying it to as many situations as possible to check its consistent operability. Retroduction is itself an experiment which constructs an hypothesis.

Peirce claims that three steps are common to all three of these kinds of reasoning to some degree. These three steps are Colligation, Iteration, and Erasure; and are explained by Peirce in this way:

> Those different premisses are then brought into one field of assertion, that is, are colligated, as Whewell would say, or joined into one copulative proposition. Thereupon, we proceed attentively to observe the graph. It is just as much an operation of Observation as is the observation of bees. This observation leads us to make an experiment upon the Graph. Namely, we first duplicate portions of it; and then we erase portions of it, that is, we put out of sight part of the assertion in order to see what the rest of it is.[1]

That these three steps are represented precisely in deductive reasoning is affirmed by Peirce when he says, "We observe the result of this experiment, and that is our deductive conclusion."[2]

The same steps are traced in inductive reasoning by Peirce:

> Now let us turn to Induction. This mode of reasoning also begins by a colligation. . . . In ordinary induction we proceed to observe something about each instance. Relative induction is illustrated by the process of making out the law of the arrangement of the scales

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[1] Vol. V, p. 402. [2] Ibid.

> of a pine-cone. It is necessary to mark a scale taken as an instance, and counting in certain directions to come back to that marked scale. This double observation of the same instance corresponds to Iteration in deduction. Finally, we erase the particular instances and leave the class or system sampled directly connected with the characters, relative or otherwise, which have been found in the sample of it.[1]

That the third mode for attaining truth, that of retroduction, contains these three steps also is affirmed by Peirce when he says:

> As for retroduction, it is itself an experiment. A retroductive research is an experimental research; and when we look upon Induction and Deduction from the point of view of Experiment and Observation, we are merely tracing in those types of reasoning their affinity to Retroduction. It begins always with colligation, of course, of a variety of separately observed facts about the subject of the hypothesis. . . . Something corresponding to iteration may or may not take place. And then comes an Observation. Not, however, an External observation of the objects as in Induction, nor yet an observation made upon the parts of a diagram, as in Deduction; but for all that just as truly an observation. For what is observation? What is experience? It is the enforced element in the history of our lives. It is that which we are constrained to be conscious of by an occult force residing in an object which we contemplate. The act of observation is the deliberate yielding of ourselves to that *force majeure* - an early surrender at discretion, due to our foreseeing that we must, whatever we do, be borne down by that power, at last. Now the surrender which we make in Retroduction, is a surrender to the Insistence of an Idea. The hypothesis, as the Frenchman says, *c'est plus fort que moi*. It is irresistible; it is imperative. We must throw open our gates and admit it at any rate for the time being.[2]

In all three types of reasoning, then, we see the similarity of the reasoning process which pragmaticism holds

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[1] Vol. V, p. 403. [2] Vol. V, pp. 404, 405.

in the attainment of truth. It is evident that the compulsion of the object is the compelling force in this attainment, and that the hypothesis is the representation by which the truth, more accurately the degree of truth, is expressed.

Regardless of the method used in the attainment of truth, Peirce emphasizes that the entire process is dependent upon the will, or desire, to attain truth. Furthermore, the prerequisite for the desire to learn is a dissatisfaction with that which is already known. He says, "The first thing that the Will to Learn supposes is a dissatisfaction with one's present state of opinion."[1] Peirce makes this the criterion for the effective teacher. It must be the teacher's own attitude and he is held responsible for imbuing his pupils with the same kind of dissatisfaction with what is already known. It is this dissatisfaction which leads to the most valuable truth of all, - "the one that goes toward enlarging the system of what is already known."[2]

In setting forth this requisite attitude for the effective teacher Peirce makes some cryptic remarks by comparing the American universities of his day to the English and German universities. Since his statements are especially relevant to the underlying purpose of this treatise, they are included here. These remarks represent an intermingling of

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[1] Vol. V, p. 405. [2] Vol. V, p. 406.

the comparison of universities and the attitude of the effective teacher with special reference to Harvard University, in whose halls these statements were made:

> The first thing that the Will to Learn supposes is a dissatisfaction with one's present state of opinion. There lies the secret of why it is that our American universities are so miserably insignificant. What have they done for the advance of civilization? What is the great idea or where is (the) single great man who can truly be said to be the product of an American university? The English universities, rotting with sloth as they always have, have nevertheless in the past given birth to Locke and to Newton, and in our time to Cayley, Sylvester, and Clifford. The German universities have been the light of the whole world. The medieval University of Bologna gave Europe its system of law. The University of Paris and that despised scholasticism took Abelard and made him into Descartes. The reason was that they were institutions of learning while ours are institutions for teaching. In order that a man's whole heart may be in teaching he must be thoroughly imbued with the vital importance and absolute truth of what he has to teach; while in order that he may have any measure of success in learning he must be penetrated with a sense of the unsatisfactoriness of his present condition of knowledge. The two attitudes are almost irreconcilable. But just as it is not the self-righteous man who brings multitudes to a sense of sin, but the man who is most deeply conscious that he is himself a sinner, and it is only by a sense of sin that men can escape its thraldom; so it is not the man, who thinks he knows it all, that can bring other men to feel their need of learning, and it is only a deep sense that one is miserably ignorant that can spur one on in the toilsome path of learning. That is why, to my very humble apprehension, it cannot but seem that those admirable pedagogical methods, for which the American teacher is distinguished, are of little more consequence than the cut of his coat, that they surely are as nothing compared with that fever for learning that must consume the soul of the man who is to infect others with the same apparent malady. Let me say that of the present condition of Harvard I really know nothing at all except that I know the leaders of the department of philosophy to be all true scholars, particularly marked by eagerness to learn and freedom from dogmatism. And in every age, it can only be the philosophy of that age, such as it may

> be, which can animate the special sciences to any work that shall really carry forward the human mind to some new and valuable truth.[1]

As can be seen clearly here, Peirce places responsibility for the practical side of attainment of truth upon the ability of the teacher to motivate in his pupils an earnest quest for truth. These remarks surely had their sting when they were made, but they served as the forerunner for a whole new philosophy of education.

Pragmaticism has one additional comment to make concerning the general method of attaining truth. It is closely related and dependent upon the desire, of both teacher and pupil, to learn. Peirce maintains that, if the desire to learn is present, honest inquiry contains, inherent in its nature, an element of enlargement which basically tends to correct itself. He says:

> Thus it is that inquiry of every type, fully carried out, has the vital power of self-correction and of growth. This is a property so deeply saturating its inmost nature that it may truly be said that there is but one thing needful for learning the truth, and that is a hearty and active desire to learn what is true. If you really want to learn the truth, you will, by however devious a path, be surely led into the way of truth, at last. No matter how erroneous your ideas of the method may be at first, you will be forced at length to correct them so long as your activity is moved by that sincere desire. Nay, no matter if you only half desire it, at first, that desire would at length conquer all others, could experience continue long enough. But the more veraciously truth is described at the outset, the shorter by centuries will the road to it be.[2]

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[1] Vol. V, pp. 405, 406. [2] Vol. V, p. 405.

In summary, we can conclude that the goal of pragmaticistic inquiry is truth. Truth consists in the precise conformity of an hypothesis to the object which it represents. The object is the way that things really are, or reality. Truth is expressed in symbols and is attained by intellectual pursuit. Furthermore, the most valuable truth is the enlargement of the inquiring process which is dependent upon the honest desire to learn.

Division C

THE PURPOSE OF PRAGMATICISM

CHAPTER XI

ON MAKING IDEAS CLEAR

Consideration of the structure of pragmaticism was presented in the opening division because it is necessary to understand the categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness to comprehend pragmaticism as a system of philosophical inquiry. Attention in the second division was centered upon the nature of pragmaticism because familiarity with certain principles of its structure is equally essential to understand the purpose of philosophical inquiry. We turn now to the purpose of pragmaticism. The purpose will be discussed within the framework of two chapters since Peirce himself conceived the purpose of pragmaticism to be two-fold. It is helpful in this connection to recall the reference in the Introduction of this treatise to the two articles, How To Make Our Ideas Clear, and The Fixation of Belief, written by Peirce early in his career. These titles reveal the two basic concerns which motivated him to ponder and produce a structure for philosophical inquiry which would lend aid to these two basic problems.

Peirce states the purpose of pragmatism in these words:

> There are two functions which we may properly require that pragmatism should perform; or if not pragmatism,

> whatever the true doctrine of the Logic of Abduction may be, ought to do these two services.
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> Namely, it ought, in the first place, to give us an expeditious riddance of all ideas essentially unclear. In the second place, it ought to lend support, and help to render distinct, ideas essentially clear, but more or less difficult of apprehension; and in particular, it ought to take a satisfactory attitude toward the element of thirdness.[1]

These two functions of pragmatism are joined in another writing by Dr. Peirce when he says that the sole end of inquiry is "the settlement of opinion".[2]

Attention will be given in this chapter to the first purpose of pragmaticism, that of making ideas clear. Peirce says that this is the first lesson that Logic should teach us.[3] The importance of possessing clarity of ideas is expressed by Peirce thus:

> To know what we think, to be masters of our own meaning, will make a solid foundation for great and weighty thought. It is most easily learned by those whose ideas are meagre and restricted; and far happier they than such as wallow helplessly in a rich mud of conceptions. . . . For an individual, however, there can be no question that a few clear ideas are worth more than many confused ones. . . . It is terrible to see how a single unclear idea, a single formula without meaning, lurking in a young man's head, will sometimes act like an obstruction of inert matter in an artery, hindering the nutrition of the brain, and condemning its victim to pine away in the fullness of his intellectual vigor and in the midst of intellectual plenty. Many a man has cherished for years as his hobby some vague shadow of an idea, too meaningless to be positively false; he has, nevertheless, passionately loved it, has made it his companion by day and by night, and has given to it his strength and his life, leaving all other occupations for its sake, and in short has lived with it and for it, until it has become, as it were, flesh of his flesh and bone of his bone; and then he has waked up some

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[1] Vol. V, p. 127.

[2] Vol. V, p. 232.

[3] Vol. V, p. 251.

> bright morning to find it gone, clean vanished away like the beautiful Melusina of the fable, and the essence of his life gone with it.[1]

Here we see that Peirce regarded man's ability to think clearly and to possess conceptions with clarity as providing the purpose for life. The process of thought is not engaged in simply for the pleasure which attends it. Nor is the satisfaction which accompanies a sound logical exercise sufficiently satisfying to justify the required effort. Pragmaticism is emphatic that only as ideas are regarded as hypotheses and clarified through the process of experimentation can purpose for life evolve. Furthermore, only as ideas become clear can life be truly meaningful.

CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS

The above idea epitomizes the significant regard Peirce held for his expressed purpose of pragmatic thought and represents the distinction Peirce makes for "clarity" of ideas in pragmaticism with the "clarity and distinctness of ideas" found propounded in ordinary Logic.

Peirce jibes at the logicians of his time with their definitions of clarity. He writes:

> A clear idea is defined as one which is so apprehended that it will be recognized wherever it is met with, and so that no other will be mistaken for it. If it fails of this clearness, it is said to be obscure.

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[1] Vol. V, pp. 251, 252.

> This is rather a neat bit of philosophical terminology; yet, since it is clearness that they were defining, I wish the logicians had made their definition a little more plain. . . . A distinct idea is defined as one which contains nothing which is not clear. This is technical language; by the contents of an idea logicians understand whatever is contained in its definition. So that an idea is distinctly apprehended, according to them, when we can give a precise definition of it, in abstract terms.[1]

In spite of this criticism of the work done by logicians, Peirce lauds the role of the science of Logic in attaining clarity of ideas.

The place of Logic in pragmaticistic thought is described by Peirce in this way:

> The very first lesson that we have a right to demand that logic shall teach us is, how to make our ideas clear; and a most important one it is, depreciated only by minds who stand in need of it.[2]

Logic is defined by Peirce as "the science of the laws of the stable establishment of beliefs".[3]

It is important to notice that the meaning of the word beliefs, as used by Peirce here, is not limited to a religious connotation. Rather, Peirce says:

> Doubt and Belief, as the words are commonly employed, relate to religious or other grave discussions. But here I use them to designate the starting of any question, no matter how small or how great, and the resolution of it.[4]

The resolution of a question, then, is represented in the decision of how to act. Action is the result of belief. The

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[1] Vol. V, pp. 248, 249. [2] Vol. V, p. 251.
[3] Vol. III, p. 271. [4] Vol. V, p. 253.

definition of belief and the essence of its nature is the concern of the following chapter. The present problem is two-fold: what are the steps of attaining belief and what relation does belief possess to the clarity of ideas? For, according to pragmaticism, clarity of ideas is attained by logical inquiry and is dependent upon the action in which the idea results.

STEPS TO BELIEF

The intellectualistic nature of pragmaticism was discussed in Chapter Two. It was evident in that discussion that meaning is derived only as a result of the thought process. That thought is the essential origin of belief is reiterated by Peirce when he writes:

> We may add that just as a piece of music may be written in parts, each part having its own air, so various systems of relationship of succession subsist together between the same sensations. These different systems are distinguished by having different motives, ideas, or functions. Thought is only one such system, for its sole motive, idea, and function is to produce belief, and whatever does not concern that purpose belongs to some other system of relations.[1]

Since the purpose of thought is to produce belief, and action is the result of belief, belief can be said to be the link between thought and action. Furthermore, since thought is intellectual cognition, the steps to belief are two. First, there must be awareness of an hypothesis which

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[1] Vol. V, p. 254.

must be believed or refuted. Secondly, the irritation of doubt stimulates the experimental process which leads to belief or refutation.

To show that belief is the result of intellectual activity, Peirce recognizes the individuality of each person. At the same time he maintains that the method of attaining belief is universal in its employment of hypothesis, testing, and interpretation of meaning, the latter becoming a new hypothesis to be tested. This is the scientific method promulgated by pragmaticism. Peirce writes of it:

> And, though these affections are necessarily as various as are individual conditions, yet the method must be such that the ultimate conclusion of every man shall be the same. Such is the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in more familiar language, is this: There are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those Reals affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as are our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly are; and any man if he have sufficient experience and he reason enough about it, will be led to the one True conclusion. The new conception here involved is that of Reality.[1]

Thus we see that although pragmaticism lays constant emphasis upon the variations of quality and the universality of method, it reaches the ultimate conclusion that it must reach. If perception is adequately utilized and reasoning by abduction is consistently followed through the path of

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[1] Vol. V, pp. 242, 243.

experience, the conclusion will be the same for every man because cognition of that which is universally real will be realized.

The second step to establishment of belief, the motivating force of doubt in the process, is described by Peirce thus:

> The irritation of doubt is the only immediate motive for the struggle to attain belief. It is certainly best for us that our beliefs should be such as may truly buide our actions so as to satisfy our desires; and this reflection will make us reject every belief which does not seem to have been so formed as to insure this result. But it will only do so by creating a doubt in the place of that belief. With the doubt, therefore, the struggle begins, and with the cessation of doubt it ends. Hence, the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opinion. We may fancy that this is not enough for us, and that we seek, not merely an opinion, but a true opinion. But put this fancy to the test, and it proves groundless; for as soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false. And it is clear that nothing out of the sphere of our knowledge can be our object, for nothing which does not affect the mind can be the motive for mental effort. The most that can be maintained is, that we seek for a belief that we shall think to be true. But we think each one of our beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is mere tautology to say so.[1]

Doubt is the motivation of the struggle to belief. It has been seen earlier that the entire method of pragmaticism is dependent upon the desire to learn due to dissatisfaction with the present state of knowledge or belief. Here can be seen the dependence of the experimental method upon doubt which stimulates the testing-process of all hypotheses.

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[1] Vol. V, p. 232.

The definition which pragmaticism provides for belief will be considered in the next chapter. It is apparent from Peirce's words just quoted that belief is intellectual because it is the result of cognition. Likewise, doubt is cognitive because it irritates belief as it is held in any moment of time. Through the challenging of intellectual doubt hypotheses are prompted to be tested, and in this way are ideas made clear.

This seems to link "clear" ideas with beliefs. Ideas, which are clear, and beliefs are not to be regarded as identical in pragmaticism. Both are hypotheses to be tested by further experimentation. Both are stable hypotheses as regarded in any one moment of time. However, the distinction between ideas and beliefs is that clarity of ideas affects the beliefs which are held. The goal of beliefs is to produce habits of action. The goal of clear ideas is to provide belief with the truest, most complete meaning possible. The question now is: how is clarity of ideas achieved?

ATTAINING CLARITY OF IDEAS

Dr. Peirce recognizes three grades of clarity. The first level he calls familiarity, the second level is termed reflection, and the third level is referred to as both argumentative and pragmatic.

The first grade of clarity of ideas, that of familiarity, does not receive detailed explanation by Peirce. It

refers to that level of clarity which is so much a part of understanding that the truth or falsity of an idea is never irritated, or questioned, by doubt. Of this level, he writes: "Every child uses it with perfect confidence, never dreaming that he does not understand it."[1]

The second grade of clearness, which involves reflection, is more complex. It is at this level men attempt to give abstract definitions to real things. Such a definition may be true or false; but that is not the important thing at this level. The important thing about it is that after some reflection, meaning is expressed in symbolic terms although the validity of the terms are not questioned. Peirce says that such a definition is reached by:

> . . . considering the points of difference between reality and its opposite, fiction. A figment is a product of somebody's imagination; it has such characters as his thought impresses upon it. That those characters are independent of how you or I think is an external reality. There are, however, phenomena within our own minds, dependent upon our thought, which are at the same time real in the sense that we really think them. But though their characters depend on how we think, they do not depend on what we think those characters to be. . . . Thus we may define the real as that whose characters are independent of what anybody may think them to be.[2]

The distinction which Peirce makes between the abstract definition of the second level of clarity and the reality of things as they are provides the basis for the third grade of clarity. At the second level the definitions simply are formed as the result of reflection. No concern is held

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[1] Vol. V, p. 265. [2] Vol. V, pp. 265, 266.

for their degree of accuracy or falsity. In the third grade of clarity there is much concern that the definition be as accurate a representation of things as they really are as possible. This degree of clarity is attained through the maxim of pragmaticism.

Ideas are rendered clear by the meaning which is contained within them. The meaning of an idea is determined by the practical consequences of the idea. Peirce says: "It is absurd to say that thought has any meaning unrelated to its function."[1] The function of thought has been already emphasized as that of producing belief, which, in turn, controls actions. Thus the meaning of any idea is determined by the practical consequences resulting from the idea. Peirce states it in these words which are somewhat familiar by now:

> It appears, then, that the rule for attaining the third grade of clearness of apprehension is as follows: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.[2]

This method of attaining clarity of ideas is not regarded, even by Peirce, to provide the true representation of reality for reality is beyond the most scientific comprehension. It is held by pragmaticism to provide the most accurate representation of things as they really exist. In this

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[1] Vol. V, p. 258. [2] Ibid.

way it achieves the hypothesis nearest the truth. As such it forms the basis for belief because it provides the meaning of belief. Both these ideas are expressed by Peirce when he writes:

> But, however satisfactory such a definition may be found, it would be a great mistake to suppose that it makes the idea of reality perfectly clear. Here, then, let us apply our rules. According to them, reality, like every other quality, consists in the peculiar sensible effects which things partaking of it produce. The only effect which real things have is to cause belief, for all the sensations which they excite emerge into consciousness in the form of beliefs. The question therefore is, how is true belief (or belief in the real) distinguished from false belief (or belief in fiction). Now, as we have seen in the former paper,* the ideas of truth and falsehood, in their full development, appertain exclusively to the experiential method of settling opinion.[1]

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*The Fixation of Belief.

[1] Vol. V, p. 266.

CHAPTER XII

THE FIXATION OF BELIEF

Because all action is the result of our belief, the second purpose of pragmaticism represents the most important aspect of this system of philosophical inquiry. It has been obvious, again and again, throughout this study that pragmaticism is an intellectualistic system. Ideas are hypotheses which form the beginning point for all inquiry. Even the interpretation of meaning, which represents the temporary result of the inquiry is a cognition, or an idea. Peirce accords the production of belief its primary place when he says that "the production of belief is the sole function of thought".[1]

Not only is the production of belief the sole function of thought; Peirce goes further to say that thought which does not produce, or refer to belief, cannot be accurately called thought. He writes in these words:

> But the soul and meaning of thought, abstracted from the other elements which accompany it, though it may be voluntarily thwarted, can never be made to direct itself toward anything but the production of belief. Thought in action has for its only possible motive the attainment of thought at rest; and whatever does not refer to belief is no part of the thought itself.[2]

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[1] Vol. V, p. 253.

[2] Vol. V, p. 255.

This establishes sufficiently the intellectual process which produces belief. The next question to be asked is what is belief. Is belief thought? Peirce replies directly to this question in these words:

> And what, then, is belief: It is the demi-cadence which closes a musical phrase in the symphony of our intellectual life. We have seen that it has three properties; First, it is something that we are aware of; second, it appeases the irritation of doubt; and third, it involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action, or, say for short, a *habit*. As it appeases the irritation of doubt, which is *the* motive for thinking, thought relaxes, and comes to rest for a moment when belief is reached. But, since belief is a rule for action, the application of which involves further doubt, and further thought, at the same time that it is a stopping-place, it is also a new starting-place for thought. That is why I have permitted myself to call it thought at rest, although thought is essentially an action. The *final* upshot of thinking is the exercise of volition, and of this thought no longer forms a part; but belief is only a stadium of mental action, an effect upon our nature due to thought, which will influence future thinking.[1]

Belief, then, is thought-at-rest. However, it is not passive because it determines action. As a stadium of mental action belief controls what we do. In the same way it affects future thought since thought includes the practical effects in its total conception.

METHODS OF FIXING BELIEF

Pragmaticism recognizes four methods of fixing belief. They are the methods of tenacity, authority, *a priori*, and

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[1] Vol. V, p. 255.

science. In light of previous discussion we would expect Dr. Peirce to laud the scientific method. However, to understand the basic nature of the various methods and to understand something of their strengths and weaknesses, these are considered here individually.

The method of tenacity consists of adopting a conclusion and clinging to it unrelentingly. Constant repetition of this conclusion is utilized without permitting any elements of doubt or experience to cause deviation from the accepted conclusion. Peirce describes it as:

> . . . taking as answer to a question any we may fancy, and constantly reiterating it to ourselves, dwelling on all which may conduce to that belief, and learning to turn with contempt and hatred from anything that might disturb it.[1]

One need not look far to find the method of tenacity followed by persons. Peirce likens it to the proverbial ostrich who buries its head when danger approaches. He goes on to say of the method of tenacity:

> It hides the danger, and then calmly says there is no danger; and, if it feels perfectly sure there is none, why should it raise its head to see? A man may go through life, systematically keeping out of view all that might cause a change in his opinions, and if he only succeeds - basing his method, as he does, on two fundamental psychological laws - I do not see what can be said against his doing so. It would be an egotistical impertinence to object that his procedure is irrational, for that only amounts to saying that his method of settling belief is not ours. He does not propose to himself to be rational, and, indeed will often talk with scorn of man's weak and illusive reason.[2]

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[1] Vol. V, p. 234.

[2] Vol. V, p. 235.

This pitfall of retreat from other opinions, which challenges a conclusion, is almost impossible for the man lives in society, according to pragmaticism. Peirce goes on to say:

> The social impulse is against it. The man who adopts it will find that other men think differently from him, and it will be apt to occur to him, in some saner moment, that their opinions are quite as good as his own, and this will shake his confidence in his belief. . . . Unless we make ourselves hermits, we shall necessarily influence each other's opinions; so that the problem becomes how to fix belief, not in the individual merely, but in the community.[1]

The second method of achieving belief is that of authority. As the name implies, this method consists in accepting beliefs as interpreted and propounded by some authority, usually the state, the Church, but in some cases, another individual. An element of ignorance accompanies this method of belief since the believer must somehow be kept immune from conflicting opinions. The more important element in this doctrine, however, is such unswerving loyalty to the authority that conflicting opinions will be regarded with contempt. Peirce cites the heirarchy of the Roman Catholic church as the best example of the authoritarian method.

Evaluating the method of authority, Peirce writes:

> In judging this method of fixing belief, which may be called the method of authority, we must, in the first place, allow its immeasurable mental and moral superiority to the method of tenacity. Its success is proportion-

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[1] Ibid.

> ately greater; and, in fact, it has over and over again worked the most majestic results. . . . If we scrutinize the matter closely, we shall find that there has not been one of their creeds which has remained always the same; yet the change is so slow as to be imperceptible during one person's life, so that individual belief remains sensibly fixed. For the mass of mankind then, there is perhaps no better method than this. If it is their highest impulse to be intellectual slaves, then slaves they ought to remain.[1]

The third method for fixing belief is called the *a priori* method. It can be described briefly as that method which arrives at belief as a result of natural preferences. It is described by Peirce in these words:

> Let the action of natural preference be unimpeded, then, and under their influence let men, conversing together and regarding matters in different lights, gradually develop beliefs in harmony with natural causes.[2]

The *a priori* method is rooted in the philosophies of Descartes and Kant and rests primarily on the premise that belief is valid if it rests upon what is natural to believe. Peirce is severely critical of Descartes in this regard. Peirce says:

> Plainly, he is aiming at a kind of truth which saying so can make to be so. He gives two further proofs of God's existence. Descartes makes God easier to know than anything else; for whatever we think He is, He is. He fails to remark that this is precisely the definition of a *figment*. In particular, God cannot be a deceiver; whence it follows that whatever we quite clearly and distinctly think to be true about any subject, must be true. Accordingly, if people will thoroughly discuss a subject, and quite clearly and distinctly make up their minds what they think about it, the desired settlement of the question will be reached. I may remark that the world has

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[1] Vol. V, pp. 236, 237. [2] Vol. V, p. 238.

> pretty thoroughly deliberated upon that theory and has quite distinctly come to the conclusion that it is utter nonsense; whence that judgment is indisputably right.[1]

Peirce is more objective in his evaluation of the *a priori* method when he says:

> The method is far more intellectual and respectable from the point of view of reason than either of the others which we have noticed. Indeed, as long as no better method can be applied, it ought to be followed, since it is then the expression of instinct which must be the ultimate cause of belief in all cases. But its failure has been the most manifest. It makes of inquiry something similar to the development of taste; but taste, unfortunately, is always more or less a matter of fashion and accordingly metaphysicians have never come to any fixed agreement, but the pendulum has swung backward and forward between a more material and a more spiritual philosophy, from the earliest times to the latest. And so from this, which has been called the *a priori* method, we are driven, in Lord Bacon's phrase, to a true induction.[2]

The method for fixing belief which pragmaticism makes its own is the scientific method. This method of thought fulfills the requirement laid down by Peirce when he says:

> To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanence - by something upon which our thinking has no effect.[3]

The scientific method, then, attains belief by considering reality. The way in which this is accomplished was described in the preceding chapter as one of the steps which renders ideas clear. In that regard it was stated that con-

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[1] Vol. V, p. 259 footnote. [2] Vol. V, pp. 241, 242.

[3] Vol. V, p. 242.

clusions are true only to the degree in which they represent the Reality for which they stand.

The extent to which this method of fixing belief is justified by Peirce in these four ways:

> It may be asked how I know that there are any Reals. If this hypothesis is the sole support of my method of inquiry, my method of inquiry must not be used to support my hypothesis. The reply is this: 1. If investigation cannot be regarded as proving that there are Real things, it at least does not lead to a contrary conclusion; but the method and the conception on which it is based remain ever in harmony. No doubts of the method, therefore, necessarily arise from its practice, as is the case with all the others. 2. The feeling which gives rise to any method of fixing belief is a dissatisfaction at two repugnant propositions. But here already is a vague concession that there is some one thing which a proposition should represent. Nobody, therefore, can really doubt that there are Reals, for, if he did, doubt would not be a source of dissatisfaction. The hypothesis, therefore, is one which every mind admits. So that the social impulse does not cause men to doubt it. 3. Everybody uses the scientific method about a great many things, and only ceases to use it when he does not know how to apply it. 4. Experience of the method has not led us to doubt it, but, on the contrary, scientific investigation has had the most wonderful triumphs in the way of settling opinion.[1]

The scientific method, then, of establishing belief is by the human power of reason, since all inquiry, of the pragmatic kind, is intellectual. This does not refute the statement of Peirce, however, when he says that, in the last analysis, beliefs are fixed by "some external permanency" rather than by anything human. On the contrary, this statement again reiterates the conclusion that pragmaticism is a

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[1] Vol. V, pp. 243, 244.

method of inquiring about reality rather than an exposition of what reality is. As has been stated before, truth simply is the most accurate representation of reality of which the human mind is capable at any one time.

THE NATURE OF BELIEF

As we come to the conclusion of this study of pragmaticism, let us attempt to apply its categories to the nature of belief. Because belief is the motivation for action, and since the practical effects of any conception must be included in the whole of that conception, it appears significantly necessary to ascertain as clear a conception of belief as possible.

Let us consider belief then as a proposition. What is believed in is not essential here since we are considering belief as the proposition. As such we know that it is the result of intellectual cognition. Also, we know that as subject, it is predicated upon something, doubtless upon prior beliefs. But in its most naked form, it is a static entity, thought-at-rest, and is capable of being, being in relation to other beliefs, and giving way to its static being when a new interpretation of its relationships is achieved.

In its first mode of being, then, belief is a quality. Belief is an intellectual quality since it has been produced by cognition. However, this is not the quality of Firstness.

The quality of Firstness inheres in the potential possibility possessed by belief. That men act according to their belief cannot be questioned. Therefore, one obvious potential possibility of belief lies in its ability to affect conduct. If a man believes that it will rain, he takes his umbrella with him when he goes out of doors. This serves, in a very commonplace way, to illustrate how belief possesses the ability to affect conduct.

The second category of being is the relationship which it has to other subjects. These relationships may be between beliefs and persons, or between beliefs and other beliefs. For our consideration here let us limit their relationships to other beliefs. Other beliefs, which have the same quality of Firstness may either irritate or substantiate that belief which is the subject. In either case the subject belief is in relationship to other beliefs and may be affected by them just as equally as it may affect them.

Consideration has already been given to the irritating quality of doubt as one of the steps to belief. Emphasis has also been made upon the intellectual nature of the process which leads to belief. One other aspect of the process must be mentioned. Pragmaticism holds this process to be a growing, developmental one. The process which leads to belief may come swiftly. On the other hand, it may take years of experimentation for thought to reach the temporary resting

place which is described as belief. Peirce states this idea in these terms:

> Feigned hesitancy, whether feigned for mere amusement or with a lofty purpose, plays a great part in the production of scientific inquiry. However the doubt may originate, it stimulates the mind to an activity which may be slight or energetic, calm or turbulent. Images pass rapidly through consciousness, one incessantly melting into another, until at last, when all is over - it may be in a fraction of a second, in an hour, or after long years - we find ourselves decided as to how we should act under such circumstances as those which occasioned our hesitation. In other words, we have attained belief.[1]

The third mode of being of belief is its interpretation of meaning. As has been pointed out, its truth lies in the degree of accuracy with which it represents reality. But, that is the basis for further experimentation and does not affect the essence of interpretation of its meaning. The meaning of a belief inheres in the actions which it produces for the practical effects of the belief are included in the conception of the belief.

Peirce says the meaning of a belief is found in the habits of action which it produces. He writes:

> The essence of belief is the establishment of a habit; and different beliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which they give rise. If beliefs do not differ in this respect, if they appease the same doubt by producing the same rule of action, then no mere difference in the manner of consciousness of them can make them different beliefs, any more than playing a tune in different keys is playing different tunes.[2]

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[1] Vol. V, p. 253.

[2] Vol. V, p. 255.

The interpretation of belief then not only produces action but is revealed by the action which it produces. It is important to notice that Peirce makes conduct, which is in the form of habit, the essence of belief rather than the goal of belief. Since habit is made the essence of the nature of belief in pragmaticism, this question must now be asked: is habitual conduct so completely the result of intellectual conceptions that it becomes automatic? If this be the case, then the goal of belief must be physical reaction rather than further mental activity.

THE NATURE OF HABIT

Habit is regarded in pragmaticism as a law of the mind.[1] This would seem at first appearance to categorize it as a mental law. Habit is certainly a category of the mind for Peirce says of it:

> Very different both from feelings and from reaction-sensations or disturbances of feeling are general conceptions. When we think, we are conscious that a connection between feelings is determined by a general rule, we are aware of being governed by a habit. Intellectual power is nothing but facility in taking habits and in following them in cases essentially analogous to, but in non-essentials widely remote from, the normal cases of connections of feelings under which those habits were formed.[2]

Peirce elucidates that habitual conduct is a law of the mind with physical relations. Connections of feelings

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[1] Vol. VI, p. 20.

[2] Vol. VI, p. 19.

are made by physical connections as well as mental ones. Conduct is physically controlled by the nerve-control-center located at the base of the brain. Nerve cells are connected to the muscles by nerve-gangila. A familiar illustration, in slow motion, of habitual connection between stimulus and nerve cells will serve to demonstrate these connections. When a man's hand contacts a flaming fire the nerves in the fingers signal the nerve-control-center that this is painful and that something must be accomplished to remove it. The nerve ganglia then contact the muscles in the arm and shoulder to withdraw the hand. This is the mental process required to withdraw the hand. Habitual behavior causes the man to withdraw the hand with as quick a jerk as possible without permitting the mental operation to run its full intellectual course. The physical basis of habitual behavior is explained by Peirce in this way:

> The cloudiness of psychological notions may be corrected by connecting them with physiological conceptions. Feeling may be supposed to exist wherever a nerve-cell is in an excited condition. The disturbance of feeling, or sense of reaction, accompanies the transmission of disturbance between nerve-cells, or from a nerve-cell to a muscle-cell, or the external stimulation of a nerve-cell. General conceptions arise upon the formation of habits in the nerve-matter, which are molecular changes consequent upon its activity and probably connected with its nutrition.[1]

Such is the nature of physical relations to the formation of habits which pragmaticism describes as a law of the mind.

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[1] Vol. VI, p. 19.

That the formation of habit is not determined completely by physical connections is demonstrated by Peirce when he says:

> The law of habit exhibits a striking contrast to all physical laws in the character of its commands. A physical law is absolute. What it requires is an exact relation. Thus, a physical force introduces into a motion a component motion to be combined with the rest by the parallelogram of forces; but the component motion must actually take place exactly as required by the law of force. On the other hand, no exact conformity is required by the mental law. Nay, exact conformity would be in downright conflict with the law; since it would instantly crystallize thought and prevent all further formation of habit. The law of mind only makes a given feeling *more likely* to arise.[1]

Habits, then, are produced by mental activity, but are more likely to follow the path of prior physical connections. Since pragmaticism defines the essence of belief as habit, it now becomes clear that a belief can become a habit. Furthermore, action resulting from belief can become habitual. Without questioning whether habitual behavior is always desireable, Peirce defines a habit as a "general conception". Thus belief, as a stable opinion, which regulates conducts, is returned to the area of mental activity which is always subject to the experimental method of the pragmatic system of inquiry. He writes in summarizing fashion:

> The one primary and fundamental law of mental action consists in a tendency to generalization. Feeling tends to spread; connections between feelings awaken feelings; neighboring feelings become assimilated; ideas are apt to

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[1] Vol. VI, pp. 19, 20.

> reproduce themselves. These are as many formulations of the one law of the growth of the mind. When a disturbance of feeling takes place, we have a consciousness of gain, the gain of experience; and a new disturbance will be apt to assimilate itself to the one that preceded it. Feelings, by being excited, become more easily excited especially in the ways in which they have previously been excited. The consciousness of such a habit constitutes a general conception.[1]

Thus the cyclical nature of pragmatic inquiry is completed. An intellectual conception produces belief. The nature of belief is the action which it stimulates. The essence of belief is habit, and habit is a general and cognitive conception which is subject to future testing by experimentation.

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[1] Vol. VI, p. 19.

PART II

INTRODUCTION

This part of the treatise is an attempt to set forth a philosophy of Christian education appropriate for our time. Emphasis is on the development of a meaningful Christian faith in the individual person through a method of Christian education which finds its basic philosophical structure in pragmaticistic philosophy. Therefore, it is a philosophy for Christian education rather than a methodology. It is readily admitted that the philosophy and the methodology, which is based upon the underlying philosophy, cannot be sharply demarcated in the art of communication. At the same time it is equally apparent that the methods and techniques utilized in the process of communication evolve from the philosophical foundations of the art of communication. This study is intended to limit its concern to the philosophical foundations of an effective method for communication of the Christian faith.

Terms, which are in common usage in both Christianity and pragmaticism, are sometimes utilized without detailed explanations. The terms of pragmaticistic philosophy were explained in the preceding pages, and a general understanding of the terms of Christianity is assumed. The latter assumption seems valid since the pages that follow are intended to be primarily philosophical rather than theological.

Documentation is from two principal sources: the Holy Bible, and the six volumes of the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce as edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. It is hoped that the justification for the linking of these two sources will become clear in the text.

The philosophy of Christian education attempted here is the result of a growing conviction as well as earnest study in the area of communicating the Christian faith. This philosophy represents the conviction that the process of Christian education always achieves some kind of results. Christian education may stimulate persons to an honest inquiry concerning the nature of the Christian faith and vital ways for the expression of this faith. In its less dynamic form it transmits a body of content about the Christian faith which may be easily affirmed without demanding expression other than the affirmation of it. The first aspect of the conviction is that Christian education must seek the former end in order to communicate the demands of Jesus' teachings. The second aspect of the conviction is that pragmatic philosophy provides the conceptions which give to Christian education a framework consistent with the teachings of Jesus. Therefore, the title, Pragmatic Roots For Christian Education, has been chosen.

Expression of the pragmatic philosophy of Christian education is the result of serious effort and earnest study. Extensive reading in the areas of theology, Christian educa-

tion, and secular education has been my privilege during the past five years of graduate study at the Pacific School of Religion in Berkeley, California. Under the guidance of the professors of this institution, particularly my major professor, Dr. Wayne R. Rood, new vistas of religious and educational thought have been entered and new horizons have come into view. Prior to this concentrated study, two years study at The College of the Bible in Lexington, Kentucky provided the first view of professional religious teaching. There, under the guidance of Dr. Myron Taggart Hopper, who credits the pioneer work of William Clayton Bower in the field of religious education as his motivation for work in the area, an experience-centered approach to Christian education was first encountered.

However, the pragmatist is malcontent with classroom pursuit alone. Therefore, the opportunity to test the principles of Christian educational philosophy in three different organized churches across the nation over a period of ten years has been greatly appreciated. These have provided the laboratory for the conviction that effective Christian education is pragmatic. The experiences of this decade are undeniably present in the subject of this thesis, although they make unpretentious footnotes for a dissertation of this kind. The pages that follow are an original attempt to express a philosophy which consistently includes the practical consequences of its concepts. With this aim in view, the experi-

ences of a decade seem to provide significant documentation.

Dr. Peirce referred to life as the "laboratory" of pragmatic philosophy. In the same way, the educational life of organized Christian churches is the laboratory of Christian educational philosophy. Belief in the pragmatic philosophy of Christian education can only be tested through the experiences of actual teaching situations. Therefore, it is sincerely hoped that the conceptions of Christian education presented herein will be subjected to broad experimentation so that their effects will become a part of the total conceptions. For, this is the only way in which the philosophy of Christian education may become pragmatic.

Division D

THE STRUCTURE OF CHRISTIAN EDUCATION

CHAPTER XIII

CHRISTIAN EDUCATION AS A METHOD

Paramount in the philosophy of Christian education is the thesis that Christian education is a methodology rather than a completed system which is final in every area of inquiry. Like pragmatism it is a method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts. Who will deny that these "hard words" keep recurring to the Christian, and often to the non-Christian as well: God, Jesus, Holy Spirit, sin, reconciliation, agape, and revelation? And who will be so bold as to offer the final answer for such concepts as these: eternal life, the grace of God, salvation, and faith? Christian education cannot be accurately called a completed system, either philosophically, or educationally. Neither can it be called a system of religious truth which is final in every area of inquiry and is to be forever defended. The only defense of Christian education as a method of inquiry lies in remaining true to its own method.

In the ascertaining of Christian meanings we regard the system as primarily a theological one. The process of the communication of Christian meanings, however, is grounded in Christian educational philosophy. This is not to ignore or treat lightly the techniques and skills of the practical teaching situations that aim at the communication of religious

meanings. It does intend to convey the belief, however, that all the techniques and skills of the teaching situation are rooted in the philosophy of communication which one holds. The pages that follow in this, the second part of the treatise, are bent in that direction.

Just as in the pragmatic method, scientific data is taken into account and given the place it so plainly deserves. Such scientific data includes the age and ability, as well as the prior orientation and temperament, of the pupil. It also includes the statistics of the past experience of the race and previous Christians as well as of the individual. Justifiably, it includes all the information that can be uncovered which bears on the hypothesis under consideration. Demonstrative proof from the process itself is not the end sought. As an art of communication, Christian education seeks the same end as pragmatism: providing the learner with an experiential hypothesis which is capable of being verified or refuted in the future, or by future observers.

Simply, then, we can say that Christian education is a method of finding more effective ways of communicating Christian experience as it ever seeks to communicate Christian experience in the process. There will be results and conclusions reached as the process goes on, but these will not be regarded as dogmatic statements of perfect truth that can never be altered and improved. Rather, these conclusions become new hypotheses to be tried and tested by the same method.

This attitude of Christian education cannot be overemphasized. More effective methods of communication are constantly being discovered through this system of inquiry. This attitude represents a sharp contrast to some philosophies of Christian education that are being advanced in our day.[1] The current vogue advocates methods of transmitting theological interpretations, the concepts of which are finalized. The cry today rising from religious educators on many sides is, "How can we communicate effectively to others? We know what we have to say!" My plea is a paraphrase of Dr. Peirce, "This treatise is meant for people who want to find out; and people who want philosophy of Christian education ladled out to them can go elsewhere."

Christian education is the most exciting facet of Christianity today! But it is as filled with challenge as it is with excitement. And if the would-be critic should raise his voice and say that I do not seem unqualifiedly certain of my conclusions, I would call him "blessed" and congratulate him upon being so right. In this area of our Christian living which cries out for a more perfect way we dare not be content with our present methods nor shrink from new discoveries that might revolutionize our concepts of communi-

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[1] H. Shelton Smith, Faith and Nurture. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954.

Randolph Crump Miller, Education for Christian Living. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1956.

cation. In our search lies the most precious, as well as exciting, adventure man can grasp - the adventure of giving to God our best efforts as we honor our Sonship.

Let us turn to the steps of Christian education. The first step is admitting that one does not already know the ultimate in effective methods of Christian education. This, obviously, is the first requisite for any type of Christian education. Only then can the process be truly educational in nature. If the attitude is that of communicating a certain body of information or systematic doctrines, then the process becomes one of transmission rather than one of education. For the genuine educational process to occur there must be taken into account the possibility that in the process of education some new hypothesis may be discovered that must be tested in the future by the same method.

Through the cumulation of life's experiences certain conclusions are reached and accepted as true. Nowhere is this more inevitable than in the area of Christian concepts and belief. Christian education requires that one lay bare his preconceived concepts and examine them critically in light of potential qualities as they are existent in any subject, then observe the being of actual facts as they exist in relation, and in this way determine the being which will shape future events.

BEING

The three steps of the pragmatic method, as derived from the three modes of being, provide the firm basis for a philosophy of Christian education. These will be discussed in detail in the chapter numbered fifteen but it is necessary to allude to them here. All three are present in any one event, or experience.

The first "given" being in this philosophy of Christian education is the qualitative possibility for the development of Christian faith which is present in every person. As Christian believers we believe it is possible for others to believe in Christ also. We begin, therefore, with persons for in the educational task it is persons that we want to become committed to Jesus Christ. Commitment is, in the final analysis, an individual mode of being, so it is correct to say that each person represents a different possibility for actualization. Furthermore, each person represents a different actualized state at any one moment of time. At the same time, there can be no question as to the reality of the possibility for actualization in persons of this faith. I believe in Jesus Christ! And if this is inadequate evidence, I simply point to the many other people, contemporary as well as prior, who make and have made the same affirmation. Christian faith is an historical fact!

The second category of being consists in the existence which occurs when one subject, the person, comes into contact with the world in which he finds himself. I choose the word, world, with intention because it includes all other subjects. I do not claim to postulate a complete list of other subjects. Certainly a list of other subjects includes these: other persons, objects, both animate and inanimate, other animals, and natural events. When the person comes into relation with this world the possibility of his being becomes changed. This change is most apparent in the conditions which we have termed generally "the struggle for survival". It can also be found in such obvious observations as these: a man cannot become a dog or a tree or a stone. The being is new because the person is affected by these facts. He must be a person in the process of interaction. He cannot be anything else.

The third category of the given is more elusive to describe but is just as real as either of the first two. It is the product of the interaction of the person in his world and its significance lies in the meaning which becomes the possession of the person. It is equally the property of the relation because it gives rise to new facts as well as meaning and will be determinate in future relationships. Therefore, the meaning is novel in each case of interaction and although it will be determinate in new situations, it will

be never static because it will be changed itself in the process of new interaction.

This comprises the triadinal pattern of the method of Christian Education. "Being" and "given" are not used here in any philosophical sense. Rather they are used as the given situation or factors in the learning process.

We who are concerned with the development of Christian faith know that such development can occur only in the lives of people. Persons are the beginning point. These persons do not live in isolation whatever their surroundings or circumstances. Each time a relationship occurs with another subject there is something interpreted or learned. Interpretation is not limited to the third factor alone for the conception of results of past experience and future purposes influence the interpretation which is made in any one response. The given of any philosophy of Christian education embraces all three of these categories. Take any one of the three away and being of the educational situation disappears.

SUBSTANCE

With the aforementioned categories of being in mind, let us look at the substance of the method of Christian education. We have attempted to show that the three categories of being form the framework for the educational process. The question now is: how can this framework be used in effective learning?

The clue is found in the pragmatic method. Once we have accepted the structure of the framework, there can be only one criterion for substance which will produce dynamic learning. This is the embodying quality of the educational method itself. The method must take into account the triadinal being of the situation, that it is persons who possess the possibility for learning, that information of the world about them contains the hard objects with which they come in contact, and that only the person's interpretation of the contact can produce learning which is meaningfully effective to the person.

The second principle, then, of the philosophy of Christian education must be: to make certain that the person's interaction with other subjects forces some interpretation. While the interpretation which is made is important in Christian education, the more important thing is that some meaning inheres in the interpretation. Meaning must be present since it simply becomes a new hypothesis to be tested by future experience. The vital substance is to make sure that the interpretation is made. Any time that an interpretation can be avoided by the person we can be sure that the method is barren of substance. The old definition of a college education as the passing of facts from the professor's notebook to the pupil's notebook without passing through the heads of either represents education which has no substance.

In the following chapter we shall look at the intellectualistic aspects of Christian education. It is sufficient to say here that Christian education seeks to provide meanings for intellectual concepts. The task is always to pass from being to substance, or from the first principle to the second. Just as pragmatism moves from existence to speculation, Christian education moves from existence to faith which provides the firm basis for speculation.

An hypothesis, or a conception, always has a subject which expresses the substance and a predicate which expresses the quality of that subject. The function of the hypothesis is to unite the being and the substance. For an example let us postulate this hypothesis: My father believes in God.

The first conception in passing from being to substance is the idea of potential. "My father" is a person; therefore, he possesses the inherent capacity to believe.

Secondly, we can know or identify a quality only by means of comparison or contrast with another quality. In this example my father "believes" rather than doubts. This conception of relation provides the second conception in passing from being to substance. The comparison is made by someone. In this case it is "I". The understanding revealed by this hypothesis on the part of the interpreter includes: a conception of "father" and a conception of "believe". Note that there is no conception of God revealed since the hypothesis postulates nothing about God. It is also significant

to notice that the understanding on the part of the interpreter includes his purpose. From this hypothesis it is impossible for us to state the purpose of this hypothesis with any certainty, but it is readily conceivable that "My father believes in God" has practical bearing upon the proposition: "I believe in God." Thus it is obvious that the practical effects of "I believe in God" is a part of the total conception of "My father believes in God."

Now, by ignoring the interpreter, there remains the interpretant of the proposition which the hypothesis expresses. There is the meaning which remains in the hypothesis apart from either subject or predicate. To us, as observers, it means that "one man believes in God". Meaning for us depends upon our concept of man, of belief, and probably of God. This hypothesis demonstrates the inseparable relation between rational cognition and rational purpose. Such an hypothesis as this would only be utilized if the observer were concerned with either his father or his belief.

Likewise, this example serves to illustrate that the meaning of hypotheses is both specific and general. In this case it not only has meaning to us as observers but also to the "I" who postulates it. It further illustrates the fact that the meaning for either the observer or the "I" is dependent upon further experimentation. The substance of the Christian educational method in this case is dependent upon whether

or not future experimentation produces belief in God for the interpreter.

THE PROCESS OF EXPERIMENT

Meanings in the philosophy of Christian education are both specific and general. Meanings are the result of the thought processes. The tools which are utilized in the learning situation are but equipment used to determine rational meaning. The values of the learning process emerge as the experimenter checks the results with the beginning hypothesis.

A previous assertion was that the value of the pragmatic philosophy of Christian education rests in its remaining true to its own method. Therefore, the value of experiment is of inestimable worth to effective Christian communication.

Using the three elements of the given learning situation the teacher uses a certain method. Out of this experiment arises an interpretant as to whether or not effective learning ensued. On the basis of this interpretation the teacher then modifies the method in the next learning situation or with the next group. In this way every experiment has meaning in and of itself but it is also evident that every experiment is related to others - both past and in the future. A single isolated situation is related to the past insofar as it was determined by past experience. It is just as signifi-

cantly linked to the future insofar as the resulting interpretation is verified or refuted by future experimentation.

Always overarching the method used in any one experiment is the desired purpose. We in Christian education make no apology for our purpose. That others may come to believe in Jesus Christ or deepen their faith in him is always the purpose. Methods are modified in light of their effectiveness in achieving this purpose. Therefore, meanings are always significant as they motivate future conduct of the person's faith.

EXPERIMENT AS EXPERIENCE

Up to now we have attempted to define the categories of a pragmatic philosophy of Christian education. We turn now to the unit of learning. The term "learning-situation" has been consistently used. This was not aimless nor for lack of a more adequate term.

The learning situation may be a single experience or it may include several experiences in one situation. Persons, relations, and interpretations are often more complex than they are single. The simplest term of learning, or the unit of learning, is an experience. An experience consists of a subject, an interaction, and a resultant interpretation which connects the first two with meaning.

Experience provides the basis for distinguishing reality from appearance, truth from falsehood, best from better. Experience is the testing ground for all hypotheses. It is the unit of learning which provides meaning for Christian faith!

CHAPTER XIV

THE INTELLECTUAL DIMENSION OF CHRISTIAN EDUCATION

Christian Education was defined in the preceding chapter as a method of inquiry which seeks to find more effective ways of communicating Christian experience as it ever seeks to communicate Christian experience in the process. The two-fold aspect must be remembered throughout this discussion. By communication of Christian experience is meant the method by which persons come to experience God and His Son, Jesus Christ. The process to accomplish this consists in methodology. Finding more effective ways of communication is the goal of the philosophy underlying the methodology. This is the aspect of Christian education consisting in theory. The two aspects can scarcely be separated. Yet it is of utmost importance that the distinction be understood. This study deals primarily with the theory, or philosophy, of Christian education rather than the method or methods, as the case may be, of communication. No doubt methodology will enter into this section since the methods represent the testing-ground of the philosophy and it is only as methodology is evaluated that the underlying philosophy can be validated or disproved. For purposes of clarity, every attempt will be made to point

it out specifically when the area of methodology is entered. Unless it is stated, this discussion will remain in the realm of the philosophy of Christian education. In other words, consideration will be given to the meaning of methodology.

Evaluation involves interpretation - interpretation of what has occurred in the past coupled with an interpretation of why the happenings occurred as they did. At once we are plunged into the intellectual dimension of Christian education. Further reflection may produce speculation as to what might have happened if the elements of the experience might have been different or occurred in a different sequence. In either case, of interpretation or reflection, the process is an intellectual one.

Christian education is concerned with the interpretation which the learner makes of any experience. For only in the interpretation lies meaning. Since interpretation involves use of the intellect, it is fair to conclude that meaning inheres in and results from the intellectual process. Christian education, then, is a method of ascertaining the meanings of intellectual concepts. We who are already believers in Christianity would be assuredly the first ones to deny that the reality of God and the life of Jesus Christ are merely intellectual concepts. At the same time, we must admit that our concepts of God, of Jesus Christ, and any other so-called "church doctrine" is the result of intellectual

cognition. This in no way refutes or minimizes the revelation of God to men in mysterious and supernatural ways. It is to say that our understanding of revelation is cognitive. Even the concept of the "mystery of God" is simply an intellectual concept because it implies that our intellect has pondered it, reflected upon it cognitively, and has interpreted the meaning to be that of mystery.

Intellectual concepts are derived from the meaning of past experience. Also included in them are the practical effects which might ensue as a result of holding any one of them. Here is evident the future aspect of intellectual concepts. This is to say that the consequences of holding a concept are a part of the concept itself. Every concept, then, has a "would-do" or a "would-be" quality. This future or consequential quality of a concept is not predicated upon a single projected set of circumstances. Rather, the consequences are predicated upon all conceivable circumstances. The concept is then held as it is because, in the words of pragmaticism:

> . . . it would be true under given experiential circumstances (or under a more or less definitely stated proportion of them, taken as they would occur, that is in the same order of succession, in experience).[1]

Thus, the relation between intellectual concepts and experience becomes clear. In fact, the relation becomes a

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[1] Vol. V, p. 319.

dyadic subject since concepts include in them the consequences which would, in all probability, occur in experience. The emphasis in the Christian educative process is upon meanings; but the meanings ascertained are dependent upon the circumstances as well as existential facts and habits. That the "would-be" of every experience is unique and different is readily admitted when we consider that one of the existent facts of the educative process is the person, and God has created each person different from every other person. Although anthropologists may cite the many characteristics common to the species _homo sapiens_, they just as readily cite the individuality of each member of the species. Therefore, the "would-be" or "would-do" of every experience is undetermined, except in a general way, until it actually exists.

Christian education regards experience as the unit out of which meanings derive. Experience can accurately be called the unit of learning in the educative process. Christian education defines experience in the same manner as pragmaticism: "Circumstances . . . in order of succession".[1] As Christian education considers its purpose, that of helping persons to believe in God and to confess Jesus Christ as the Son of God and personal Savior, it reflects upon and analyzes how circumstances may be created and ordered to cause others to hold this belief. Then the area of methodology is entered.

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[1] _Ibid._

Christian education, likewise, is based upon pragmaticism's second definition of experience which is: "the world of fact".[1] Experiences are the facts of life out of which meaning is derived. Once a person experiences God, in a personal way, it becomes a fact of his life which affects his conduct. In the same way, experience of the life of Jesus, or of the Spirit of Jesus Christ, becomes a fact which modifies, often reverses, conduct.

How is the meaning of experience interpreted? Christian education depends upon cognition for the meaning of interpretation. This is not to say that cognition is the only factor of experience; but the element which gives meaning to experience is intellectual. Some may be quick to say that persons "feel" the nearness of God or the Spirit of Christ. This is not to be denied nor treated lightly. However, the process of Christian education is based upon the interpretation of such feelings which, in the last analysis, is intellectualistic.

COGNITION

Cognition is regarded to mean an increase of knowledge as we consider it in Christian education. It refers to mental operation. In the present discussion cognition will be regarded as a completed thought and used as a means. The [illegible]

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[1] Vol. I, p. 160.

of cognizing, or act of predication, will be denoted by the verb form, cognizing.

Experience has already been defined as possessing three elements: the possibility, the fact of interaction, and the response or media of connection. That these three elements comprise the learning-situation was explained in the preceding chapter. In the educative process the focus is upon persons, therefore the person represents the possible beginning point for Christian education. Every person comes into contact with the world about him, hence the fact of interaction is obvious. As a result of interaction with the world some interpretation is made of what it means to live in this world.

Because it is the person who makes this interpretation, experience is an individual, or a personal, matter. In the Christian educative process the individuality of experience is apparent in two ways. First, each person is unique. The individuality of each man in the species has been referred to in the preceding section. Scientists admit this fact. Christians accept the scientific affirmation of it, but more than that, they attribute it to the creative act of God. Therefore, the possibility of experience, which inheres in each experience of the individual, is unique and different because of the individual potential possibility of each person.

In the second place, experience is individual because the circumstances are unique. It is true that they may occur

our conduct is motivated by "how we feel" as is motivated by will. This emphasizes the other two elements of a cognition. Pragmaticism maintains that a cognition is composed of feeling, will, and synthetic thought, or continuity. Christian education, likewise, recognizes the influence of feeling and will as well as continuity in the learning process. It is these same three qualities which compose consciousness.

CONSCIOUSNESS

Consciousness is regarded here as the knowing mind. Christian education recognizes the mental processes in the production of meaningful interpretation, as has been emphasized in the foregoing discussion. Psychology has taught us the function of the sub-conscious activity. Education recognizes the consciousness as that aspect of knowing which is awareness. Rather than emphasizing the conscious and the sub-conscious aspects of awareness, the educative process recognizes the relatively small area of immediate consciousness and the larger area of dimly-conscious activity. The mind may know many things, but only as they are kept in repetitious usage do they remain in the immediate consciousness. A thought retreats deeper and deeper into the dimly-conscious through disuse. However, each time a thought is recalled into the area of immediate consciousness it becomes more deeply impressed in the total consciousness of awareness.

Those thoughts upon which other thougsts are built represent the cumulative aspect of the learning process.

The three categories of consciousness are distinguished in pragmaticism as these: feeling, which occurs in an instant of time and is passive consciousness without any recognition or analysis; interruption or resistance, which is an awareness of something which is other or over against; and synthesis, which binds thought together.

In Christian education the feeling of worship of God is an example of feeling. Worship is conscious, to be sure, but does not attempt to analyze why worship has occurred nor reflect upon the process of feeling which occurs. Earnest study illustrates the second category of consciousness. When one studies he seeks to find out how things were in the past, how they now are, or how they may be. Always present in this pursuit is the possibility that they may be quite different from his current conception. This represents the interrupting or resisting quality of consciousness. The quality of synthesis is represented by the meaning which is currently ascertained. It is constructed upon the past experience of others as well as the individual interpreted in light of possibility that it may have been otherwise. Thus, the new meaning is synthetic in nature since it binds together all conscious awareness.

Since consciousness is the result of mental activity, we can say that every kind of consciousness becomes a cog-

nition. A cognition is an informing thought of which we are aware. We now turn to cognition as a sign or symbol.

COGNITION AS A SIGN

In the light of the preceding section, we have seen that a cognition is a thought operation of one of the three types of consciousness. Once the thought is in the realm of awareness, it is then a representation of all the factors in the experience of cognizing. Each cognition is a sign. A sign is something which stands for something else in a specific and definitive way.

A cognition, then, is a sign because it carries meaning as it stands for an object. A cognition defines the object for which it stands. All words are signs. Words may stand for single objects or for ideas. Obviously, all ideas are expressed in words, but a single word may carry a complexity of ideas in its meaning. Christian educators consistently use such words as God, Jesus, Holy Spirit, sin, reconciliation, agape, and revelation. The complexity of ideas conveyed by such signs is readily apparent. The conceptions of Christian education are constructed with signs in the same way that language is constructed with signs. The task of Christian education is to make sure such signs as God, Jesus, Holy Spirit, sin, reconciliation, agape, and revelation convey meaning.

COGNITIONS DETERMINED BY PREVIOUS COGNITIONS

The cumulative nature of cognition is the important cornerstone in the experimental nature of Christian education. It has already been said that a cognition involves the mental interpretant of something represented. This interpretation issues out of consciousness or there would be no interpretation made.

Each time an interpretation is made it becomes the property of the interpreter or the person. This possession alters the person so that his qualitative possibility is changed. Since the quality of potentiality is different at each point of relationship, it is apparent that the interpretation made in any one cognition is determined by previous cognitions insofar as they have produced a different person.

This may be at a conscious level or may become so automatic that it reaches the level of habit. Previous cognitions may become so much the possession of a person that conduct is automatic and does not involve conscious reasoning of the whole conception. Walking is a vivid example of habitual conduct. For those of physical ability to walk, walking is accomplished without any conscious reasoning of the manner in which one foot is placed alternately in front of the other, and balance of weight shifted, to accomplish locomotion.

At the conscious level the person is faced with the decision of how to act. To determine a satisfactory response he deliberately calls into immediate consciousness all prior cognitions of how he acted in similar situations, or how others have conducted themselves in like situations. On the basis of these previous cognitions he determines how to act in the immediate present. Christianity teaches the brotherhood of all men. Yet, the first time that a Caucasion person is called upon to share living quarters with a person of another race, there is apt to be a deliberate reasoning process encountered utilizing all previous cognitions of the consciousness.

The logical conclusion here is that all cognitions are determined by previous cognitions. However, Christian education makes room for revelation, or cognitions that are determined by the object rather than by previous cognitions.

COGNITIONS NOT DETERMINED BY PREVIOUS COGNITIONS

The philosophy of Christian education recognizes that there are cognitions not determined by previous cognitions. Use of the term intuition is common in pragmatistic philosophy. Christianity traditionally uses the term revelation. Neither one of these seems as accurate or appropriate in describing behavioristic action as the term reflexive action. Intuition is more adequate since it is an act of man.

Christian thought utilizes revelation to connote God's action, not man's. It will be recalled that in the discussion of pragmaticism intuition referred to the beginning point of cognizing. It is conscious, as is all cognition, but is distinguished from the reasoned deliberate cognitive awareness.

Often conduct is required before a new reasoning process can be accomplished. At the moment of the awareness there must then be split-second action. The term reflexive action seems more adequate than intuition since intuition connotes some awareness out of conscious awareness. That such action is determined solely by the object confronted is obvious since there is no time for reasoned deliberation. The recognition of this in the process of Christian education is correlative to that made in pragmaticism. Doubtless, no one has forever avoided changing or wanting to change his first reflexive action after he has engaged in the reasoning process.

The task of Christian education is to produce cognitions so that even their beginning point will reflect conduct rooted in faith in God and His Son, the Christ.

RELATION OF MEANING AND CONDUCT

In this chapter we have thus far attempted to show that the meaning of Christian faith is derived from experience. Experience is the single unit of learning from which

persons learn meaning. Furthermore, experience is composed of three elements: the possibility inherent in the experience; the facts of relationship or interaction as they occur; and the reasoned connection which produces a response or action. Meaning is the result of intellectual awareness. Meaning arises from the thought process of the conscious mind.

This intellectual dimension of Christian educative philosophy indicates three important aspects for the structure of such a philosophy. First of all, Christian education must stimulate the intellectual process. Secondly, the meaning of Christian faith derived is individual since experience is individual. Experience is individual because each person, as a subject, has been created a unique person by God. Thirdly, included in the meaning are the practical effects of conduct to which the Christian faith, as interpreted and held by each person, leads. It may be superfluous to say in this connection that conduct is a personal individual matter. For the philosophy of Christian education this obvious fact must always be kept in mind.

Nowhere is the relation of meaning and conduct more significant than in the philosophy of Christian education. Earlier in this chapter the goal of Christian education was defined as the development of a meaningful Christian faith in the person. This is true. Christian education must take the next step as well and relate faith to conduct. These climactic words from Jesus' Sermon on the Mount sound strong

and clear to all who ponder the philosophy of Christian education:

> You will know them by their fruits. Are grapes gathered from thorns, or figs from thistles? So, every sound tree bears good fruit, but the bad tree bears evil fruit. A sound tree cannot bear evil fruit, nor can a bad tree bear good fruit. Every tree that does not bear good fruit is cut down and thrown into the fire. Thus you will know them by their fruits.[1]

From the Scriptures comes the clue for the pragmatic philosophy of Christian education. Concepts of the Christian faith are attained through intellectual cognition. Included in these concepts, if they are to be truly meaningful, must be the conduct, or the practical consequences, demanded by a meaningful Christian faith.

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[1] *Holy Bible*. Revised Standard Version. New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1952. Matthew 7: 16-20.

CHAPTER XV

THE EMPHASIS ON INTERPRETATION OF MEANING IN CHRISTIAN EDUCATION

Interpretation of meaning is the hub for the process of Christian education. Indeed, interpretation of meaning provides the basis of the expression of Christian faith which persons hold. It is readily apparent from experience that there are as many degrees of expression of this faith as there are persons who affirm faith in God through Jesus Christ. The individuality of experience was seen in the preceding chapter. The emphasis here is focused upon the manner in which the interpretation of meaning, which produces expression in terms of conduct, arises.

One of the purposes of Christian education is the clarification of Christian concepts. Only as Christian concepts become clear in individual conscious awareness, can expression of Christian conduct be expected. It is at this point that the Christian life differs from other ways of life. The Christian faith, held with meaning, produces such imperatives as these:

> You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind. This is the great and first commandment. And a second is like it, You shall love your neighbor as yourself.[1]

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[1] Matthew 22: 37-39.

> Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you; and lo, I am with you always, to the close of the age.[1]

The distinction between an affirmation of Christian faith and the meaningful interpretation of faith which produces and affects conduct is epitomized in these words of the Apostle, Paul: "So faith by itself, if it has no works, is dead."[2]

The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education begins then, with the purpose of the Christian faith instead of an analysis of the tenets of the Christian faith. The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education is based upon the idea that as the concepts of Christian faith are made a part of experience, new meanings will emerge which will lead to a closer identification of meaning with the truth of God's reality. The object of Christian education is to deepen the meaning of Christian faith from consideration of what we already believe about God. Each concept is subject to the process of experimentation. This will be elaborated in Chapter Twenty-Two. Therefore, an intellectual conception of the Christian faith is meaningful only as it is validated by future experience as having meaning. The final validity for the intellectual dimension of Christian education, then, is facts, as they present themselves in experiense, and not the intellectual pro-

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[1] Matthew 28: 19-20.

[2] James 2: 17.

cess itself. As the facts of experience, or circumstances in succession, are interpreted does the meaning which produces Christian conduct issue.

In order to understand the distinction between interpretation of meaning and idealism in the pragmatic philosophy of Christian education, it must be remembered that although the meaning is cognitive it does not hold the conception to be equivalent with reality. Pragmatic Christian education recognizes that any conception is only a conception about Reality. It may be false or a misrepresentation, or it may accurately represent things as they really are. The degree of accuracy in the representation is the criterion for its truthfulness. And the truthfulness can be validated only by the testing-ground of experience, the unit of learning. The nature of experience must be examined, then, as the unit of learning out of which all meaning derives. Experience, once it has occurred, represents the structure of being or actuality and is composed of three categories: firstness, or the potential possibility of experience; secondness, or the fact of interaction; and thirdness, the resultant response of interaction.

FIRSTNESS

The first element of experience is the potential quality inherent in any subject. The philosophy of Christian

education, constructed in pragmatic terms, recognizes different kinds of subjects. It is primarily concerned with persons, since persons possess the possibility of believing in God and in His Son, Jesus Christ. However, the education process recognizes also an object, or a tested hypothesis, usually referred to as a fact, as subjects. And since the term Christian designates a prior point of reference, Christian education is concerned with reality, or things as they really are. For the Christian reality includes the existence in reality of a personal God who not only creates His whole creation but also loves it with agape.

The first element of experience recognizes the existence of subjects as they are regardless of anything else. This original, innate being is positive because it represents the capacity for interaction.

The potentiality of interaction in a person is obvious. Just as obvious is the potentiality of interaction in an object. Let us take a table for purpose of illustration. A table is of a certain height and width, therefore it is of a certain form. A table occupies space and if a person comes into contact with it, he does not expect it to collapse or withdraw. Rather, it retains its potential of bumping or knocking the person who attempts to place himself in the area which the table occupies. This is a description of things as they really are regardless of anything else. Take a fact.

The fact is that salt added to water will produce water with a salty taste. Now the potential quality of the salt could be explained in the same way as the quality of the table was explained. But the fact in this regard is that if salt is added to water, the result will be water with a salty taste. The fact of the salt taste simply validates the positive qualitative possibility of salt. Furthermore, the fact is so dependable it must be considered every time salt is added to water.

In Christian education God is regarded as real. He is so real that He can be discovered through relationship. As subject, He acts. He acts in the continuous creation of the universe, in the revelation of Himself through Jesus Christ, and in the lives of persons. Christian education regards this quality of action as the way God is regardless of what anyone may say or think about it.

In the same way, experience contains the potential possibility of meaning. This is the nature of experience regardless of anything else. This is the element of firstness or potential possibility in experience: the possibility of producing meaning which can be interpreted.

SECONDNESS

Secondness describes the element of experience in which at least two subjects come into relation. More than two subjects are existent in the relationship but there al-

ways are two at least. Just as each subject has original qualities of existence, in relationship there exists the element of affectation. In other words, relationship as the second element of experience, represents the category in which one subject affects another and is affected by the other. Each of the two subjects is both actor and patient. Neither is exactly the same after the relationship.

Christian educational philosophy recognizes this element of relationship. This is the element of experience which can be created, planned, and manipulated to produce a desired interpretation of meaning. It has already been stated that the goal of Christian education is to produce faith in God through Jesus Christ. Thus the structure of Christian educational philosophy must begin with a preconceived purpose. The setting up of relationships in experience in such a way as to produce and deepen Christian faith lies in the area of methodology of Christian education. The philosophy is concerened with the elements of experience which are regarded as the units of learning.

The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education recognizes the struggle inherent in the element of interaction. It is in the element of secondness that the subject encounters the brute force of hard fact. Since Christian education is concerned with persons, it can be said that this is the element of experience where the world is encountered as it really is.

For example, the person who has the conception of God as a man with a white, flowing beard sitting in a gold throne somewhere in the fleecy heavens will be force to struggle when confronted with the concept of a personal God who is Spirit. This is struggle resulting from the relation of one concept with another. Or, the person who confesses faith in God until tragedy strikes at his personal well-being and then either damns God or says that there is no God is struggling with the encounter of his faith and facts as they really are. In all kinds of experiences persons bring themselves, or their concepts, as subjects to the world of facts in which they live and find the relationships quite different from those which they expected. The struggle which ensues from subjects in interaction forcibly modifies the subjects by this encounter. It is from this element of experience that the third element, interpretation of meaning, develops. The interpretation of meaning resulting from the encounter of two subjects interacting is the connection between subject and hard fact and is the element of thirdness in experience.

THIRDNESS

The philosophy of Christian education is primarily concerned with the third element of experience. For it is in the interpretation of meaning of experience that Christian faith is produced or negated, deepened or lessened. It is

the interpretation which gives meaning to all experience. Only persons are capable of making interpretation since it is an intellectual process. This makes persons the chief concern of Christian education. Animals may be trained to perform in a certain way in response to a given signal, but when the signal is absent the response is not called forth. Other subjects, such as objects and hypotheses, which have been considered as subjects up to now, are incapable of cognition so can be excluded from the list of subjects capable of interpreting meaning. Those things which are real certainly exist in relation but the extent to which they have cognition must remain in the realm of mystery.

Christian education is concerned with the element of thirdness for another reason. It is the element of experience which affects and produces the conduct of a person. And, as has been pointed out earlier in this chapter, Christian faith requires Christian conduct. The conduct which is required then by interpretation of meaning is a part of the conception itself. Christian educational philosophy would do well to paraphrase the maxim of pragmaticism[1] thus:

> The entire intellectual meaning of any concept of the Christian faith consists in the totality of rational conduct which the concept demands, tempered by all the different circumstances and desires.

Or, as the maxim was stated in its original form,[2] an equally appropriate paraphrase for the philosophy of Christian education

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[1] Vol. V, p. 293.

[2] Vol. V, p. 258.

might be:

> Consider what action, that might have practical bearing, we conceive our conception of faith in God to have. Then, our conception of this action is the whole of our conception of Christian faith.

In other words, Christian education must produce in the person a Christian faith which has sufficient meaning to cause him to express that faith. A pragmatic philosophy of Christian education relates the cognitive conception of faith in God, through Christ, to Christian conduct and includes Christian conduct as a part of that conception. This represents a sharp contrast to a transmissive philosophy of Christian education which attempts to systematize and isolate basic historic conceptions of Christian faith held by others through the centuries and seeks to attain an affirmation of these conceptions. Christian education which is pragmatic seeks to help persons interpret meaningfully the experience arising from Christian faith so that conduct will be more Christian.

The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education emphasizes the third element of experience for still another reason. Indeed, as was stated at the opening of this chapter, it forms the pivotal point of the pragmatic method of inquiry. As a conception of faith in God is established as a belief it becomes a new subject. True, it is only an hypothesis to be further tested by experience, but it represents a subject in that it is a substantial entity with its own

quality capable of interacting with the person who holds it, with other conceptions, and with other persons. Thus the continuous nature of the pragmatic method is made possible.

Interpretation is an intellectual cognition and represents something learned from experience. However, as a new subject, this interpretation is subject to new experience and as a result of new interpretations of meaning may be altered, modified, expanded, or eventually discarded. In this way the process of learning through the pragmatic method ever continues.

MEANING AS AN INTERPRETANT

Since the pragmatic method asserts unequivocally that nothing is actually learned until meaning is interpreted, the philosophy of Christian education is dependent upon some interpretation of how meaning is made. Christian education is compelled to achieve some interpretation of meaning concerning the Christian faith as a result of experience if learning is to occur with effectiveness. This characterizes the pragmatic structure of Christian educational philosophy.

Thus far it has been stated that Christian education is a method of finding more effective ways of communicating Christian experience as it ever seeks to communicate Christian experience in the process. Upon individual Christian experiences is a meaningful Christian faith developed. Concepts of

a meaningful Christian faith are attained through intellectual cognition and include the conduct demanded by that faith. Therefore, the interpretation of meaning accorded each concept of the Christian faith is the area of Christian faith with which the philosophy of Christian education must concern itself.

The philosophy of Christian education must consider then the two aspects of communication. The effectiveness of the Christian educational process is evaluated in light of whether or not personal interpretation of concepts of faith is achieved. Meaning includes the conduct compelled by these concepts. Likewise, the first aspect of the educational process - that of finding more effective ways of communicating Christian experience - is evaluated in light of the degree to which meaning is achieved. If meaning is seldom achieved, the concepts of the philosophy must be altered in an attempt to produce meanings of greater significance in the life of the individual. If meaning is achieved as the result of the educational process, the representative hypotheses of the philosophy can be considered as more effective since the conduct of the philosophy is the communication of Christian experience in the life of the person. Thus the pragmatic quality of Christian educational philosophy is evidenced. In other words, the effectiveness of any Christian educational

philosophy is measured by the extent to which it produces Christian interpretations of meaning in the lives of persons.

Another pragmatic quality of Christian educational philosophy is apparent in the alterability of the hypotheses comprising it. It must be remembered that the conceptions of any philosophy of Christian education are tested in the experiential area of interpretation of meanings in the lives of people. The conceptions of the philosophy then are but representations of the most effective methods known to date. They are alterable as the area of experience shows them to be effective or ineffective. In this way the concepts which make up the pragmatic philosophy are representations of meaning to be tested and changed as required by their degree of effectiveness. Herein their meaning as interpretants rests. Once again the language of pragmaticism furnishes significant meaning:

> Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another representation to which the torch of truth is handed along, and as representation, it has its interpretant again.[1]

In this kind of philosophy the pertinent question then becomes: is there any end to this kind of interpretations arising from experience, or is it just one series of interpretants after another? The answer comes from the

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[1] Vol. I, p. 171.

pragmatic method. While it is true that each conception, as it is held at any one time, is only an interpretant which is capable of being replaced by new interpretation, it is also true that there may be a true, or most effective method, discovered at some time. The pragmatic method does not deny the existence of absolutes. On the other hand, meanings, as derived from experience, seem to be inexhaustible. New data constantly shed new light on evidence and on effective ways of communication. The most significant evidence, however, lies in the fact that the person, as subject, is constantly changing as a result of past experience and therefore demands new concepts for the process of effective interpretation of meaning to continue.

The emphasis upon the interpretation of meaning, which is so central in a pragmatic philosophy of Christian education, is clearly identified with the practical results which it effects in the lives of men and women, boys and girls. Only as these effects are conceived is there significant meaning in the interpretant. This does not deny the reality of truth. Rather, the pragmatic Christian education can say with Peirce:

> Experience is our only teacher. Far be it from me to enunciate any doctrine of a *tabula rasa*. . . . there manifestly is not one drop of principle in the whole vast reservoir of established scientific theory that has sprung from any other source than the power of the human mind to *originate* ideas that are true. But

> this power, for all it has accomplished, is so feeble that as ideas flow from their springs in the soul, the truths are almost drowned in a flood of false notions; and that which experience does is gradually, and by a sort of fractionation, to precipitate and filter off the false ideas, eliminating them and letting the truth pour on in its mighty current.[1]

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[1] Vol. V, p. 37.

CHAPTER XVI

THE SYMBOLIC NATURE OF THOUGHT UTILIZED IN CHRISTIAN EDUCATION

The intellectual dimension of Christian education was considered in Chapter Fourteen. Meaning is conceived in intellectual terms since all cognition is a mental process. Each cognition is a sign because it represents an individual interpretation derived from experience. The symbolic nature of thought utilized in Christian education is obviously apparent since all interpretations, if they are expressed, are expressed in words. Words are readily seen to be symbols for the ideas which they convey.

Christian education, however, is concerned with the interpretation of meaning accorded special words of the Christian faith. Christian education seeks for the personal interpretation of such words as these: God, Jesus Christ, Holy Spirit, sin, reconciliation, agape, and revelation. It is not the purpose of Christian education to define such words and then transmit those definitions, even if this were possible. Rather, it is the purpose of Christian education to see that meaningful definitions of such words are sought. The Christian faith assumes the objective reality of God, Jesus, and the Holy Spirit. Christian education seeks to fill these

words with meaning and subjective reality as Christian experiences are communicated.

THE USE OF SIGNS IN CHRISTIAN EDUCATION

Christian education builds its pragmatic philosophy upon signs. Any concept of God is a symbol which stands for what God really is. Therefore, a pragmatic philosophy of Christian education regards a sign to be precisely the same as pragmaticism defines it:

> A *Sign* is anything which is related to a Second thing, Its *Object*, in respest to a Quality, in such a way as to bring a Third thing, its *Interpretant*, into relation to the same *Object*, and that in such a way as to bring a Fourth into relation to that Object in the same form, *ad infinitum*. If the series is broken off the Sign, in so far, falls short of the perfect significant character.[1]

The philosophy of Christian education is filled with signs. The most basic words in the Christian faith, God, Jesus Christ, and Holy Spirit, are but signs of the realities for which they stand. Utilizing the definition from pragmaticistic thought, that a sign is a representamen with a mental interpretant, these words represent concepts with mental interpretation. The first requirement then, of a sign in the pragmatic philosophy of Christian education is that it be mentally interpreted.

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[1] Vol. V, p. 416.

There is another significant requirement for a sign in the pragmatic philosophy of Christian education. The clue for this is contained in the pragmatic definition of a sign quoted above. A sign must stand in relation to its object in such a way as to bring forth an interpretation of meaning. But it must go a step farther than simply achieving the first interpretation. It must cause the interpretation to stand in such a relation to the object as to constantly produce new interpretations constructed upon former ones in an earnest attempt for the sign to accurately represent the object. This gives the philosophy of Christian education its developmental quality. This quality can be applied to any sign contained in the structure of the Christian faith. In the same way, this creative quality can be applied to the philosophy of Christian education itself.

If applied to the sign of a concept of God, the developmental quality provides the concept with the ability to build one interpretation of meaning upon another so that the concept of God as held by the person at any one time, is not regarded as the final truth. On the contrary, the concept must have sufficient meaning to produce new interpretation so that the quest for the reality of God is a creative process.

The same principle of creativity applies to the philosophy of Christian education. This is especially rele-

vant since, as has already been stated, Christian education is a method and its greatest validity is found in its ability to remain true to its own method. Any concept of a philosophy of Christian education can be called a sign since it represents a step in the methodological process with a mental interpretant. Every concept of the philosophy must stand in relation to the method in such a way as to produce a new interpretation of the concept. Only when this is true does the philosophy remain pragmatic. If a concept loses this developmental quality, it becomes dogmatic and opinionated and the creative, pragmatic quality is lost.

It is now clear that the concepts utilized in the process of Christian education are symbols, or the third type of signs defined by pragmaticism.[1] Neither the icon nor the index, as delineated by pragmaticistic thought, asserts meaning. The meaning is conveyed by either existential likeness or referential quality. A symbol, however, can convey no meaning unless an interpretation is made.

THE SYMBOL

The pragmaticistic system of thought, presented in Part I, defines a symbol as a sign which has meaning regard-

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[1] The structural form of this chapter varies, therefore, from the parallel chapter, Chapter Four, of Part I. Icons and Indices are pertinent to the methodology of Christian education rather than to the philosophy. Only symbols are treated here as we are dealing with the concepts of a pragmatic philosophy of Christian education.

less of any similarity or any factual connection with its object. A symbol is a sign which causes itself to be interpreted. Words and sentences are obviously symbolic signs. In the same way, ideas and concepts are symbols since they carry with them an interpretation. Unless the interpretation is conveyed there is no meaning.

A symbol acquires meaning through the usage which is made of it. This was implied in the earlier discussion of the developmental quality of a sign. This aspect imposes a special responsibility on the philosophy of Christian education as it seeks to communicate Christian experience in the lives of persons.

Some interpretation is always present in the mind of a person when a symbol of the Christian faith is used. Christian education is concerned with the way in which the present interpretation may be altered. Therefore, the philosophy of Christian education is constructed upon the fact that concepts of the Christian faith may be replaced with new interpretations of meaning which become new concepts. The criterion which reveals the need for altering the present concepts is the degree of meaning which inheres in the concept for the person who holds it. And, as was emphasized in the preceding chapter, the degree of vital meaning can be determined by the conduct which the meaning produces. The conduct, then, is included as a part of the total conception of any concept of

the Christian faith. The meaning, which is acquired through usage, of any concept is acquired through utilization of the concept rather than by reaffirming any creedal statement of faith. The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education seeks to help people develop interpretations of meaning which include the practical results of any interpretation. Without being redundant, then, it can now be asserted that a pragmatic philosophy of Christian education seeks to produce interpretations of meaning which are pragmatic. Pragmatic interpretations become the kind of symbols which possess the maximum meaning for any concept of the Christian faith.

Another criterion for determining whether present concepts have need for alteration also exists. It is equally pragmatic in quality as is the element of conduct. In any scientific method it may be assumed but a reminding word must be included here. The criterion is this: any concept of the Christian faith must be the result of careful consideration of all the evidence which may be compiled that is relevant to the formulation of the concept. This place a heavy responsibility upon the methodology of Christian education as it is the responsibility of methodology to see that all relevant data are introduced and brought to bear upon any concept which is considered. The scientific method is equally demanding to the philosophy of Christian education since it is one of the criteria for the necessity of changing concepts

of the Christian faith as they are held at any one time.

A symbol, then, is the kind of sign which involves mental interpretation. A symbol acquires meaning through usage. Symbols are developmental in nature as they are judged by the conduct which they effect, or by scientific data which affect them, or by both. Because a symbol is the kind of sign which has meaning only as it is mentally interpreted, it appears that a symbol includes the icon and the index in its composition since pragmaticism asserts that the icon and the index are essential for meaning to occur.

THE RELATION OF ICONS AND INDICES TO SYMBOLS

Symbols constitute the area of meaning which can be made clear by the pragmatic method. Furthermore, concepts form the symbolical expression of the Christian faith which people hold. Included in such symbolical expressions are qualities and reactions. Qualities are denoted by the kind of signs referred to as indices in pragmaticism.

An icon is the kind of sign which stands for something else simply by the nature of its quality. An icon is a sign which represents its object by possessing a similar nature. Pictures and diagrams were cited as examples of icons in Part I. Examples of icons are not cited here to demonstrate the kind of signs denoted by them, but rather to

illustrate that icons represent a quality of representation between sign and object. An intellectually interpreted sign, or symbol, possesses a qualitative character in its representation.

For example, let us take the concept, "God is love." Christian education is much concerned about the qualitative interpretation of this concept as held by any one person. In developing the iconic quality of this concept Christian education must take into account and deal with such questions as these. to what extent is God love? is love all that God is? is God anything other than love? how does God exert his love? and, does God love in general, or rather love something or someone? The qualitative character of the concept is filled with meaning as the persons come to interpret the concept of love in the sense of agape and in light of such questions as those just enumerated.

Turning now to the relational aspect of signs, it will be recalled that pragmaticism describes the index as that kind of sign which indicates relationship between sign and object. The barometer and the weathervane were cited as indices which represent direct relationship between the sign and the conditions of the weather as it actually exists. It can be said, then, that the kind of sign called an index indicates the relationship between the representation and the

object represented. Thus, an index indicates relation between the sign and things as they really are.

The Christian faith constantly deals in this kind of relational representations. Regardless of any descriptive concept of God in qualitative terms, the Christian faith asserts that "God is." That God's existence is the way things really are is affirmed by the Christian faith. Therefore, the interpretation of all symbols, or concepts, of the Christian faith possess this relational existence between the concept and things as they actually are.

Concepts of the Christian faith are regarded as symbols and include the nature of the two other types of signs: the quality designated by icons and the relational existence expressed by indices. Such is that nature of symbols. Especially significant to the philosophy of Christian education is this symbolic nature of the concepts essential to clear expression of the Christian faith. The concern of Christian education is that the development of Christian concepts reach toward interpretations that are not only meaningful to the person, but also stand in relation to God as He really is. The structure of the Christian education method is to achieve meaningful interpretations which are as accurate representations of Christian truth as possible. It is in this way that Christian concepts become symbols that are capable of

standing sufficiently firm and independently to become the first element in the production of a new interpretation, or concept of the Christian faith.

CHAPTER XVII

THE REALITY OF RELATIONISM

From the preceding chapters of this part it is now clear that relationship is the element which not only makes Christian education effectively communicative but also provides meaning for its own structure. The two-fold aspect of Christian education has been evident in the definition herein accorded to the process of Christian education. The double nature of Christian educational philosophy has been reiterated often in each preceding chapter of this part. First of all, Christian education is a method of communicating Christian experiences to persons with such effectiveness that the interpretation of meaning derived from these experiences produces Christian conduct. Such interpretations are achieved through intellectual perception and are always subject to the laboratory of future experimentation. Education, which is truly Christian, produces individual interpretations of meaning which become meaningful concepts of Christian faith for that person. The plea of this thesis is for an educational process which is so vital that the concepts formulated include the conduct, or effects, resulting from the concepts. In this way the methodology of pragmaticism as a system of thought furnishes significant rootage for the philosophy of Christian

education. The concept may be more readily seen when stated in negative fashion: Christian education which does not produce concepts sufficiently meaningful to produce or affect Christian conduct cannot realistically be called Christian. Here the pragmatic rootage for Christian education becomes clear, even judicatory. The practical effects of the philosophy of Christian education, then, are included in the concepts of Christian educational philosophy.

The pragmatic quality is equally significant to the other aspect of a vital philosophy for Christian education. This aspect has been defined as the method of finding more effective ways of communicating Christian experience. Here the pragmatic method turns its eyes on the philosophy which it predicates and emphasizes the fact that every concept comprising the pragmatic philosophy of Christian education is simply an hypothesis for effective communication. Consistent with its own method of inquiry, each hypothesis is tested by the practical consequences which it effects. These effects not only become a part of the concept but also provide the data in the realm of experiment through which an hypothesis gives way to the formation of a new hypothesis. Thus, concepts of a pragmatic philosophy of Christian education always stand in relation to other concepts. Furthermore, the pragmatic philosophy of Christian education constantly seeks to achieve the hypotheses which represent the

Real, or perfect, method of communication as accurately as possible. Such is the structure of pragmatism.

This seems to presuppose a philosophy of Christian education which is true and perfect in all respects. Who can deny that there may be such? Certainly few of us would choose to deny that a perfect form of communication may exist. The pragmaticistic method recognizes that a perfect form of communication may exist. The teaching methods utilized by Jesus are often used by Christian educators to represent the most perfect form of communication known to date. Again, it is believed that there are few educators who would deny this and elect to show wherein they were deficient. It is not the purpose here to prove or disprove the hypothesis that the teaching methods used by Jesus were the perfect form of communication. Rather, it is our purpose to assert that only as the concepts of the Christian educational philosophy, held at any one time by any one person, are capable of producing new interpretations as a result of experiment, which in turn form concepts that are more effective than prior concepts, can the pragmatic quality of inquiry be said to be at work. The developmental quality of pragmaticism depends upon the fact that the hypothesis of the present represents the most accurate representation acquired thus far in the process of inquiry to things as they really are.

In both aspects of the philosophy of Christian education can be seen the relevance of the pragmaticistic method

of philosophical inquiry. One concept of the philosophy always stands in relation to another concept, either already existent or in the future. In the formulation of a meaningful Christian faith in the lives of persons, one concept of the faith stands in relation to another, more meaningful, concept - either formulated or possible in the future.

The existence of relationship in experience has been pointed out in Chapter Fourteen with interpretation of meaning as the connecting link between personal subject in relationship to another subject. The relationship of the person to Reality was discussed in Chapter Fifteen with the element of interpretation becoming an independent subject, as the element of Thirdness, capable of affecting conduct or producing new concepts. The symbolical nature of cognitive thought, described in the preceding chapter, was seen epitomized in Symbols, which include qualitative icons and relational indices.

Thus, the entire philosophy of Christian education is cognizant of relationships that already exist. Christian education must take into account the relational structure which exists. God has created man unique and different, with positive potential possibility. Likewise man exists in the world, therefore he is existentially in relationship to the world and all the things and qualities which the world includes. Let us turn now to the implications of relationship for a prag-

matic philosophy of Christian education, and examine the three universal phenomena of experience, sensation, consciousness, and volition, as they affect Christian experiences.

RELATIONISM IN SENSATIONAL EXPERIENCE

The basic existing relationship with which Christian education deals has already been said to be the relationship of the person to the world as he encounters it. By person is meant all the positive potential possibility which a personal subject possesses through his quality of Firstness. Likewise, by world is meant all the potential possibility which the world possesses in its quality of Firstness. Both the person and the world possess the second mode of being as they existentially stand in relationship to each other. The premise here is that when a person exists, he exists in the world. The validity of the premise is self-evident. Through this relationship the first two elements of experience are existent. It can be said in a general way that Christian education seeks to effect a Christian interpretation of meaning in the person as he relates to the world.

Sensational experience provides the first way in which the person relates to the world. The person with normal faculties sees the world, hears the world, smells the world, tastes the world, and touches the world. Through these sensational experiences come mental impressions of the world

to which he relates. Through sensational experience the person encounters the physical world as it really is. The physical world includes physical objects and phenomena, natural events, and natural laws. The act of relating is at the sensuous level.

As the child sees objects in the world he receives mental impressions of them. Through interpretation of the physical characteristics possessed by these objects he decides which ones will harm or hurt him, and which ones bring him no discomfort. Through the symbolical use of language he learns to call objects by names so that other people will know of what he speaks. In another realm the child experiences the world through hearing. The child hears noises of the world and comes to identify a dog's bark, a cat's meow, and the voice of his mother and father. The mental impressions received by the child from these sounds of the world are received through sensational experience. Similar illustrations could be cited for each of the physical senses, but the fact of relationship in sensational experience seems sufficiently clear from these two areas.

As these mental impressions become consistent and regularized the child makes interpretations which have meaning. The dependability of sounds produces the kind of meanings which come to be regarded as always identified with that object. Learning occurs then through sensational experience with the

mental impressions of past sensational experience always affecting the interpretation made in any single experience.

Distinctions of things as they really are in the world are also interpreted through sensational experience. In the case of sounds, as one sound is compared with another different interpretations of meaning ensue. In this way the bark of a dog is distinguished from the meow of a cat, and so on. In the same way qualities of the same type of sound are distinguished through comparison so that the child can tell when his mother is sad or happy, confident or perplexed.

These illustrations serve to clarify two principles of sensational experience. First, that the relationship contained in sensational experience is determined by previous interpretations of prior experiences. And, secondly, that the relationship in sensational experience is determined by the quality of the representamen.

Relationships inherent in sensational experience become so commonplace and routine that they are taken for granted without reflection upon the nature of relationship contained in them. This nature is cited here, at the risk of being tedious, to demonstrate the basic reality of relationism surrounding the person as he exists in the world.

RELATIONISM IN CONSCIOUSNESS

Individual interpretations of meaning are the result of a single sensational experience. As was pointed out in

the preceding section individual interpretations are affected by previous interpretations derived as the result of prior experiences. The element which binds individual meanings together is consciousness. The fact that relation is the basic structure of consciousness seems self-evident. Christian education depends upon the relationalism of consciousness constantly in the construction of one concept of the Christian faith upon prior concepts. Thus Christian education asserts with pragmatism that "thought is a thread of melody running through the succession of our sensations".[1]

The interpretative nature of cognitive thought was discussed in the preceding chapter. In that connection emphasis was placed upon the adequacy of symbols to convey the expression of concepts contained in the Christian faith. These concepts are bound together in the conscious awareness of them. Thus, as individual meanings are cognitively interpreted in any one instant of time, they are also cognitively retained in consciousness and bound together by the relationship of one meaning to another.

In this way Christian faith becomes a melody composed of individual interpretations just as the melody of a piece of music is composed of single notes. Consciousness constitutes the relating element for the concepts. Pragmatic

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[1] Vol. V, p. 254.

Christian education seeks a melody of consistency in Christian faith and conduct. The erratic expression of Christian faith indicates a shallow interpretation of significant meaning. Christian education, which seeks to be pragmatic, affirms the relational quality of consciousness in the same manner as pragmaticism defines it:

> These two sorts of objects, what we are _immediately_ conscious of and what we are mediately conscious of, are found in all consciousness. Some elements (the sensations) are completely present at every instant so long as they last, while others (like thought) are actions having beginning, middle, and end, and consist in a congruence in the succession of sensations which flow through the mind.[1]

One simple illustration in the area of Christian education serves to show the relational quality of conscious experience. Christian education seeks to develop in persons the concept that God is personal Spirit. Through interpretations of meaning derived from experience's category of Consciousness the concept of "God is Spirit" is fostered. Later the concept of God being personal is produced and nurtured. The consciousness of the person is immediately conscious of the concept of "God is personal" - creating, sustaining, and loving each creature. The consciousness is also mediately conscious of the prior concept "God is Spirit". The relational quality of consciousness binds together the two concepts

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[1] _Ibid._

so that the related concept, "God is personal Spirit", is made possible. Only the individual concepts are cognized in one instant of time but the ability of relating the two is the ability of conscious awareness as it operates in time.

RELATIONISM IN VOLITION

The third category of experience in which the reality of relationism is evident, according to pragmaticism, is the area of volition or will. Volition is the area which relates meaning and action. It comes after cognition and before action. Volition might accurately be termed the area of decision. It relates the interpretations of meaning to the action the person wills to do as the result of active cognition. In this way, it can be said that volition is the relating factor of experience. It stands between completed past and effected future.

Pragmatism emphasizes the fact that volition represents the area of pure existence and elaborates the dyadic nature of pure existence. Existence is distinguished from being in that being of any mode represents potential possibility. The first mode of being is monoidal suchness. The second mode of being is described as subjects in relation and represents the possibility for volition in experience. The third mode of being is representation and is monoidal in character since it represents a finished interpretation or

completed act which becomes a new subject. Existence is a development of the second mode of being and is represented by relation determined by decision without the presence of the interpretation of meaning which will be the result of this union in the completed experience.

Furthermore, there are two types of dyadic existence defined by pragmaticism. True dyadic existence is "an act of arbitrary will or blind force".[1] Volition, in its strict sense, is instantaneous. The decision represented by "I will" or "I do" may be the result of many past experiences with their respective interpretations of meaning, but when volition denotes decision in a single experience it is sudden and instantaneous.

The rootage for the relating quality of volition in the experiences of the Christian educational process is very significant. The purpose of a pragmatic philosophy of Christian education is to produce a meaningful Christian faith in the lives of persons. In other words, the purpose of Christian education is to cause people to assert with meaning, "I believe in God and in His Son, Jesus Christ." The moment when this affirmation of faith is decided upon is the category of volition in experience. It is relative in nature because it stands between faith and unbelief. It is relative, also,

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[1] Vol. I, p. 164.

because it stands between the interpretation of meaning which produces it and the Christian conduct which is the result of it.

The areas of volition in Christian experience has been often referred to as decision. It may be also accurately called resolve. In the language of children it may well be referred to as "making the promise to follow Jesus". Whatever the terminology, it is specifically accomplished suddenly in the lives of persons. Many prior experiences with their respective interpretations of meaning and much reflection may contribute to it, but the time when volition in experience relates all the various interpretations of life in the world to the reality of a personal God revealed in Jesus Christ is momentary and instantaneous. In "slow-motion" language the person says to himself, "From this moment on I believe in God and in His Son the Christ, and resolve to follow this way of life for as long as I shall live." This is the goal of Christian education in its strictest sense.

Pragmatic Christian education also recognises the two types of dyadic existence described by pragmaticism. The blind force of volition is illustrated in pragmaticistic thought by the growth of thistles in spite of all the efforts of the universe. The other kind of dyadic existence is the result of consciously directed and deliberately planned action. This kind of volitional relationism in Christian education

will be discussed in the succeeding section. Our concern here is with the former type of existence, that of blind force.

A pragmatic philosophy of Christian education not only recognizes, but also depends upon, the blind force of the Holy Spirit. This is not to say that the Holy Spirit is blindly capricious and undependable. Rather, it is meant to say that the operability of the Holy Spirit is not dependent upon the methods employed in Christian education. The Spirit which moves men to belief is external to the methodology of Christian education. The process of Christian education is dependent upon the force of the Holy Spirit to move men to volitional belief.

This does not make the Christian educational process unimportant altogether. The creation of experiences which may be interpreted by persons in a Christian context contribute much to the volitional resolve of the person. It has been said earlier that the task of Christian education is to see that some meaningful interpretation of experiences is achieved. Two facts of evidence remain, however. With the most effective methods of Christian education utilized to date not all persons who experience the methodology are motivated to meaningful belief. On the other hand, it is not uncommon for cases to be known where vital faith is possessed by persons who have had no participation in the so-called process of Christian education.

The task of Christian education, then, can be said to be the creation of experiences which set the atmosphere for the response of Christian faith on the part of the person and makes Christian belief more likely. As the Holy Spirit is understood here, it does not operate best where a vacuum of Christian experience exists. While the operability of the Holy Spirit is not dependent upon man's educational methods, it finds fertile fields in the lives of people who are stimulated by the meaningful interpretations resulting from Christian experiences.

Yes, a pragmatic philosophy recognizes the unexplicable force of the Holy Spirit in the volitional resolve toward Christian faith.

RELATION AS THE RESULT OF ACTION

When Christian education turns its attention to the kind of volition which relates Christian faith, instead of unbelief, to prior meaning, special demands are imposed upon the Christian educational process. This type of volition has been called an act of arbitrary will relating completed past to effected future. The concept speaks in harsh terms to the philosophy of Christian education and says: unless the volitional resolve to Christian faith is effected in the lives of persons, the communication of Christian experiences has been incomplete and inadequate. It must be quickly added,

however, that this is the Christian judgment placed upon the process of Christian education. The resolve toward skepticism or agnosticism is just as much an arbitrary act of will as the resolve toward Christian faith.

It now becomes clear that a volitional resolve in experience by a person is an act and not a relation. By the act the person is relating past experience to the future. The relation serves as initiator of the volitional act insofar as some action is necessitated by the relation. The relation is also the result of the arbitrary act since it relates meaning to meaning in such a way as would not have otherwise occurred if the volitional act had not taken place. Thus, the person already exists in relationship and volitional acts affect existent relations.

This relationship which is the result of volitional act is of utmost significance to the philosophy of Christian education. Christian education presupposes the fact that the person exists in relation to a personal God because man exists in the world which includes the reality of God's presence. Once the arbitrary act of faith is accomplished in the volitional category of Christian experience, a new relationship to God on the part of the person is called into being. Christian thought asserts that this relationship existed all the time, but when the person volitionally recognizes it a new and different relationship exists. The person

then acts as a person who possesses meaningful Christian faith. The new relationship is then a result of the person's action to believe.

As a result of action, new Christian conceptions are achieved, and as new Christian conceptions become meaningful, new results in terms of Christian conduct are effected. The maxim of pragmaticistic thought then conveys significant meaning to the philosophy of Christian education:

> Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.[1]

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[1] Vol. V, p. 258.

Division E

THE NATURE OF CHRISTIAN EDUCATION

CHAPTER XVIII

THE CONCEPTIONS OF SYNECHISM AND TYCHISM IN CHRISTIAN EDUCATION

The preceding division has presented Christian education as a method of finding more effective ways of communicating Christian experience as it ever seeks to communicate Christian experience in the lives of persons. This dual nature of Christian education was emphasized throughout the chapters which deal with the structure of Christian education. The intellectual dimension of Christian education was seen in the cognitive interpretations which give concepts their meaning. The developmental quality of hypotheses which provides the soil for growth in Christian faith and practice was described in the chapter dealing with the emphasis of Christian education upon interpretation of meaning. As a method of communication, Christian education is concerned with the symbolic nature of special words which connote significant meaning. Furthermore, the basic structure of the philosophy of Christian communication is relationship. We turn now to the nature of the Christian educational process.

As we begin to consider the nature of Christian education, the first thing to be said about it is a reiteration of a principle contained in Chapter Thirteen. Reference is

made to the progressive nature of the method. Christian education is not to be regarded as comprising a final method of communication which is never to be altered. In the same way, the purpose of Christian education is not to transmit a body of knowledge or pre-formed concepts of Christian faith which the person simply affirms through recitation of them. Rather, Christian education seeks to provide the structure by which a meaningful Christian faith is developed in the lives of persons. Through this method, concepts of Christian faith are tested in the future by the total meaning, including its consequences, of it as a conception. In this way are new and significant meanings of the Christian faith achieved and this faith deepened and expanded.

The meaning of one concept is built upon the meanings of past experience; hence, total meaning is cumulative. Both the terms "progressive" and "cumulative" are appropriate to the pragmatic philosophy of Christian education. The use of these words means that some movement and change occurs as new interpretations are made as a result of experience. The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education not only recognizes this principle but also attempts to manipulate the movement in such a way that Christian faith is deepened and expanded.

THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTINUITY

The movement involved in the formulation of a meaningful concept in the Christian faith can be basically represented

by the following sequence:

(1) A person exists in the world and necessarily must make some adjustment to the world as he experiences it.

(2) An experience consists of three elements: possibility, interaction, and connection.

(3) Meaning is derived from a single experience and is interpreted intellectually.

(4) An interpretation of meaning, once it is derived, becomes a concept, that is a subject which exists _sui generis_ and possesses the potentiality of affecting other concepts.

(5) Any concept becomes an hypothesis to be tested by future experience.

(6) Christian education seeks to do two things: (a) Induce some interpretation of those experiences which people have and fill them with Christian meaning, and (b) create for people experiences which produce and heighten Christian interpretation.

It is readily apparent from this sequence that the process of Christian education is dependent upon the possibility of one concept affecting another one. Once a concept is regarded as a subject, existing _sui generis_, it inherently stands in relationship to other subjects, either persons or other concepts. It is also evident that a concept, held as subject at any one time, contains prior interpretations of experience. This is the way in which concepts come into

existence. There can be no interpretation of meaning devoid of the meanings interpreted in the past. Christian educational philosophy must both recognize and utilize the cumulative nature of meaning.

Again, the rootage for effective communication of Christian interpretation of meaning in pragmatic philosophy becomes strikingly clear.

Synechism was defined in pragmaticism as the law of continuity. This law of the mind was applied to the realm of ideas and described by Peirce thus:

> . . . that ideas tend to spread continuously and to affect certain others which stand to them in a peculiar relation of affectibility. In this spreading they lose intensity, and especially the power of affecting others, but gain generality and become welded with other ideas.[1]

Pragmaticism affirms, in this way, the affectation which ideas have upon other ideas. Furthermore, pragmaticism affirms the general nature assumed by ideas as they affect other ideas. In other words, all ideas become a part of each new idea, considered as subject.

It is appropriate then to ask the two questions of a pragmatic philosophy of Christian education that were asked earlier of pragmaticism: how can an idea which occurred in the past still be a present idea in the mind? and, how can past ideas be present in immediate consciousness?

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[1] Vol. VI, p. 87.

In reply to the first question, a pragmatic philosophy of Christian education affirms that an idea which occurred in the past is still present in the mind. From the philosophical point of reference herein presented, an idea which occurred in the past is present in the mind because the previous interpretation of meaning achieved in the past was subject and therefore possessed the quality of positive potentiality. It was a unique subject because the person, as prior subject, was unique, thus making the relationship to all other subjects different from the relationships experienced by any other person. In the process of experience and as a result of the interpretation of meaning achieved the subject was affected by the new meaning. Thus, when a new experience was encountered the subject was different because of the affectation of the last experience. So the process continues. Each time a new meaning is interpreted it becomes the property of the interpreter, and in this act of possession the person becomes changed, and hence new. This is the cumulative and continuous nature of meaningful conceptions.

Let us look at the operation of synechism in practice. If a person has an unhappy or unpleasant experience with a person of another race or from another country, the interpretation of meaning includes dissatisfaction and a desire to avoid repetition of another relationship since it would be likely to result in a similar encounter. Not only is the one

person, which was a subject in the unpleasant encounter, to be avoided, but the tendency is to generalize the interpretation to mean that all relationships with all persons of that race or country are to be avoided. If the experience with the one individual is not repeated, the meaning of this one experience loses its intensity with the passage of time, but the generalization affects all future contacts with all persons of the specific race or country. The conception of prejudice becomes a subject since it affects other conceptions. At the same time it becomes the property of the interpreter since future experiences with others from that race or country are met by a person who is different than he was prior to the first experience.

This illustration could be multiplied in different areas. However, it seems sufficient evidence to demonstrate how an idea which occurred in the past still can be present in the mind of a person. Past ideas are present first of all, because they have affected other ideas. They are present also because they have altered the person and thus made a new subject of the person for future experiences. Lastly, past ideas are present because they are continuous in nature. They cannot be wholly past in that they can be assigned to any single date in the past. They are connected with the past, but they remain present in the total interpretation of meaning. Therefore, they are in process and are present through their own

continuous nature.

When we turn to the second question - how can past ideas be present in immediate consciousness? - a pragmatic philosophy of Christian education asserts, like pragmaticism, that a past idea is present in the mind through its presence in conceptions which are *ipso facto* present. Immediate consciousness is consciousness in any one moment of time. However, at any given moment, that which comprises the immediate consciousness is not isolated from all other consciousness. Therefore consciousness is continuous. The consciousness which is perceived in any one moment of time is composed of the consciousness which preceded it. Not only is immediate consciousness composed of the consciousness which preceded it, but also is the result of preceding consciousness. Dr. Peirce stated it extraordinarily well in pragmaticistic philosophy when he said:

> . . . let there be an indefinite succession of these inferential acts of comparative perception, and it is plain that the last moment will contain objectively the whole series. Let there be, not merely an indefinite succession, but a continuous flow of inference through a finite time, and the result will be a mediate objective consciousness of the whole time in the last moment.[1]

Conceptions, then, which were formulated in the past are present in immediate consciousness through their participation in immediate consciousness at any one moment.

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[1] Vol. VI, p. 90.

Thus far, the relevance of the law of synechism for a pragmatic philosophy of Christian education has been shown in these philosophical terms. The interpretation of existence in terms of relationism was emphasized in the preceding chapter. Here is seen the relational quality of concept to concept as well as concept to personal subject.

Christian education consistently utilizes the synechistic principle in the effort to produce Christian faith in the lives of persons and to deepen that faith when it is existent. The entire process of Christian nurture is based upon the principle that concepts contained in the Christian faith do affect other concepts. Furthermore, the Christian nurture process assumes that specific ideas will lose the intensity which they possess at the first formulation of them and that they will gain generality as they become a part of succeeding concepts. The developmental quality of Christian nurture in practice is well expressed by Lee J. Gable in his book entitled Christian Nurture Through The Church, when he says:

> By Christian nurture we mean the total effort of the church to help each person to dedicate himself to Christ and to develop the understandings, the attitudes and the skills that he needs in order to be Christian in his personal life and in his relations with others.[1]

Although this is a practical statement of the nurturing process

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[1] Lee J. Gable, Christian Nurture Through The Church. New York: The P and D Department of National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., 1955, p. 11.

and not a philosophical one, it is significant that the entire definition is predicated upon the quality of development. All development of dedication, understanding, attitudes and skills contained in Christian nurture is dependent upon the principle of synechism.

A pragmatic philosophy of Christian education not only recognizes the synechistic principle but utilizes its function as the root which produces the methodology of the Christian nurturing process. The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education recognizes each interpretation of meaning as an individual concept of the Christian faith which is subject-in-itself; but that any one such subject may contain many generalities of prior interpretations of meaning. Therefore, in a very real way, the individual concept of any one moment of time is given meaning because it represents the connection of prior meanings in light of a new experience.

THE PRINCIPLE OF CHANCE

It will be remembered that tychism, like synechism, is regarded by pragmaticism to be so universally operative that it can accurately be called a law. Tychism was defined in the first part of this study as "the doctrine that absolute chance is a factor of the universe".[1] Dr. Peirce describes

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[1] Vol. VI, p. 137.

chance as the term employed "to express with accuracy the characteristics of freedom or spontaneity".[1]

Pragmaticistic philosophy illustrates the law of tychism by the chance which is inherent in the first mode of being, by the creative process of the universe, and by the triad composed of feeling, effort, and habit in the realm of ideas.

The philosophy of Christian education depends upon the law of tychism as it is explained by pragmatistic philosophy. Christian education recognizes the soundness of the philosophical doctrine which explains the role of chance in the creation of the universe within the system of Christian theology. Its exposition, however, is not the primary purpose of Christian education.

Christian education is concerned with the development of Christian faith in the lives of people. It is concerned, therefore, with both faith and persons. As has been seen earlier, however, interpretations of meaning of which Christian faith consists is personal and private. This fact places emphasis upon the individuality of the person who possesses faith in God and in His Son, Jesus Christ. It is the person who comes to believe. Christian education, therefore, gives attention to the principle of tychism as it exists in the first mode of being - that of positive potentiality of

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[1] Vol. VI, p. 138.

the subject, and in the freedom or spontaneity in the realm of experienced ideas which causes faith to develop.

The uniqueness of the person as individual subject was stressed in Chapter Fourteen. Christian education seeks to develop Christian faith in all persons. At the same time, it knows that Christian faith, which is meaningful, is developed by the individual in his unique way. The Christian education process is centered upon the person with his peculiar quality of positive potential possibility. The methodology of Christian education which attempts to be pragmatic, is person-centered and is rooted in an educational philosophy which recognizes the uniqueness of each person. The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education does not attempt to provide the same experiences for every person. Rather, it attempts to provide experiences which will provide the greatest opportunity for Christian interpretation of meaning for each person. A pragmatic philosophy of Christian education does not seek to force all persons into the same mould of Christian faith.

Furthermore, the pragmatic philosophy of Christian education does not seek to explain why each person is unique other than to attribute it to the act of God's creation. It does seek to understand the abilities, interest, background, feelings, and purpose of each person. In this way Christian education depends upon the law of tychism as an element of

God's creative act in the positive potential possibility inherent in each person.

There is still another way in which the pragmatic philosophy recognizes the tychistic principle. This consists of the element of chance inherent in experience.

Reference has been made in this study to the task, or concern, of Christian education - to develop a meaningful Christian faith in the lives of persons. By the very nature of this task, then, we begin with a preconceived point of reference. An element of control, then, in the educational process is readily admitted. Every effort is exerted to help people interpret those experiences which occur in their lives within a Christian frame of reference. In those experiences which are created, the goal is to effect an interpretation of meaning which is Christian. Hence, these experiences are carefully planned with the desired result in mind.

In spite of all the careful planning, the law of chance is operative in experience. This is not to be confused with the operability of the Holy Spirit discussed near the close of the preceding chapter. The element of chance in experience means that the feelings and interpretations of meaning resulting from the experience may be quite different from those anticipated and planned for. Of course, the individuality of each person, as subject, makes the resultant interpretation unique and different for each person. But

there is also a living quality in the experience itself which arises spontaneously and is unpredictable. Pragmatic Christian education not only recognizes this tychistic element in experience, but also depends upon it in the hope that the variable quality of intensity in the Christian interpretation of meaning resulting from the experience will produce staunch volitional resolve toward Christian faith.

The first thing to be said about the nature of Christian education is that it is truly both synechistic and tychistic.

CHAPTER XIX

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ABDUCTIVE THOUGHT

The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education regards personal Christian faith to be composed of individual meaningful conceptions. These conceptions are enriched with significant meaning, expanded or discarded as the result of experience. Experience forms the testing-ground for the conceptions of faith as they are held at any one time. The changing nature of conceptions is inherent in the concept of a personal Christian faith that is ever seeking to deepen and expand itself.

Two things which have been stated previously need to be recalled here. First, that concepts of the Christian faith are formulated out of the interpretations of meaning derived as the result of experience. The experience has been described as the unit of learning for the acquisition of the kind of vital Christian faith which produces Christian conduct. Secondly, that meaningful Christian faith is perceived cognitively. This latter assertion does not deny the place of revelation contained in the Christian revelation of God in His Son, Jesus Christ. Faith is the act of man, not of Divinity. Therefore, it is accurate to say that man regards revelation cognitively. Even when man states that there are

things about God that are mysterious, he is simply saying that his thought-processes can perceive these only as mystery.

These two affirmations indicate the hypothetical nature of concepts contained in the Christian faith. Concepts are hypothetical in nature because they are capable of being altered, either enlarged with new meaning or reformed to include new meaning. One writer, of the New Testament, defines faith as "the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen."[1] Assurance and conviction are nouns dependent upon the concepts which compose them. A pragmatic philosophy of Christian education presupposes a faith that changes in its growth toward a deeper relationship with God, and Jesus Christ as Savior.

To say that concepts of the Christian faith are hypotheses in no way indicates an uncertain faith. Rather, it indicates a faith that grows deeper as the concepts which compose it are validated or disproved through Christian experience. Christian faith remains firm throughout the process of experimentation. Faith can be said to be the overarching interpretation of meaning resulting from the relation of individual concepts. Both the capacity of concepts to change and the intellectual dimension of interpretation forces Christian education to be concerned with the way in which

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[1] Hebrews 11:1.

concepts are formulated. Therefore, attention is turned to the methods of reasoning which produce interpretations of meaning or hypotheses. Consideration will be given to deductive, inductive, and abductive types of reasoning. All three types of reasoning are significant in the Christian educational process since all of them deal with the inquiry into existence, or things as they really exist in dyadic relationship. However, as will be seen, abduction is the most important type in Christian education since it provides the way in which hypotheses are formulated. Both deduction and induction deal with the substantiation or disestablishment of hypotheses.

DEDUCTION

Deductive reasoning begins with a generalized hypothesis and seeks to determine its validity or invalidity by determining its operability in specific cases. If the generalized hypothesis is true in numerous cases, then it is concluded to be true in all cases. The emphasis is upon the relationship of particular cases to the general theory with which we begin.

Pragmaticistic thought defines two parts of deductive reasoning. The first part is the purely logical explanation of the hypothesis; the second part is the demonstration of the logic. The relationship represented in the conclusion is to the beginning hypothesis. Upon this validation of conclusion

to hypothesis rests the effectiveness of deductive reasoning. The conclusion may or may not represent Reality, or things as they really are. This is not the primary purpose of deduction as a kind of reasoning.

Doubtless, the most familiar illustration of deductive reasoning is: all men are mortal, Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is mortal. This illustrates well the process of deductive reasoning.

In the realm of Christian concepts, however, deductive reasoning may easily produce difficulties. For example, many Christians declare that there is a quality instinctive within all men that causes them to seek God. In the terms of deductive reasoning, then, this would be postulated thus: all men seek God; John is a man; therefore, John seeks God. The facts may be that John unequivocally denies the existence of God. The relationship between the conclusion and the beginning hypothesis is just as effective as the former example so the validity of this type of reasoning is maintained. One need not be a religious person, however, to see that the conclusion does not represent things as they really exist. This fact is consistent with the method and purpose of deduction, but a method of Christian education to deepen John's Christian faith constructed on this conclusion would doubtless be completely ineffective upon John.

Christian education which seeks to produce Christian faith and deepen Christian faith where it already exists must more carefully determine the state of existence than may be produced by deductive reasoning.

INDUCTION

Induction, like deduction, begins with a generalized hypothesis. However, unlike deduction which applies the general theory to specific cases, induction proceeds by applying particular cases to the general theory. The generalized hypothesis is more accurately a prediction and is evaluated in light of specific cases.

The method of induction is that of experiment. The purpose of this type of reasoning is to establish the relationship of specific cases to reality. That is to say, that through inductive reasoning the generalized hypothesis is supported by at least one particular instance which is true. Of course, induction seeks to support the hypothesis by more than one instance. But the relationship is between one case which is true and tends to support the hypothesis, rather than between an original hypothesis and the conclusion as is the purpose of deduction. Induction then proceeds to say that because of the degree of accuracy which one case represents of reality the same accuracy of representation will

likewise exist in all other cases in which the conditions are identical. Thus the relationship between the general hypothesis and the specific instances become regularized.

The ultimate validity of an hypothesis cannot be proved or disproved, then, until all possible instances of experimentation have been exhausted. This requirement of endless experimentation is impossible practically but is the logical requirement demanded by induction in the final analysis. Because each individual experiment, however, has a beginning and an ending in the infinite series, each single experiment gives a certain validity or invalidity to the general hypothesis.

An example of the inadequacy of pure inductive reasoning is apparent in the following hypothesis. All persons of the negroid race are mentally inferior to persons of the caucasian race; Joe is a negro; therefore, Joe is mentally inferior to all persons of the caucasian race. A single experiment concerning Joe may lend either support or non-support to the generalizes theory. Before the hypothesis can be said to be either true or false, experimentation with every person of both the negro and caucasian races would have to be completed.

Christian education must give careful attention to the manner in which hypotheses are tested by induction. This

consideration, however, causes the Christian educational process to be primarily concerned with the way in which hypotheses come into formulation.

ABDUCTION

As has been seen from the foregoing discussions, both deduction and induction begin with generalizes hypotheses. The question, Whence do hypotheses come?, becomes a significant one for the pragmatic philosophy of Christian education since concepts of the Christian faith are here regarded as hypotheses which are subject to the testing-ground of Christian experience.

Abduction is the type of reasoning which gives birth to new hypotheses. It may well be called imaginative reasoning since an hypothesis is formulated by suggesting that a certain generalization may be true. This does not mean mere whimsical suggestion, but rather a suggested hypothesis arising from the observation of phenomena as they seem to exist. From the observation of phenomena comes a suggestion that something may be true. This is the way in which hypotheses arise. Each new hypothesis, then, is unique, and exists as subject with a quality of positive potential to be tested for its validity or invalidity. Experience has been described heretofore as the testing-ground for hypotheses. This remains equally valid in light of the foregoing discussions

which describe specific methods of testing hypotheses by either deductive or inductive reasoning. The type of reasoning utilized to test an hypothesis may be either a part of or the complete experience. The three elements of an experience will be recalled as potential possibility, interaction, and connecting interpretation. The testing of an hypothesis, either by deduction or induction, has no effect upon the origin of an hypothesis. These two types of reasoning only deal with hypotheses after formulation.

The inevitability of experience was seen in the chapter concerning the reality of relationism. Man, as he exists in the world, cannot escape encountering the world, or experiencing it. From these inevitable experiences is bound to arise observation of phenomena. From these observations arise the formulation of hypotheses which express the way in which things may exist. These expressions are the hypotheses which are subject to the testing-ground of experimentation. The first step in the process, that of observing phenomena, is bound to occur. It is unreflective and is the result of sensational experience. The middle step, that of suggesting generalized theories from the observation of phenomena, is reflective. It is the process of abductive reasoning and represents the conscious awareness of relationism. This step is not automatic and since it represents some interpretation of meaning can be equated with learning. The formulation of

hypotheses represents the conscious understanding of phenomena as it is understood at that time. Each hypothesis, as it is held in any one moment of time, is a subject possessing the possibility that it may represent reality as it really exists, but always subject to new interpretation of meaning resulting from further experimentation. Experiment has been defined earlier as experience.

Since the Christian faith has been defined as the over-arching interpretation of meaning derived from the concepts contained within it, the significance of abductive reasoning for the philosophy of Christian education is apparent. Concepts of the Christian faith are hypotheses of how things may be. Abductive reasoning produces the hypotheses which make a meaningful Christian faith possible.

The nature of the Christian faith which, on the one hand, is that of staunch volitional resolve, and on the other hand, is always subject to further testing may be called paradoxical. Pragmaticism, which is not content with explaining the nature of belief in terms of paradox, brings a different kind of attitude to this nature of Christian faith. Pragmaticism says that the staunchness of the faith, or the whole of the conception, is dependent upon the practical consequences which the faith, or conception, effects. In this way faith becomes an act which includes within it the effects of future experimentation. This is to say that faith which does

not constantly include the possibility of new interpretations of meanings can not accurately be termed a meaningful faith. Thus, abductive reasoning must always be present to produce new concepts of the Christian faith as a result of faith which existed in past time.

Abduction is equally significant to the philosophy of Christian education. Just as abductive reasoning produces new hypotheses for Christian faith, in the same way it produces new concepts in a Christian educational philosophy. Again, the rootage for the philosophy of Christian education in pragmaticistic philosophy becomes clear.

This emphasis on abductive reasoning is not intended to disregard intuition, or native insight, as it is called by pragmaticism, in the formulation of hypotheses. This ability is perceptual, but often is "unreasoned" or "uncalculated" to the extent that it resembles instinct. The pragmatic Christian educator can agree with Dr. Peirce when he says of this native ability:

> An insight, I call it because it is to be referred to the same general class of operations to which Perceptive Judgments belong. This Faculty is at the same time of the general nature of Instinct, resembling the instincts of the animals in its so far surpassing the general powers of our reason and for its directing us as if we were in possession of facts that are entirely beyond the reach of our senses. It resembles instinct too in its small liability to error; for though it goes wrong oftener than right, yet the relative frequency with which it is right is on the whole the most wonderful thing in our constitution.[1]

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[1] Vol. V, p. 107.

The recognition of native insight does not reduce the significant position of abduction for the pragmatic philosophy of Christian education.

Abductive reasoning provides the philosophy of Christian education with both its beginning and its end. Abduction is the means by which observations become hypotheses or concepts.

This admits to the testing-ground of experience every reasonable suggestion. The end of Christian education is the production of a Christian faith which is so meaningful to the person who holds it that it issues in Christian conduct. Remembering the words of Jesus, "You will know them by their fruits",[1] Christ education seeks to produce a Christian faith which expresses its meaning in conduct. Therefore, as one concept of communication stands in relationship to other concepts within the philosophy of Christian education, through the process of experimentation these concepts of communication which do not result in the expression of Christian faith through conduct are either discarded, altered, or revised in favor of more effective ones. The observation of these kinds of phenomena produce new concepts through the process of abductive reasoning.

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[1] Matthew 7:16.

For the philosophy of Christian education, each concept contained within it is valid if it posits the possibility that a certain method may be effective, if it is capable of further experimentation, and if it fulfills its goal of producing sufficient meaning to affect Christian conduct.

CHAPTER XX

THE ASSUMPTION OF UNDERLYING REALITY

To include a chapter in the philosophy of Christian education on the assumption of God's reality may at first appear superfluous. The use of the word Christian implies the assumption of God's existence. This is true. However, it is this very point which makes the inclusion of this discussion essential to any consideration of Christian educational philosophy.

Christian education was defined in the opening chapter of this part of the discourse as a "method". It is true that the definition hastened to say with what the method was concerned - finding more effective ways of communicating Christian experience as it ever seeks to communicate Christian experience in the process. The objects of the method gives the definition a Christian connotation which assumes the underlying reality of God; but to define Christian educatiin as a method may appear both incomplete and flimsy to some. Process has been the term more in vogue during the past two decades. Although stated in different ways, Christian education has been defined as the process through which persons come to know God and His Son, Jesus Christ and commit their lives to the Christian way. Use of the word, process,

involves both commitment and nurture and this seems wise. To quarrel severely with this type of definition is not the purpose here. The purpose of this treatise is to show that the word process implies a static philosophy upon which the process is based. The process may be varied well to the needs, interests, abilities and skills of each person. Furthermore, it may be experimental and creative as it seeks to communicate Christian experience and fill each experience with significant meaning.

An equally important aspect of Christian education is that the experimental attitude prevails within its own nature. In other words the method of discovering more effective ways of communication is just as important as the communication of Christian experience to persons. It may be maintained that method is no more adequate a word than process. However, a method which seeks to find more effective ways of communication while communicating Christian experience at the same time is an attempt to express both aspects of Christian education.

Both of these aspects are equally rooted in pragmatic philosophy. The philosophy of Christian education finds its conceptions subject to experimentation to include the practical effects resulting from the conception. The methodology of Christian communication finds its conceptions likewise

subject to experimentation and to include the practical effects of Christian conduct. Christian education includes both in the conception of it as method.

The total task of Christian education assumes that God exists. Once we begin describing God with adjectives or adverbs, the danger of limiting or maligning His nature is inevitable. The nature of God becomes a concept for the subject matter of Christian education. The important assumption for the philosophy of Christian education is that God exists and the task of Christian education is to produce some response to His existence in the lives of persons. This gives Christian education a purpose that is distinct from any other kind of educational procedure.

Christian education assumes that God's existence is a part of the world to which every person has an inevitable relationship. Furthermore, that God as creator and continual creator of the world is the Ultimate Real of all reality. Therefore, a pragmatic philosophy of Christian education agrees with Dr. Peirce when he says that the world is an "argument" of God's purpose. The precise words of pragmaticism are:

> . . . the universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities.[1]

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[1] Vol. V, p. 75.

This represents the assumption of underlying reality which a pragmatic philosophy of Christian education assumes. It does not raise the question as to whether there be a God. Christian education assumes that God is.

This assumption is critical to a philosophy of Christian education for two reasons. First, the assumption God's existence furnishes Christian education with a generalized, preconceived interpretation of meaning which it seeks to communicate. Secular education is usually regarded as being concerned primarily with the acquisition of mental, motor, and social skills. It is true that for the decade following the close of the second World War, secular education placed some emphasis upon helping the pupil learn to think. The current emphasis, however, is on scientific and technological advancement. This increasingly leaves to Christian education the whole task of helping persons to both ask and answer the question: what is the meaning of life? Or, in a more personal way, what is the meaning of my life? Of course, there will be some who ask the question as a result of their relationships with and within the world, and will come to the agencies of Christian education for help with a meaningful answer. Christian education is concerned with this group. But Christian education must be more concerned with the larger group of people who, for one reason or another, do not make this inquiry of meaning in light of Reality.

In the first place, then, the assumption of underlying Reality is significant to the philosophy of Christian education because this conviction compels Christian education to cause people to stand on the threshold of Reality and inquire after the meaning of life as well as to provide the Christian answer when the question is asked.

In the second place, the assumption of God's existence as underlying reality prevents Christian education from becoming secular. At first appearance, this seems obvious. However, the institutional agencies which carry on the task of Christian education can become so preoccupied with the soundness of methodology that the purpose of Christian education is eclipsed, or even completely lost. This preoccupation is not the only reason which overshadows the true purpose of Christian education - that of effecting and expanding Christian faith in the lives of people. Cultural pressures, such as the emphasis on large numbers and the benefits of social fellowship sometimes cause education, which is carried on in the name of Christian education, to lose its Christian purpose. When God's existence is remembered and regarded as the underlying reality, Christian education remains Christian in its purpose of effecting and deepening Christian faith. This assumption, then, provides the criterion by which both the philosophy and methodology of Christian education remains true to its purpose.

Christian education may deal with the evidences of God's existence; but it never questions the fact of His existence. God's existence is assumed and made the ultimate reality from which man derives meaning for his own existence.

A RELIGION OF SCIENCE

It was apparent in Part I that pragmaticistic thought "married" religion and science to achieve this title of A Religion of Science. Science was defined as a correct method; religion was defined as a deep recognition of the relation of man to the "circumambient ALL". It is religion that stands firm and profits by this marriage since science gives to religion the scientific method. According to Peirce, religion can arise from nothing but religious sensitivity. The scientific method gives to religion the animation of an inquiring method.

The rootage which Christian education finds in pragmatic thought becomes apparent once again. The philosophy of Christian education must provide the basis for a scientific method of finding more effective ways of communication as it ever seeks to communicate Christian experience in the process. A scientific method places a new dictum upon the method of Christian education. First of all, it says that the method must be of inquisitive nature; that is to say, it must inquire sincerely and honestly. The scientific method also

emphasizes that all the data must be considered. For Christian education, this includes the person with his various interests, abilities, feelings, and motives; the factors of relationship; the nature of reality, and previous interpretations of meaning achieved by others under a similar sequence of circumstances. Thirdly, the scientific method requires that the facts of experience, as experiment, be accurately observed. The facts of experiment in light of all the data are evaluated. Then, a conclusion, or an interpretation of meaning, may be formulated which becomes a new hypothesis, subject to further testing.

Pragmaticism delineated these four significant characteristics of religion: religion is personal; religion is also social; religion is the supreme motivation of conduct; and man exists as a relational subject. A pragmatic philosophy of Christian education is constructed on these same characteristics.

The individuality of interpretation of meaning has been emphasized previously. This comprises the factor which makes religion private. Each person, as subject, brings his own unique qualities to each experience. Each cognition is determined, to some extent, by previous cognitions. Each relationship is private because it has never occurred before as well as relating new and different subjects. Thus, every relationship is private. This can result only in a private

interpretation of meaning. When the relationship includes the reality of God, as subject, the private interpretation of meaning enters the area of religion. Or, in the same way, when the relationship includes Jesus Christ, as subject, the interpretation of meaning may become specifically Christian. A philosophy of Christian education is constructed on the privacy of religion as it is individually interpreted by each person.

Religion is also social. The effectiveness of this characteristic is evidenced through all the ceremonies, rituals, and group rites that have developed in the name of religion and to express religious feelings. The social nature of religion in the area of communication has been expressed by such maxims as these: "More religion is caught than taught", and, "The curriculum is ninety per cent teacher". The social nature emphasizes the positive potential which each subject possesses to affect another subject with which it comes into relationship. This relationship may be between two persons, as subjects, or between a person and a concept, as subjects. In some cases the relationship may be between person and object. In any event, the social aspect of religion is dramatized by pragmaticism's philosophical explanations of the potential quality of Firstness and its ability to become actualized through relationship. A pragmatic philosophy of Christian education not only recognizes

but is dependent upon the person existing in relationship to all other subjects, including God and Jesus Christ.

The third characteristic of religion, as viewed by pragmaticism, is its motivating force for conduct. Once a person has made a religious, or Christian, response to reality, conduct is certain to change. The degree to which it changes is different with each person since the interpretation of meaning is individual. With the religious, or Christian, interpretation of meaning, however, comes a different kind of behavior. The pragmatic quality of a Christian educational philosophy is clearly seen in this characteristic. A philosophy of Christian education is called upon to produce the response of Christian faith in the lives of persons. Furthermore, as the philosophy attempts to communicate Christian experience, conduct is affected by new meanings as they are derived. The central theme of this thesis is evident here. The Christian Scriptures are clear in their declaration that faith is known through the works which it effects. Pragmatic philosophy provides the categories through which concepts and effects are inseparably linked. A philosophy of education, which is Christian, then, can be constructed most effectively with pragmatic conceptions as the roots.

Lastly, pragmaticism characterizes religion by emphasizing man as relational subject to the "circumambient All".

This aspect of religion's nature has been emphasized previously. A philosophy of Christian education is constructed clearly upon this characteristic. Throughout the foregoing paragraphs, emphasis has been placed upon the fact that it is man who makes a Christian response to reality. The threshold-of-reality has been used to describe that area before response is made. Different persons make different responses to reality even when it is seriously confronted. Christian education seeks a Christian response to reality since it presupposes the existence of God as underlying reality.

One obvious question arises in this discussion of Christian education as a scientific method. Only the person who already possesses Christian faith will ask it. The question is: Does not the act of God produce a Christian response to reality? The clue to the answer has already been suggested. This question is never raised until after a person has made a Christian response. It is not applicable to the person before a Christian response to God's reality is made. However, Christian education assumes the quality of God to be that of Firstness. His existence is unquestionable, and possesses the quality of potential positive possibility. In this way God is capable of entering into relationship. The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education, then, assumes God's existence as underlying reality and seeks to make its method sufficiently scientific to effect the same assumption in the lives of others.

ATTAINING KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

An elaborate argument for the existence of God is not the purpose of this treatise since Christian education assumes God's existence. Christian education is vitally concerned, however, with the way in which knowledge of God is attained.

The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education regards the experience as the unit of learning. Thus, all knowledge, including knowledge of God, is derived from experience. In other words, God is known as He is directly experienced. In general terms, the task of Christian education is to lead persons to directly experience God.

Remembering that an experience is composed of three elements - a subject, relationship, and connecting interpretant - the language of pragmatism assumes significant meaning. Both God and the person are subjects in the direct experience of God. Both possess the quality of Firstness. Man is capable of encountering God just as God is capable of confronting man. Man is forced to relate to the world, although it may be on a purely sensational level. The philosophical term of "existentialist" has come to be applied to this kind of response. When man relates to the world cognitively and asks consciously and sincerely, what is the meaning of life? he is beginning to reckon with reality. Some kind of interpretation of meaning begins to be made. In other words, some connection

between person and the reality of the world is made. If the person regards the underlying reality of the world in terms of divine or supernatural spirit, whether or not he calls it God in the beginning stage it seems fair to say he has directly experienced God. A faith is born.

The birth of faith has been regarded as the primary goal of Christian education. Birth must take place before nurture can occur. As has been reiterated throughout this study, Christian education is concerned with both the birth and the nurture of Christian faith. Both are dependent upon the person's experiences of God. In this kind of experience the person is the subject; the person enters into relationship with God, another subject; the interpretation of meaning is cognitive representamen. If the interpretant is positive in its recognition of God's existence it can be called faith; if the interpretant denies the existence of God, it can be called atheism.

The task of Christian education becomes three-fold: to help persons encounter God's reality so that some interpretation of meaning is accomplished, to fill this interpretant with significant meaning concerning God's existence, and to provide recurring experiences in which God's reality is encountered again and again.

God is known through experience. A pragmatic philosophy of Christian education recognizes the "three universes

of experience", as described by pragmaticism, as the kinds of experiences through which knowledge of God is attained.

THREE UNIVERSES OF EXPERIENCE

Both philosophy and Christian theology find the most obvious evidence for God's existence in His role as perpetual creator. Christian theology goes on to find other evidences, particularly as the Father of Jesus Christ. The lowest common denominator for the proof of God's existence is that of creator of all things. Therefore, the philosophy of Christian education finds firm foundation in pragmaticism which asserts that God, as creator, is creator of all - even the universes of experience through which persons may come to know Him. There are three such universes of experience: ideas, facts, and connections.

Considering these universes of experience in order, then, the first way in which God may be known is through the world of ideas.

Ideas of God are produced by free play or musement, according to pragmaticism. The philosophy of Christian education recognizes this quality of free mental exercise. Persons begin to wonder and soon the area of reflective meditation produces ideas about God. It is true that they are just ideas but they are important because they are speculative. This kind of wondering and speculation causes cognitive

observation. In this way hypothetical interpretations come into existence. Pragmaticism, as it is described by Peirce, is certain that this kind of speculative meditation will lead to belief in God's reality and His immanence. Christian education, likewise, holds this conviction that belief in God will result from observation and meditation. However, the prior prejudice of both pragmaticistic philosophy and Christian education must be recognized in this connection.

The second universe of experience through which God may be experienced is the area of things and facts. Pragmaticism maintains that a latent tendency to believe in God is a universal phenomena of human nature. The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education, as it is presented here, does not maintain that the tendency toward belief is universal. Christian education does depend upon a similar phenomenon in the universe of facts. The phenomenon is that there is a universal desire in the hearts of men to achieve a meaningful interpretation of the meaning of life. This is of great significance to the philosophy of Christian education as it opens the doors for a Christian interpretation to be made.

Conceptions, or hypotheses, of belief in God are formulated in the first universe of experience, the universe of ideas. These conceptions are the cognitive result of musing, observing phenomena, and meditation. The third

universe of experience provides the areas of connection between the universe of ideas and the consequences which each idea requires. This universe of experience translates ideas into terms of action required by the meaning of idea. As connections are made the effects of the idea become a part of the total idea.

The third area of experience prevents conceptions of faith in God from being simple passive affirmations. The realm of connection relates conceptions of the Christian faith to Christian action. Through experiences of connection belief in God commands influence over the whole conduct of the believer. Christianity utilizes the words of Paul to express the importance of this connection through experience: "So faith by itself, if it has no works, is dead."[1] A pragmatic philosophy of Christian education utilizes these words directly from pragmaticistic philosophy to express this demand of faith upon action:

> Yet it is absurd to say that religion is a mere belief. . . . Religion is a life, and can be identified with a belief only provided that belief be a living belief - a thing to be lived rather than said or thought.[2]

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[1] James 2: 17.

[2] Vol. VI, p. 306.

CHAPTER XXI

FEELINGS, AS QUALITIES OF THOUGHT, ARE COMMUNICABLE

The preceding chapter has asserted that Christian education must assist people in accomplishing a meaningful interpretation of those experiences which they encounter. Since Christian education has a calculated purpose, its task is obviously to fill these interpretations with Christian meaning. Christian education must go further than this. Its method must provide the kind of experiences which are apt to result in a Christian interpretation of meaning.

The individuality of interpretation of meaning has been emphasized previously. Yet, Christian education has been defined as the method by which Christian experience is communicated. There is a sense, then, in which Christian experiences can be said to be "common" experiences, that is to say experienced "in common" or by groups. Such Christian experiences can be placed under five general categories: study, worship, service, fellowship, and witness. Communication of Christian experience, as it is meant here, is the creation of experiences which are specifically arranged to produce a Christian interpretation of meaning. An experience has already been defined as consisting of three elements: a subject,

relationship with other subjects, and a connecting interpretant. That each person, as individual subject encounters relationship individually, and achieves an individual interpretation of meaning cannot be denied. In such group experiences as have just been mentioned, each person has an individual experience. Because some of the subjects in the experience, to which an individual subject relates, are common to another individual subject, it can be said that experiences are common to more than one subject.

For example, two persons participate in the same worship service. They follow the same order of service, sing the same hymns, unite in the same prayers, and hear the same sermon. The experience can, in one sense, be said to be a common experience. At the same time, one person may feel very close to God; the other may have no true feeling of worship at all. This is used to illustrate the individual aspect, which is always present, in the kind of experiences considered to be group experiences.

Christianity has long utilized group experiences to communicate Christian interpretations of meaning. The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education, as it is presented here, is not intended to condemn experiences which are common to more than one person. Quite to the contrary, the method of Christian education utilizes them as a method of communication. The communication of Christian experience may occur

under varying circumstances. It may be quite private as a person observes phenomena of the world and achieves a meaningful hypothesis. Christian experience may be communicated as two persons come into relationship with each other. Or, it may be within a group of many persons.

Pragmatistic thought furnishes the philosophy of Christian education with significant foundations in its emphasis upon interpretation of meaning as the third element of experience. This helps Christian education to see that experience is incomplete unless an interpretation of meaning is achieved. In other words, a person may participate in a worship service without actually worshipping. Or a person may be a part of a class without really studying.

The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education is required to create experiences which result in a Christian interpretation of meaning. Such experiences may be between two persons or more than two. In either event, communication is based upon the premise of pragmaticism that feelings, as qualities of thought, may be shared. Interpretations of meaning, then, as they are formulated, are individual. Once they are put into a language of symbols, they may be communicated through verbalization. To communicate the quality of thought, or feelings, requires further verbalization about it. Christian education, which is pragmatic, is constructed upon the concept that experiences can be created which will

produce qualities of interpretation, or intensity of thought, which can be shared by two persons, or more than two persons. In this way Christian experience can be communicated with the degree of vitality which will affect conduct.

THE NATURE OF FEELING

Reference has been made above to feeling as the quality of thought. Since pragmaticism can be generally characterized as an intellectualistic system of inquiry, and since feeling is the quality of thought, it can be concluded that feeling is intellectualistic or cognitive, in its general nature. Pragmaticism attributes three elements to thought: First, there is the element of representation. Thought stands for the interpretation of meaning which is attained by intellectual process. The second element of thought is its relational element which not only brings one thought into relation with another, but also provides the continuity of thought. The third element is the quality of thought or how the thought feels.

The nature of feelings is especially significant to Christian education since the quality, or intensity, of conceptions composing the Christian faith of any one person are an important determing factor of the effected conduct. The degree of intensity of Christian feeling produces the variance in Christian commitment on the part of persons. An

illustration citing the variance in feeling of worship effected in two different worshippers has already been given. Varying intensity of feeling causes one person of a family to devote his life in a professional way to the work of organized Christianity while another person of the same family does not feel compelled to express his commitment to Christ professionally. The commitment is to the same cause of Christianity but varying intensitis of feelings compel varying expressions of it.

Feelings are cognitive because they are an element of thought. Feelings are also cognitive because of their cumulative nature. This is to say that feelings are partially determined by prior feelings. Feelings, which are past, are deposited in continuous consciousness. As new feelings are cognized in the immediate present the deposit of previous feelings influences the intensity, or quality, of the present feelings.

A vivid example lies in the realm of modern art. A person who has feelings of meaninglessness at the first abstract painting which he sees is apt to find no meaning in the second abstract painting he views. Each time this feeling is reproduced the possibility of feeling appreciatively toward any abstract painting is lessened. A more positive example can be found in the realm of religious feelings. When a person feels close to God in one experience, the

cognitive deposit of that experience make it easier to reach a high level of feeling close to God the second time. Each time the feeling recurs the intensity of the present feeling is influenced by previous feelings.

In the second place, feelings are individual insofar as they occur in one moment of time. It is granted that previous feelings influence them, but as individual feelings occur, they are singular in that they are one feeling and occur in one instance of consciousness. This singular quality emphasizes the fact that a feeling is a subject with the positive potential quality of coming into relationship with other subjects. The singular quality of feelings can be demonstrated by continuing the illustrations used above. A person has an individual feeling each time a particular painting is encountered. It arises in one moment of consciousness and in one instant of time. Likewise, each time one reaches the feeling of worship, it is a singular feeling in that moment of time.

Thirdly, a feeling is a living and dynamic quality. The living quality of feeling is best seen by its capacity for variation. The same kind of feeling attains different intensity at different times. A feeling rises and falls in different moments of time. A feeling exists independently of other contents of consciousness. It may arise from other elements of consciousness, but, as a feeling, it exists

independently. The feeling of appreciation for one painting is not obliterated by the feeling of revulsion by another although the two feelings achieve varying intensities at different times. In the same way, a feeling of worship may vary according to many circumstances but the feeling exists alongside intellectual conceptions present in the consciousness.

The intellectual nature of a feeling was seen in its cognitive character. Because feeling is a quality of thought it cannot lose this intellectual nature. It is this aspect of feeling which distinguishes feeling from emotion and, at the same time, gives to feeling the nature of an hypothesis which can be subjected to future experimentation.

THE NATURE OF COMMUNICATION

Communication is usually regarded as the conveyance of an idea from one mind to another mind. This definition is consistent with both the principles of pragmaticistic philosophy and pragmatic Christian education. However, pragmaticism places special demands upon communication which provides special significance to the consideration of communicating Christian faith.

First of all, pragmaticism holds that ideas, or conceptions, are formulated as the result of interpretations of meaning. Interpretations of meaning arise through experience.

Experience includes the prior two elements of subject and relationship before interpretation of meaning can be achieved. Interpretations of meaning are individual. Therefore, ideas must be individual.

This sequence vivifies the fact that the conveyance of an idea from one mind to another is not as simple as it first appears. An idea may be expressed in the symbols of language and spoken to another person. If the second person comes into relationship with the meaning expressed by the symbols of language and makes an individual interpretation of meaning which is his own possession, communication has been achieved through experience. The elements of experience are readily apparent, the second persons as subject, relationship with both the speaker and the concept expressed, and a new individual interpretation of meaning. On the other hand, this does not necessarily insure that the other person will come into relationship with the idea in such a way that the interpretation of meaning will be individually accomplished by him. If the second person does not encounter the idea in such a way as to make his own individual interpretation of meaning, it is accurate to say that communication has not actually occurred.

Communication, then, occurs only through experience. Experience is the mode of communication. Communication may take place when two persons express their ideas in spoken

words and sentences. However, what teacher has not had the experience of feeling completely misunderstood or failing to be understood at all. In such instances, we are apt to say, "The lines of communication are befogged" or, "I seem unable to communicate." Pragmaticism sheds light on this dilemma by reminding us that the idea may be adequately spoken. The difficulty lies in the failure of the second person to enter into the experience. This does not absolve the teacher of all responsibility; rather it dramatizes the fact that communication occurs only through experience. Experience is not complete when any one of the three elements, as described by pragmaticism, is absent.

That every idea has its quality, or feeling, has just been discussed in the preceding section. Throughout this study, the Christian faith has been described as the overarching interpretation of meaning of the concepts within it. The beginning point of commitment, volitional resolve, has been described as a part of consciousness. However, the preceding section has emphasized the intensity, or quality, of intellectual concepts which also affects conduct. This is not a contradiction to the pragmaticistic system of thought since feeling is a part of thought. The effects of the thought are a part of the whole conception.

Christian education is concerned with the development of meaningful interpretations, or concepts of Christian faith.

Feelings, as qualities of thought, are equally important to Christian faith as they are to pragmatism. In both cases, intensity of thought plays a significant role in determining conduct. Feelings, as the quality of Christian concepts, have been attributed to be the varying element which produces degrees of Christian commitment.

The establishment of experience as the mode of communication imposes special demands upon communication. Experience must actively involve the subject. In Christian education the subject is a person. The person, as subject, must be more than a passive listener. He must be involved in order to bring his full positive potential to the experience. More than this, he must be an active participant in order to enter into vital relationship with the other subject.

Communication by experience is intellectual. Interpretations of meaning are achieved through cogniton. Therefore, prior conceptions, which are a part of the subject, must confront new ideas. Thus, pragmatism requires that new ideas must be provided in the creation of experience so that new interpretations of meaning may expand present conceptions. Confrontation with new ideas furnishes experience with the element of diversification. Diversification gives to experience the living quality which prevents interpretations of meaning from becoming habitual.

New ideas provide only one way of furnishing experience with a living quality. The diverse nature of experience, which inheres in experience itself, has been elaborated under the principles of tychism. Methods of creating experiences must be varied also to nurture the diversity of communication. Through diversity of experience different minds are able to grasp the same concept but in an individual way which makes individual interpretation possible. Diversity is a quality of both ideas and experience.

Also inherent in the nature of communication by experience is the quality of generality. Pragmaticism terms the general nature of ideas the "embodying spirit". This is interpreted to mean that the origin of ideas cannot be accounted for by any mechanical necessity. The general nature of ideas gives to communication through experience a general nature of both continuity and predictability. Ideas cannot become objects in the same sense as wood and stone are objects. The general nature of ideas causes them to remain ideas and thus they can only communicate conceptions, or hypotheses, of meaning. Through this general nature of ideas, one idea can stimulate the birth of another idea. This provides communicative experience with a continuous and somewhat predictable nature.

The nature of communication is by the involvement of a person in an experience to such an extent as to require

him to make an individual interpretation of meaning. Communication through experience is intellectualistic since interpretations are achieved by persons through cognition. Both the diversity and generality of ideas are retained in the act of communication which gives to communication both creativity and continuity. The quality of intellectual concepts vary so that experiences may be nourished and intensified through the methodology of creating different experiences. The latter fact provides unlimited opportunities for Christian education which always possesses the preconceived purpose of producing and expanding conceptions of Christian faith. Consequently, Christian education is concerned with the communicability of feelings which are qualities of thought.

THE COMMUNICABILITY OF RELIGIOUS FEELINGS

Experience as the method of communication has been set forth in this chapter. Also established is the fact that religious feelings are the quality of intensity embodied in an intellectual concept. Since ideas may be communicated, it is clear that feelings can be communicated through experience also. This is of vital importance to the philosophy of Christian education for two reasons. In the first place, since feelings are a part of thought, communication of ideas always involves the communication of feelings. Thought and

the quality which accompanies it cannot be separated. In the second place, this connection between thought and feeling provides Christian education with the broad opportunity of communicating significant religious feelings at the same time that it seeks cognitive interpretation of meaning.

The quality of conceptions within the Christian faith are of great significance to a pragmatic philosophy of Christian education since feelings effect practical results which are a part of the total conception. In this way the communicability of religious feelings are as much a goal of Christian education as the meaningful interpretation of concepts. The variance of intensity, or degree, which has already been described as a part of the nature of feeling, provides Christian education with the opportunity to intensify religious feelings through communicative experience. Along with this opportunity comes the responsibility to create experiences which will heighten the intensity of religious feelings so that a greater degree of Christian conduct is effected.

The task of Christian education then becomes the communication of religious feelings which effect significant Christian conduct and which are capable of development as are the conceptions of which they are a part.

Communication of religious feelings involves the creation of experiences in which the person, as individual

subject, encounters relationships which produce intense quality as a part of the interpretation of meaning. The inseparability of thought and feeling has been demonstrated throughout the present chapter. Indeed, pragmaticism shows that some feeling is a part of every conception. Therefore, concepts of the Christian faith are certain to embody some feeling, or some degree of intensity within them.

Christian education must recognize this connection as it seeks to communicate Christian meaning. The experiences which are created must give attention to the feeling part of thought and seek to produce feelings of closeness to God. Such feelings produce the kind of volitional resolve and continuing commitment which issues in significant Christian conduct.

Communication of religious feelings is accomplished by Christian experience. Experience, as the mode of communication, demands that a person, as subject, be an active participant in such experiences in order that some interpretation of meaning is achieved. In this way religious feelings can be communicated. Christian experience further demands that one of the subjects with which the person, as subject, comes into relationship is God. We have tended to talk in terms of the concepts of the Christian faith. That the object of such concepts is God, and His Son, Jesus Christ, was set forth in the preceding chapter. However, as has been

stated previously, it is man who believes; therefore, it is the person who possesses Christian faith in God. Pragmatic Christian education is neither presumptive nor remiss when it lays emphasis upon the setting up of experiences for persons. It is the person who experiences and, as a result of these experiences, interprets his own Christian faith in concepts which include feelings as a part of them. Both religious concepts and feeling may be communicated and shared through experience, but as they are interpreted and possessed by one person always remain individual and private.

CHAPTER XXII

THE ATTAINMENT OF TRUTH

The rootage of a vital philosophy of Christian education in pragmaticistic philosophy is dramatically seen in the quest for the attainment of truth. Pragmaticism is a system of philosophical inquiry which seeks attainment of truth. It is founded upon the fact that there exist Reals, which can never be completely known. However, as a system of inquiry, pragmaticism seeks, through the method of experience, the construction of interpretations of meaning which are hypotheses for further experimentation. The truth which pragmaticism seeks, is as accurate a representation as possible by hypotheses of the nature of Reals, or of reality as it actually is.

Christian education is founded also upon the assumption that God, as Ultimate Reality, can never be completely known. However, as a method of inquiry Christian education seeks to help persons, through the method of experience, construct interpretations of meaning about God which become hypotheses for future experience. The truth, which Christian education seeks, is as accurate and complete a representation as possible by hypotheses of the nature of God as the underlying reality of all existence. Christian education seeks

truth about God since it assumes God to be the underlying and Ultimate Reality.

The dual nature of the philosophy of Christian education must be recalled in this connection. A pragmatic philosophy of Christian education seeks truth concerning the most effective methods of communication as it seeks to communicate the true nature of God through Christian experience at the same time. Truth is represented, in both aspects, by hypotheses which are conceptions about reality. The assumption of God as Ultimate Reality gives the Christian no cause for surprise. To assume that a perfect form exists for communication is more startling. As has been suggested before, however, this is the underlying assumption for a pragmatic philosophy of Christian education. Just as man will never perceive the whole nature of God, man will never perceive the perfect form of communication. This does not deter us in our efforts to continue to seek God nor deflect our pursuit toward finding the perfect form of communication.

TRUTH AND REALITY

Truth consists in conceptions about reality. Truth, therefore, is represented by ideas, or hypotheses, about the way things actually are. Reality is the way things actually exist. Hence, reality is beyond truth and is not held to be totally comprehensible by man. Reality remains as it is

regardless of any conceptions about it. Truth lies in the degree of accuracy in which reality is represented by conceptions about it.

With this distinction in mind, we turn now to the movement toward truth which the pragmatic philosophy of Christian education seeks.

Hypotheses arise through the process of abductive reasoning. Abduction produces premises which are suggestions of the way things may be. These suggestions are certain to come into relationship with the hypotheses produced by other persons, and by organized society in general. As a result of this relationship the hypothesis takes on a certain form as the result of a fermentation of ideas. The hypothesis is tested by experience and develops into an hypothesis which contains some degree of truth, or conformity with reality. Both experience and the effect of reality give the hypothesis life. Peirce states the latter fact explicitly when he says that an idea finally reaches "the idea of truth as overwhelmingly forced upon the mind in experience as the effect of an independent reality".[1]

The experiential method provides Christian education with the method whereby hypotheses of the Christian faith may strive toward truth. The presupposition that reality may

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[1] Vol. V, p. 394.

never be completely known prevents inquiry from being closed to itself. Hypotheses, as they are conceived at any one time, are subjected to other hypotheses, as subjects, through future experience. By this method they are validated, altered, or refuted. Each hypothesis is a living conception subject to further experience and new interpretation of meaning. This living, changing aspect of truth is a part of truth itself. It is this changing, evolutionary quality which gives to truth the quality of freedom. Remove the possibility of new interpretation of meanings and truth becomes static, hidebound in a quality of dogmatism.

Christian education is dependent upon the experiential approach to truth for both philosophical and theological reasons. Philosophically, Christian education seeks to implant the desire for truth in the minds of persons. It recognizes that truth, as persons perceive it, is contained in meaningful conceptions which represent the reality of the object of those conceptions, although no conception is regarded to be reality itself. Christian education maintains that the admission of inaccuracy as an element of all conceptions is a part of truth itself. Theologically, Christian education seeks to help persons attain truth about God and His Son, Jesus Christ, as the object of Christian faith. Christian education regards men's conceptions about God incapable of completely understanding and comprehending the

full nature of God, therefore Christian faith must be ever seeking. The result of earnest seeking will be consistent evolvement of changing concepts concerning God's reality. No concept of Christian faith about God changes his Real Nature; God exists as He does regardless of any conception, or group of conceptions, about Him.

A pragmatic philosophy of Christian education regards truth to inhere in hypotheses, or porpositions. Hypotheses are true insofar as they are a true representation of their object. In other words, truth seeks to represent reality. Christian education seeks this kind of truth because it is a demand of both experiential philosophy and the Christian faith itself.

THE NATURE OF CHRISTIAN TRUTH

A proposition is a representation of something real: its object. The Christian faith is the composite interpretation of meaning embracing all the interpretations of meaning of the conceptions which compose it. The object of those conceptions is God as revealed in Jesus Christ. It is accurate, therefore, to speak of the nature of Christian truth. Christian truth consists in propositions which represent God. The existence of God as underlying reality has already been acknowledged as an assumption of Christian education.

Remembering that pragmatic thought maintains that a proposition, or an hypothesis, represents the meaning of the object for which it stands, it can be accurately stated that an hypothesis is induced to some extent by that object. An hypothesis contains truth insofar as it accurately represents its object. This is the nature of truth as held by the philosophy of pragmaticism. The nature of Christian truth, conceived in pragmatic terms, can be similarly stated. Hypotheses of the Christian faith represent the meaning of God as it is held by any one person. These hypotheses are required by God although the interpretations of meaning are cognitive and individual. The hypotheses are true insofar as they represent God as He actually exists. This is the nature of Christian truth.

Two problems arise immediately in this description of Christian truth. First of all, it has been stated at different times throughout this thesis that God cannot be completely known and comprehended by man. The second problem centers about the attitude of Christian truth to the nature of revelation, upon which Christianity depends so much.

The philosophy of Christian education finds significant help in both of these problems from the philosophy of pragmatism. With regard to the first problem, God is considered as a Real and pragmaticism is based upon the premise that Reals are never completely known. This in no way degrades

the use of the word truth for truth inheres in hypotheses which do accurately represent their object. The more important aspect lies in pragmaticism's assertion that confession of error is a part of truth itself. The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education exalts God by asserting that God, as Real, cannot be completely known. It remains true to its own method, also by saying that those hypotheses which we hold as Christian truth include an element of error and are always subject to further experimentation. Pragmatic Christian education is always inquiring; it brings the method of further inquiry through experience to all dogmatic statements regarding the nature of God.

The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education emphasizes the fact of Christian truth through revelation. This is the element of Christian truth which is produced by its object, God. This element gives to God, the quality of Firstness, capable of compelling and determining His own representation. Hypotheses, then, become symbolic expressions of man's cognition of God, as subject. Pragmatic Christian education recognizes God as subject and active in the world, capable of actualizing His own potential.

There is still another significant aspect of Christian truth. Christian truth has been described as inhering in propositions, or hypotheses, of the Christian faith. Furthermore, hypotheses are symbolic expressions of man's cognition

of God. The function of Christian truth is to direct attention of persons, or interpreters, to the object of the propositions within Christian faith. The object, of course, is God. Pragmaticism declares that the purpose of a sign is "to seize its interpreter's eyes and forcibly turn them upon the object meant."[1] The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education not only desires but also depends upon this potent character of Christian truth. The hypotheses of Christian faith constantly direct attention to God as their object. Only in this way can Christian faith be deepened and expanded, and this is the task of Christian education.

METHODS FOR ATTAINING CHRISTIAN TRUTH

The intellectual nature of Christian truth has been seen in the foregoing discussion. That Christian truth inheres in hypotheses, which are cognitive propositions, about the nature of God as their object, has been emphasized. This in no way limits or equates the nature of God with the ideas, or hypotheses, which are held about Him for God is regarded as an external Real that exists as He does regardless of any propositions about Him. All thought about God includes a quality of feeling. Furthermore, a part of the nature of truth is the compulsion which the object of an hypothesis

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[1] Vol. V, p. 391.

forces upon the hypothesis. So long as the hypothesis confesses a degree of inadequacy and inaccuracy which invites further inquiry, the system remains open to the attainment of new truth. In this way the pragmatic system remains true to its own method.

A pragmatic philosophy of Christian education recognizes these three methods for attaining Christian truth: induction, deduction, and retroduction. All three of these are intellectual methods. The methods for attaining Christian truth must necessarily be intellectual since the truth is contained in cognitive hypotheses.

The three steps of colligation, iteration, and erasure are common to all three methods for attaining truth. Colligation is the process of bringing several ideas, as premises, into a single assertion. Iteration is the process of observing repeatedly the various possible effects of the assertion as it relates to other hypotheses. The third step, erasure, is the result of observation. As certain portions of the colligated hypothesis are erased through observation as being inaccurate or impossible, the accuracy or truth of the hypothesis is left clear to be tested by experimentation.

In inductive reasoning the process of colligation is centered upon one instance. Observation, or iteration, is of all the evidence related to the one instance. Through the process of iteration the general hypothesis which is

achieved is applied to a general system through the nature of the one specific instance. In deductive reasoning the process of colligation is more evident since several premises are combined in a single generalized premise. This becomes the subject for iteration and erasure. During iteration observation of as many instances as possible is sought. Through the process of erasure instances which do not conform to the generalized hypothesis are eliminated, or erased, and all instances which remain are utilized to support the consistent operability of the general hypothesis.

Both induction and deduction involve experimentation in the attainment of Christian truth. The pragmatic quality of both methods becomes obvious at once since experiment has been defined earlier as experience. Induction and deduction are applicable, however, when a generalized hypothesis already exists. Experimentation then is able to provide the data whereby the hypothesis is demonstrated to be valid or invalid.

Take, for example, the hypothesis "God is love."[1] Through a deductive process all the instances wherein God's nature might be demonstrated as being that of love are tested and if the nature of God in each instance is that of love, the general hypothesis is considered to be valid or true.

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[1] I John 4:8.

Or through an inductive method, observation of one instance in which the nature of God appears to be that of love causes the general hypothesis that "God is love" to be posed. The inductive method then calls for experimentation in every possible instance where God's nature might be demonstrated as being that of love and every instance where God's nature might be other than love so that the hypothesis might be declared to be valid or invalid.

The value of both deduction and induction can be seen in the experimentation of Christian interpretations of meaning. Both methods deal intellectually with the evidence presented through the process of experimentation. Insofar as experimentation becomes experiences which vitally involve the person, as subject, and force the person to a Christian interpretation of meaning which includes action, both methods are valuable in the attainment of Christian truth. Neither deduction nor induction, however, produces new hypotheses through the contemplation of their object alone. Rather, they deal with the relevant data surrounding hypotheses. Christian truth, in the sense that it is composed of individually interpreted hypotheses, arises from experiences that contemplate the existence of God as Ultimate Reality.

The most important method of attaining Christian truth is the process of retroduction in the pragmatic philosophy of Christian education experiment. Retroduction

always begins with the colligation of a variety of separate premises about their object. The process of iteration may or may not occur. For any single experience is not concerned about recurrence in the immediate instance of experience. The process of erasure becomes more a result of the experience than an element of the logical process itself, for the experience involves a surrender to the force of the meaning which is conveyed by the generalized idea. The surrender is to the insistent idea whose force is garnered from contemplation of the idea's object. Thus, the idea is so fortified by the compulsion of its object that the concluding hypothesis must be reached. Because of its object, the force of the idea is so strong that no other conclusion could be reached. Pragmaticistic thought described the result of retroduction as irresistible and imperative and says of the hypothesis: "We must throw open our gates and admit it at any rate for the time being."[1]

Through the method of retroduction, persons contemplate the object of the hypothesis "God is Love." The hypothesis may arise through colligation since many factors may be present in the birth of the hypothesis. However, the force of the hypothesis is not dependent upon the processes employed in deduction and induction. The insistence of the

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[1] Vol. V, p. 405.

idea contained in the hypothesis causes one to surrender to the compelling force of God, as the object of the hypothesis, and through the experience of surrender one emerges from the experience saying that this hypothesis, "God is love", is true. The evidence is in the experience and not dependent upon the data of experimentation in all cases. This is the kind of attainment of Christian truth which a pragmatic philosophy of Christian education seeks. Reason and experiment are present, to be sure, but the truth lies in the personal experience with the object of the hypothesis. This is the truth of personal Christian experience which can be verified only by the experience. This kind of Christian truth cannot be transmitted. It can be affirmed and somewhat explained. Christian education seeks to provide the experiences which will lead persons to retroductive experience. In the last analysis, however, it is the compelling force of the object which effects the attainment of this kind of Christian truth. And in the personal conception of the hypothesis, as an interpretation of meaning which represents the real nature of God, can Christian truth be said to exist. This is not meant to imply that truth cannot be shared by different persons. Rather, it affirms the basic tenet of the pragmatic method, that truth is contained in propositions which conform to the nature of Reals, and that hypotheses are individual interpretations of meaning.

Communication is through the media of experience, as was emphasized in the preceding chapter. Christian education seeks to communicate Christian truth through retroductive experience. This kind of experience brings persons into personal contemplation of the object of all the hypotheses contained in Christian faith. At the same time, it provides the personal nature of Christian faith which must be maintained if Christian faith is to affect the conduct of the believer. All this must be included in the nature of Christian education.

The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education attempts to help persons attain Christian truth as they express their individual Christian faith. One final aspect of the nature of Christian truth must be mentioned, or its basic assumption to the attainment of truth may be forgotten. A pragmatic philosophy of Christian education declares that the most valuable thing about truth is the quest for truth. The will to learn is prerequisite for learning. In the area of Christian truth, only the desire to attain Christian truth can result in attainment of it by any of the methods named herein. Only as persons seek can that faith which is already held, be enlarged and expanded. The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education must always seek to provide the motivation for the quest for truth.

Division F

THE PURPOSE OF CHRISTIAN EDUCATION

CHAPTER XXIII

MAKING CHRISTIAN CONCEPTIONS CLEAR

The words "the task of Christian education" and "the concern of Christian education" have been used frequently throughout the latter part of this study. This is deemed essential in order to set forth, to any satisfactory degree, the structure and the nature of Christian education. It has been stated in the sections dealing with the structure of Christian education that Christian education seeks to provide meaning for intellectual concepts. Christian education is concerned with the interpretation of meaning which is made of each and every experience. The task of Christian education has been defined as making sure that such significant symbols of the Christian faith as God, Jesus, Holy Spirit, sin, agape, and reconciliation convey meaning to the interpreter. Furthermore, the pragmatic quality of this task is to effect Christian faith in the lives of those who do not already believe and to expand and deepen faith when it already exists.

Under the general heading of the nature of Christian education it was seen that Christian education is a method of inquiry which seeks to communicate Christian faith at the same time that it inquires of its own effectiveness. Meaningful concepts of Christian faith are constructed upon prior

meanings held by the person, therefore Christian education is concerned with both persons and the faith which they hold. That God exists is assumed; the nature of Christian education is the process through which persons come to believe in this underlying reality and to commit their lives to Jesus Christ, as the Son of God and man's personal Savior.

Numerous rootages for a philosophy of Christian education in the pragmaticistic philosophy have been pointed out in the preceding chapters. In brief and summarizing fashion these several rootages can be stated in these two general premises. The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education includes in the total conception of it its effects, specifically, whether or not Christian faith is produced, and if so, the kind of Christian faith that it is. This is the first criterion of pragmatic Christian education. The second premise of the pragmatic philosophy of Christian education is that individual Christian faith includes in its total conception the effects of that faith, or the conduct which expression of the Christian faith demands. Both premises are applied to the philosophy of Christian education; however, the second one, in its strictest sense, is the pragmatic quality of Christian faith itself. Since Christian education is concerned not only with the production of Christian faith where it does not already exist but also with the kind of Christian faith held by persons, the two premises are

inseparably linked in such a way that the philosophy of Christian education must always consider them together.

We turn now to the purpose of Christian education. The purpose of Christian education is found in the dual nature of the pragmatic quality of Christian education stated above. The purpose of Christian education is seen, in a general way, to be two-fold: (1) Christian education seeks to establish belief in God and Jesus Christ, and (2) it seeks to make the conceptions of that belief clear and meaningful. Consideration of the first purpose of Christian education, that of fixing belief or producing Christian faith, will be given in the final chapter. Here, attention is centered upon the second aspect of the pragmatic quality, described as the conduct demanded by a meaningful Christian faith.

Emphasis upon a meaningful Christian faith focuses attention upon the necessity for clarity of Christian conceptions. Only as conceptions are made clear do they possess significant meaning. Therefore, the Christian faith, as the overarching interpretation of meaning of all concepts contained within it, is made significantly meaningful only as the individual conceptions become clear.

Pragmaticistic thought has different ways of expressing the importance of clarity of thought. Dr. Peirce, in one place, emphasizes that the sole end of inquiry is

"the settlement of opinion".[1] At another time he stresses that clarity of conceptions is the first lesson which logic should teach.[2] That clarity of thought is essential to significant thought is expressed through these words of his: "To know what we think, to be masters of our own meaning, will make a solid foundation for great and weighty thought."[3] A pragmatic philosophy of Christian education is rooted in all of these various expressions. Christian education seeks clarity of Christian conceptions to settle opinion, regards it as the first lesson from logic, and conceived clarity as the cornerstone for all significant thought. Christian education emphasizes the last necessity for clarity of conceptions. Clarity of Christian conceptions is essential for Christian faith to have meaning. Clear meaning gives to faith a living and developing quality, and it also gives to the person who holds faith the whole purpose and direction for his life.

CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS

The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education recognizes the difference between clearness and distinctness of ideas which pragmaticism makes. An idea becomes distinct when it can be defined precisely in abstract terms. An idea

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[1] Vol. V, p. 232. [2] Vol. V, p. 251. [3] *Ibid.*

is clearly perceived when it leads to the stable establishment of beliefs. The distinctness of an idea simply involves the definition of terms within the conception; it does not lead to a conviction which states that an idea means one thing or another.

Christian education does not ignore the distinctness of an idea. Christian education, however, is concerned with attaining clarity of ideas, as it is regarded in pragmaticistic thought. An idea which becomes clear contains the conviction that an idea contains a certain representation. It has withstood all doubt which would cloud its certainty and remains as a stable belief. Although pragmaticism, as it provides the words of doubt and belief, does not limit their connotation to religious usage , Christian education is concerned with using them in the usual connotation of religious ideas.

The significant thing to remember is that pragmatic Christian education seeks the clarification of ideas to the extent that conviction is included within the idea. In this way beliefs are established. Christian education seeks the stable establishment of beliefs because belief issues in action. Action is the effect of Christian beliefs. Thus, the pragmatic quality of Christian faith is effected. The next question, which must be considered, is: how the stable establishment of beliefs is attained.

STEPS TO BELIEF

Consistent reference in this study to Christian faith as the overarching interpretation of meaning uniting the interpretations of meaning of all conceptions contained within it emphasizes the intellectualistic nature of Christian faith. A meaningful Christian faith is derived from thought process. The continuous quality of Christian faith has been referred to as conscious awareness, or the continuous quality of consciousness as it proceeds through time. The object of faith is God, and when we speak of Christian faith, as is done here, the revelation of God through Jesus Christ must always be included as a part of the object of Christian faith. This definition of Christian faith can borrow a timely illustration from pragmaticistic writings to demonstrate the continuous quality of Christian faith while, at the same time, it is composed of individual interpretations of meaning. Faith is the melody of Christian expression composed of individual interpretations of meaning just as a musical melody is made up of individual notes.

The purpose of thought about God, and Jesus Christ, is to produce Christian faith. The beginning point of Christian faith has already been described as the volitional area of consciousness. Since volitional resolve represents the achievement of thought, faith can be called thought-at-rest.

As Christian faith it represents a resolute belief. Indeed, it is resolute because it is firm and fixed; by its own nature, however, it is a living entity, a "First" which is capable of producing new interpretation of meaning. In this way, faith is capable of coming into relationship with other subjects, and as new interpretations of meaning are achieved, alters itself as subject.

Because resolute belief is regarded by a pragmatic philosophy of Christian education as subject, it is capable of producing action. This aspect of Christian faith will be considered in detail in the concluding chapter. It is sufficient to say here that Christian faith is the link between thought and action.

The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education recognizes two steps to the establishment of belief. First, there must be on the part of each person who establishes resolute belief, an awareness of an hypothesis which must be interpreted in some way. It must be either believed or refuted. Secondly, the irritation of doubt surrounding the hypothesis must be overcome as completely as possible. Doubt is the stimulus for the experimental method which eventually leads to belief or refutation.

Belief, or Christian faith, is the result of intellectual activity. A person, as subject, encounters an hypothesis. It may have been formualted by the person himself,

or it may exist as the resultant interpretation of meaning from another person's experience, or from the experience of a group of persons. In any case the person, as subject, comes into conscious relationship with it. This represents the first step to belief - the conscious awareness of an hypothesis. The conscious awareness of an hypothesis stimulates experimentation with the hypothesis and an individual interpretation of meaning. It is fallacious to assert that the awareness of an hypothesis demands or requires experimentation. A person often encounters an idea and does nothing with it. The conscious encounter with an hypothesis, however, implies that the person is motivated to deal with it in some way; hence, the area of experimentation is entered. Experimentation must be accomplished if an interpretation of meaning is to be possessed individually by the encountering person.

The individuality of the person, as encountering subject, will be a part of the personal interpretation of meaning. This first step of attaining belief, however, is universal. It involves the employment of the hypothesis, the experimentation or testing of it, and the resultant interpretation of meaning, the latter becoming a new hypothesis to be consciously encountered and the same process repeated.

Pragmatic Christian education is dependent upon this step to the attainment of Christian belief. The person, as subject, encounters hypotheses consciously, experiments with

them to establish their validity or invalidity, and arrives at his own individual interpretation of meaning which becomes a new hypothesis to be tested by the same method. This is the first step to Christian faith as resolute belief. Lest it be forgotten, the emphasis, which pragmatic Christian education makes upon the compelling action of the object upon all hypotheses about it, needs to be recalled in this connection. The compulsion of God, as the object of all hypotheses of Christian faith, is included in the symbolic nature of the hypothesis. In the first step to belief, it is an element within the hypothesis of which the person, as subject, becomes consciously aware.

The dyadic nature of existence, as conceived by pragmaticism, was discussed in Chapter Five of this treatise. For resolute belief to exist there must be present in the belief some overcoming of doubt. Belief and doubt are dyadic since they exist as individual subjects, but have their being only in connection with each other. The second step to Christian belief is the overcoming of doubt so that belief is resolute, unclouded with doubt. This is the attainment of belief which corresponds to clear conceptions of Christian faith. Clarity of conceptions produces truth and the settlement of opinion.

Doubt represents the motivation in the struggle to attain belief. It stimulates the consistent process of

testing described in the first step to belief. Thus, the second step to belief is the perpetual experimentation of hypotheses which are consciously encountered. This is the way in which doubt is consistently overcome and resolute Christian belief established. The second step to belief is the continuous process of the first step; but it is sufficiently distinct as to accurately be called the second step. Doubt challenges all hypotheses of belief. Only as the process of experimentation is continued can new interpretations of meaning be made which conquer doubt and lack of clarity.

One of the purposes of Christian education is to produce ideas which are sufficiently clear to become resolute beliefs. Belief is the soil for action and the living vital quality of belief is evidenced by the Christian conduct which it effects. The next question is: is clarity a constant quality, or are there levels of clarity in conceptions?

ATTAINING CLARITY OF IDEAS

As has been seen in the preceding section, ideas are made clear through the process of experimentation, or testing of hypotheses through experience. Through this method, interpretations of meaning become free from doubt and become established as stable beliefs. Christian faith is composed of stable beliefs about God and Jesus Christ. This kind of Christian faith effects Christian conduct.

The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education recognizes three grades of clarity. The first level is termed familiarity, the second level is called reflection, and the third level is referred to as argumentation.

The first grade of clarity, that of familiarity, is achieved through unquestioned understanding. That is to say, an idea is so clear from frequent usage that the validity of the idea is never doubted. To choose an example within the framework of Christian faith, the hypothesis "God is love" serves as a striking one. Because it is the definition of God so often used with children, it represents the level of familiarity. It is also the definition for God utilized in catechetical and confirmation textbooks. This hypothesis becomes to many persons an idea which is clear through frequent usage as the definition of God. The kind of love meant in the hypothesis is not questioned, nor is the matter of whether this hypothesis represents a total description of God. It is the level of an unquestioned idea that attains meaning and clarity to the interpreter through frequent usage.

Reflection is the second level of clarity. It is at this level that interpretations of meaning of reality are expressed in abstract terms. The truth or falsity of the idea contained in the interpretation is not questioned at this level. At this point, reflection is the same as the first level of familiarity. The second level is distinguished from

the first level, however, by the fact that some reflective thought has gone into the expression. Through reflection the definition is a conscious attempt to describe something which is real in abstract terms.

The same hypothesis, "God is love", can be used to illustrate the second degree of clarity possessed by ideas. If response to the question of what is the nature of God is a reflective one, and this represents an attempt to put into abstract terms the nature of God, as reality, it represents the second level of a clear idea. There is no experimentation present at this level which attempts to prove or disprove the idea. There is simply the reflective quality which expresses that love must be the nature of God.

At the third level of clarity of ideas, argument, there is serious concern that the interpretation of meaning conveyed by the idea be as accurate a representation of the real object, which it represents, as possible. This is the level at which ideas are rendered clear by the meaning which they contain. Included in the meaning are the practical effects of the conception. This involves careful experimentation, or argumentation, to test the idea for its degree of truth or falseness. Since the effects of the idea are included as a part of the total meaning of the idea, it is at this level that ideas become sufficiently clear to become stable beliefs. As has been emphasized earlier in this

chapter, beliefs are the connection between thought and action.

The third level of clarity, argumentation, is the degree of clarity in Christian faith which a pragmatic philosophy of Christian education seeks to establish. The hypothesis, "God is love", assumes a new level of clarity because the idea that God is love means that He loves me. Furthermore, the idea conveys the meaning that because He loves me, I respond with love. Included, then, in the idea that God is love are the practical effects of our love for God expressed in the words of Jesus:

> You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind. This is the great and first commandment. And a second is like it, You shall love your neighbor as yourself.[1]

The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education ever pursues the purpose of making ideas so clear that stable Christian beliefs, which require action, are established. Whether we turn to the teachings of Jesus, or to the philosophical writings of Charles Sanders Peirce, the linkage between Christian faith and its effects is clearly seen. The maxim of pragmatism furnishes a potent root for Christian education when it seriously tries to produce a meaningful Christian faith which issues in Christian conduct.

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[1] Matthew 22: 37-39.

> Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.[1]

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[1] Vol. V, p. 258.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE FIXING OF BELIEF

Jesus taught his disciples with these cogent words, "Not everyone who says to me 'Lord, Lord', shall enter the kingdom of heaven, but he who does the will of my Father who is in heaven."[1] The emphasis of Christian faith in this teaching is clearly upon doing, or action. The second purpose of Christian education is the firm fixing of belief so that Christian conduct will become habitual in the lives of persons.

The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education maintains that Christian action issues from the Christian faith as it is held. More than this, the action is included in the total conception of Christian faith. Christian education seeks to effect in persons a Christian faith which is more than an affirmation of "Lord, Lord"; it seeks the kind of Christian faith which compels the doing of "the will of my Father".

Christian education has been presented throughout these pages as a method of finding more effective ways of communicating Christian experience as it ever seeks to

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[1] Matthew 7:21.

communicate Christian experience in the process. The philosophy upon which Christian education is constructed must ever keep this dual nature of Christian education in mind. The first aspect, that of finding more effective ways of communication, has as its laboratory the second aspect, the communication of Christian experience to persons. If Christian faith is not effected in the lives of persons, the way of communication must be altered. Furthermore, if the kind of Christian faith effected does not result in Christian conduct, then a more effective way of communication must be sought. This is the negative manner of saying that Christian education finds the roots for its effectiveness in pragmatic philosophy. It is valuable because it dramatizes the inquiring nature of Christian education. Christian education inquires after more effective ways of communication at the same time that it inquires after the true meaning of the object, God as revealed in Christ, of Christian faith.

Christian education seeks to produce meaningful Christian conceptions. The general unifying meaning of these various conceptions can be called a Christian faith. The meaning is achieved through intellectual process, therefore Christian faith can be said to be cognitive, or rational. Included in all thought is its quality, or feeling. Experience, as the unit of learning from which meanings are derived, becomes the method of experimentation for all

conceptions as well as the mode of communication of preconceived meanings. The nature of Christian education demands that meanings attain the most accurate representation of reality as possible. The purposes of Christian education are to clarify conceptions so that stable belief is established and the fixing of belief so firmly that Christian conduct becomes the norm, or the habit, of the faithful person.

The intellectualistic nature of Christian education was set forth early in the presentation. The sole purpose of thought is evident. It is the fixing of Christian faith, or belief. Faith has been described as thought-at-rest. This hyphenated word seems adequate to describe the arena which is built by thought, but at the same time, furnishes the ground in which action is rooted and the space in which action can occur. Belief is not a passive arena; rather, it is the solid soil which determines action. The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education affirms the definition of belief phrased by Dr. Peirce:

> It is the demi-cadence which closes a musical phrase in the symphony of our intellectual life. . . . it has three properties; First, it is something that we are aware of; second, it appeases the irritation of doubt; and third, it involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action, or, say for short, a habit.[1]

The first property of belief, as it is described here, is

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[1] Vol. V, p. 255.

seen in the place which cognition occupies in this pragmatic philosophy of Christian education. The overcoming of doubt was discussed in the preceding chapter as the second step in attaining clarity of conceptions. We turn now to the third property of belief, that of establishing a rule of action in the nature of persons.

METHODS OF FIXING BELIEF

Pragmaticistic thought describes four methods by which belief is fixed. These are the methods of tenacity, authority, *a priori*, and science. The method which pragmaticism finds satisfactory and claims for its own method is the method of scientific inquiry. The scientific method has as its goal the attainment of truth concerning things as they really exist, or reality.

The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education depends upon the method of fixing belief which pragmaticism terms the scientific method. So identified with pragmatism has this method become that it can accurately be called the pragmatic method. The method may be described briefly in this way: truth consists of interpretations of meaning contained in propositions which represent reality as accurately as possible, each such proposition is an hypothesis subject to further experimentation, the method of experimentation is through experience which includes one subject in relation

to other subjects resulting in a new interpretation of meaning, and, finally, the real object of a proposition, as subject exerts a compulsion into the experience by its own quality of Firstness.

Christian education, which is pragmatic, strives to fix belief by the scientific, or pragmatic, method. It seeks to attain belief by cognitive interpretations of meaning, derived from experience which utilizes all the data relevent to the experience. It states these interpretations of meaning in hypotheses which are an earnest attempt at truth, but always confess an element of inaccuracy. Furthermore, Christian education attempts to create experiences which induce interpretations of meaning by considering the object of Christian faith, the object being God and His revelation in Christ. Christian education depends upon the compulsion of the object of Christian faith in the fixing of belief. This compulsion is represented by the action of God through the Holy Spirit.

The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education admits that, in the last analysis, beliefs are fixed by the permanency of God's reality and His compulsive action. The rootage for Christian education in pragmaticistic philosophy becomes evident again in this premise. Christian faith is an act of man; the conceptions which compose Christian faith are intellectual; Christian faith consists in hypotheses which

represent the reality of God; Christian faith is compelled by the nature of God, as revealed through Christ, rather than by the method of Christian education as the creation and effort of human persons.

This attitude does not minimize the role of Christian education in any way. The attitude represents the expression of a person who has already found the Christian faith to be the most satisfying and adequate response to reality. This response includes within it a certain conclusion achieved in time past, or the Christian point of view. The element of preconceived point of view present in all Christian education has been confessed previously in these pages. Christian education remains significant because it recognizes and depends upon the act of God in the final fixing of belief. Christian education has as its purpose the fixing of belief by preparing the person for this final kind of certain belief. It is accurate, therefore, to speak of Christian education as a method of effecting Christian faith, and of expanding and deepening Christian faith when it is already held by persons.

The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education regards the purpose of Christian education as being to fix belief through inquiry about God's reality and nature and experience with Him. The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education emphasizes that the purpose of Christian education is not to transmit an exposition of the reality and nature of God.

Rather, persons must be helped to seek after God through personal experience, make interpretations of meaning personally, and thus be prepared to come to the compelling nature of God's act. In this way, God's possibility is actualized in each person who inquires after a meaningful Christian faith.

It must readily be admitted that the pragmatic method in Christian education is based upon the existance of the reality of God. A previous chapter was devoted exclusively to this assumption. If the question, how is God known to be real?, remains, a paraphrase of Dr. Peirce's philosophical explanation of the existence of Reals may be helpful. In the first place, investigation and experience have not settled conclusively that God does not exist as reality. Secondly, religious hypotheses concerning the existence and nature of God are an historical fact. In other words, the social impulse is toward the existence of God as underlying reality. In the third place, many persons use the experiential, or pragmatic, method as the basis for their belief in God and only cease to use it when they do not know how to apply it. Fourthly, experience with the pragmatic method has shown that it has led to the establishment of stable Christian faith in the lives of many persons.

The most adequate and accurate method of fixing belief in the method of Christian education is the pragmatic method. Pragmatic philosophy terms it the scientific method.

In brief, it is the method of personal experience. These words about experience as "our great teacher"[1] by Dr. Peirce will be recalled in this connection: "She says, 'Open your mouth and shut your eyes and I'll give you something to make you wise'; and thereupon she keeps her promise, and seems to take her pay in the fun of tormenting us."[2]

Another important question remains. Is the pragmatic method of fixing belief the only one which a pragmatic philosophy of Christian education recognizes? The precise answer is, No; it does recognize the methods of tenacity, authority, and *a priori*. However, a pragmatic philosophy of Christian education does not seek to propagate these methods of fixing belief. It seeks to induce and develop Christian faith by the pragmatic method. Hence, Christian education advocates, and seeks to live by, the pragmatic method. As the method of Christian education seeks to effect its purpose of fixing stable Christian belief, however, it must deal with the tenacious, authoritarian, and *a priori* methods.

The pragmatic method of Christian education will doubtless crash headlong into the method of fixing belief by tenacity. This results in the adoption of a conclusion and maintaining it in spite of contrary evidence which may be purported. The common term for the person whose belief

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[1] Vol. V, p. 37. [2] *Ibid.*

is fixed this way is dogmatist. The dogmatist is careful to preserve his answer in two ways. First, he clings to his answer by dwelling on the evidence which does support it. And second, he exerts effort to keep from his view any evidence which might disturb the answer or position which he already holds. If neither of these seem completely adequate, he may scorn at any other method of ascertaining an answer. Often this takes a form of scorning at so-called "new" ideas. To involve this kind of person in Christian experience requires much skill for the Christian educator, and it may be added, also infinite patience.

A pragmatic philosophy of Christian education has no room for the authoritarian method of fixing belief. The pragmatic approach of Christian education presented herein has reiterated many times that a Christian faith which is meaningful to the person is one which is individually interpreted since all interpretation of meaning is individual. This does not preclude consideration of the interpretations of meaning made by other persons, or groups of persons, throughout history. Education seeks to bring all relevant conceptions, as well as other persons, into relationship with the subject in a learning experience. Pragmatic Christian education emphasizes, however, that meaning which is significant must be the result of individual experience and the resultant individual interpretation of meaning. By this method blind

acceptance of beliefs from any authority, be it another person, a group of persons, an institution, or a civil entity, is not only discouraged, but is rendered impossible. The pragmatic method of Christian education does not automatically condemn all conceptions held by authoritative sources, but it does condemn the individual's acceptance of them without individual experience and interpretation of meaning.

The last method for fixing belief recognized, but not advocated, by the pragmatic philosophy of Christian education is the a priori method. Stated briefly, this method fixes belief through the acceptance of that which can be believed naturally. This method of fixing belief is unsatisfactory to pragmatic Christian education because it makes man's conception of any reality reality itself. Obviously, this represents a fallacious method of fixing belief in God for pragmatic Christian education. God, or any other real existent, remains as it exists regardless of man's conceptions of it. The a priori method may lead to true induction, which is not to be totally condemned, but that induction does not produce meaningful hypotheses of reality has already been pointed out.

With this bold plea for the pragmatic method of fixing Christian belief, let us turn to the nature of belief itself.

THE NATURE OF BELIEF

Belief has been defined as thought-at-rest, the stadium built by thought and the arena which gives rise to action. As the link between a meaningful Christian faith and significant Christian conduct, its central place in the pragmatic philosophy of Christian education is obvious. Belief constitutes the connection for the whole of the conception since it joins a concept with the effects which are produced by belief in the concept.

Christian faith, or belief, in this way is regarded as subject, and possesses the same three modes of being possessed by all subjects - firstness, secondness, and thirdness.

In its first mode of being, Christian faith is a quality of positive potential. It is an intellectual quality since it is produced through cognition. It has feeling, or intensity, as a quality of its cognitive interpretation. The hypotheses of Christian faith have been compelled by its object, God as revealed in Jesus Christ. As a first, or positive potential, Christian faith is capable of coming into relationship with other subjects and becoming actualized. It may affect the person who holds it. It may affect other beliefs held by that person. It may affect other persons. Christian faith, as a first, is capable of affecting new

interpretations of meaning which arise out of succeeding experiences. It will most certainly affect the conduct of the person in whose life it is a subject. In these ways Christian faith, in its first mode of being, is capable of actualizing itself.

As a subject, Christian faith comes into relationship with other subjects. This comprises its second mode of being. Christian faith may come into relation with other kinds of beliefs, with the person who holds it as the source of action, or with other persons. One of the most obvious areas of relationship within Christian living is the relationship of Christian faith to conduct. As a way of life Christianity constantly requires that faith must express itself in works. The teachings of Jesus are explicit in that "Christians are known by their fruits." Through relationship Christian faith, as subject, is capable of being affected by other subjects as equally as it may affect them.

Relationship can be said to be the tension of Christian living. One pole is represented by a Christian faith which is so vital and meaningful that Christian conduct is demanded. The other pole is the constant correlation of conduct with the concepts of a dynamic Christian faith as they are cognitively interpreted. The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education holds that this is the basic dyadic nature of Christian living. Therefore, the development of

Christian faith is a constant and continuous effort. The developmental nature of Christian faith is more adequately seen and understood when it is regarded as a subject, as the term is applied in pragmatic philosophy, with its categories of firstness, secondness, and thirdness.

Belief's third mode of being is seen by the interpretation of meaning which it represents. The extent to which Christian belief can be said to be true consists in the degree to which conception represents reality. The meaning of Christian faith, however, inheres in the action which it produces. The pragmatic philosophy of Christian education regards the effects of any conception a part of the total meaning of that conception.

The purpose of Christian education is to develop in persons the kind of Christian faith which recognizes the practical results of faith as a part of faith. Further, Christian education seeks to make the awareness of this linkage conscious and habitual. If awareness of the linkage between conceptions and actions resides in the conscious awareness of the believer, he is provided with a basis for the conscious effort to "do the will of my Father". If this conscious effort reaches the level of habit, the person is ever cognizant of God as the ruler of all life, His spirit present in all of life's experiences. Then, in experiences of both distress and exultation, the person is

able to pray, in the words of Jesus, "not as I will, but as thou wilt."[1]

THE NATURE OF HABIT

Christian education seeks the establishment of stable Christian faith which becomes the habit of persons, habitual in Christian living. This includes habitual interpretations of meaning and habitual conduct for the dyadic manner in which the two are joined has been discussed in the foregoing section.

Christian education has been presented as a method of intellectual inquiry. The nature of habit is applied to the intellectual processes of Christian faith by the pragmatic philosophy of Christian education. Christian education utilizes habit in the same way as pragmaticistic philosophy. Pragmaticism states it in these words, "When we think we are conscious that a connection between feelings is determined by a general rule, we are aware of being governed by a habit."[2]

The general rule which Christian education seeks to effect is that the thought of every person be governed by cognition of God as Lord of all life. This kind of habit may produce different interpretations of meaning as the result

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[1] Matthew 26:39.

[2] Vol. VI, p. 19.

of individual experiences. And, as it has been seen, each interpretation of meaning will issue in its resultant conduct. The habit of the Christian faith, however, will include the reality of God and His will for man in all the experiences of life which man encounters. This is the general rule which Christian education seeks to have dominate the intellectual activity of every person. Then, will Christian faith be resolute belief, fixed always upon God as revealed in Jesus Christ. Also, then, will Christian faith be the growing, developing subject, deepened and expanded by each of life's experiences, which continuously fixes belief in God as the underlying reality of all existence and the object of Christian faith.

CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions of the thesis provide the structure for a philosophy of Christian education which, it is believed, can be effective in helping persons to develop a vital faith in God as revealed through Jesus Christ. The teachings of Jesus require the expression of Christian faith, once it is affirmed. This is the pragmatic quality of Christian faith.

The Christian educational philosophy advocated herein is an humble attempt to recognize the conduct which is demanded by Christian faith and to root this philosophy firmly in the thorough philosophical system of pragmatism which consistently recognizes the practical effects of its conceptions as a part of total conceptions. The thesis that effective Christian education is pragmatic is demonstrated through the format of the dissertation and utilization of pragmaticistic terminology as well as the development of the textual material. The following summary of conclusions is included here that the rootages for a philosophy of Christian education in pragmaticism may be graphically seen.

The pragmaticistic philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce is summarized under twelve general headings.

1. Pragmaticism is a method of philosophical inquiry rather than a completed philosophical system. It does not

propose to determine final truth and then defend its position. Rather, pragmaticism is a system of thought which seeks to "ascertain the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts."

2. The combination of "common sensism" and scientific inquiry, which permeates every facet of Peirce's thought, gives ample evidence that it is an intellectualistic system. Meanings are derived cognitively from experience. Interpretations of meaning are intellectual conceptions in the mind of the interpreter.

3. Emphasis is placed upon individual interpretations of meaning. An interpretation of meaning becomes a subject possessing three modes of being: Firstness, the positive potential possibility; Secondness, the relationship of one subject to another; and Thirdness, the connectional interpretation of meaning resulting from the interaction of subjects in relationship. The goal of philosophical inquiry is the achievement of interpretation of meaning.

4. Cognitive thought is symbolical since every cognition represents an interpretation of meaning derived from experience. Signs are of three types: Icons, which stand for something else simply by the nature of their quality; Indices, which indicate the objects for which they stand by similarity or reference to their objects; and Signs, which

have meaning regardless of any similarity or factual connection with their object.

5. Pragmaticistic philosophy is based upon the relational nature of existence. Pragmaticism asserts that all existence is dyadic. The relational nature of existence is seen through sensational experience, conscious awareness, and in the area of human volition.

6. Pragmaticism recognizes the general operability of two laws, synechism and tychism. The philosophical system of inquiry is constructed upon these principles of continuity and chance, which are seen in all existence but are especially applicable to the realm of ideas. Synechism, the law of continuity, and tychism, the principle of chance, are regarded as existential factors of the universe by pragmaticism.

7. Hypotheses are intellectual conceptions which can be tested by experience for their validity or invalidity. Both deduction and induction are dependable types of reasoning in pragmaticism; however, abductive reasoning is the most important type of reasoning since abduction produces hypotheses.

8. The entire method of pragmatism, as conceived by Peirce, presupposes the existence of an underlying reality. He consistently refers to this as God. Peirce defines the universe as a vast representation of God's purpose which works itself out in living realities. Pragmaticism regards

faith in God as a great deal more than mere affirmation of belief in the existence of God. Religion is held to be a way of life in which belief becomes a living belief and includes the conduct effected by belief in God.

9. Thought contains three elements: representation, relation, and quality. The quality of thought is its intensity which is called feeling. Feeling is cognitive not only because it is a part of thought but also because it is predicated upon prior feelings. In this latter aspect, feelings are intellectually cognized in consciousness. Feelings are communicable because qualities of thought can be shared.

10. Pragmaticism, as philosophical inquiry, seeks the attainment of truth. Truth inheres in hypotheses. An hypothesis can be called true in the extent to which it represents the true nature of Real objects. Truth is distinguished from reality in that truth is contained in conceptions; reality is the way things exist regardless of any conceptions about it. Truth is attained through experimentation and is represented in hypotheses. An important factor in the attainment of truth is the compelling action of the object of an hypothesis upon the formulation of the hypothesis.

11. The purpose of pragmaticism is two-fold. First, pragmaticistic inquiry seeks to make conceptions clear. The

method of inquiry provides the means by which interpretations of meaning are as true as possible so that further experimentation is scientifically accurate and meaningful. In this way doubt is overcome.

12. Secondly, pragmaticistic thought leads to the development of stable beliefs. Belief is the area of thought-at-rest and is the source of all action. Belief is produced by intellectual cognition and issues in conduct. It is at this point that the pragmatic maxim, "consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object", asserts itself with significant meaning.

The pragmatic roots for a philosophy of Christian education are seen to be:

1. Christian education is regarded as a method of inquiry. It seeks to find more effective ways of communicating Christian experience as it ever seeks to communicate Christian experience in the process.

2. The intellectual dimension of Christian education is apparent in that all concepts which compose the Christian faith of each person are interpretations of meaning, resulting from experience and achieved through the process of thought. That Christian interpretations of meaning must

include the conduct required by them is consistent with the teaching of Jesus, "You will know them by their fruits."

3. Christian education strives to effect Christian interpretations of meaning as a result of experience. It attempts to fill the interpretations of meaning which result from experience with the recognition of God's real existence. More than this, Christian education seeks to create experiences which are especially designed to effect a Christian interpretation of meaning.

4. Concepts of the Christian faith are expressed in symbolic language. Christian education is concerned that the development of Christian concepts reach toward interpretations which are meaningful to the person and the nature of God as He really exists.

5. The development of Christian concepts through experience is possible because man exists in relation to the world as he encounters it.

6. Christian education utilizes the law of synechism. Interpretations of meaning are cumulative and general in nature because prior interpretations of meaning are present in the first mode of being. Christian education is tychistic because the principle of chance, or variety, is inherent in experience.

7. Suggestions of the way God's reality may actually exist are produced by abductive reasoning.

8. Christian education assumes the existence of God as underlying reality. It does not seek primarily to prove the existence of God. Rather, Christian education seeks to lead persons into meaningful experiences with God through these three universes of experience: ideas, facts, and connections of faith and conduct.

9. Religious feelings, as qualities of thought, are communicable through experience.

10. Christian education seeks the attainment of Christian truth. It seeks to help persons construct interpretations of meaning which are as accurate and complete representations of the real nature of God as possible.

11. Christian education seeks to make conceptions of the Christian faith sufficiently clear so that they will become stable beliefs.

12. The ultimate purpose of Christian education is the fixing of belief in God, as revealed through Jesus Christ, in such a way that Christian conduct is demanded by the belief. In this way Christian faith becomes pragmatic and cognizant of the criterion set forth in Jesus' teaching, "Not everyone who says to me 'Lord, Lord,' shall enter the kingdom of heaven, but he who does the will of my Father who is in heaven."

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